2014 Annual Conference Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy

4-6 December, 2014

Australian Catholic University

Melbourne Campus

ACU School of Philosophy
115 Victoria Parade, Fitzroy VIC 3065, Australia
www.acu.edu.au/philosophy

Contents

Welcome	3
Acknowledgements & Thanks	4
Hosts	5
Conference Events	6
Conference Schedule	8
Keynote Speakers	10
Paper Abstracts	14
Thematic Panels	84
Book Panels	94
Professional Development & Discussion Panels	99
Practical Matters	100

Welcome

On behalf of the 2014 ASCP Conference Organising Committee, I would like to extend a very warm welcome to all conference delegates, especially those who have travelled internationally to join us.

ACU's School of Philosophy, and our Centre for the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion (part of the Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry) are proud to host this very significant annual gathering for the first time. For almost two decades now, the annual ASCP conference has brought together some of the most creative and insightful thinking in the Continental tradition of philosophy being conducted across of Australasia, and well beyond to North America, Europe and Asia.

We trust you will enjoy the many sessions planned: plenary keynote sessions, individual papers, book and themed sessions, and various topical and informative sessions as well. We would also encourage you to attend the ASCP reception on the opening night, and the AGM and conference dinner on day 2.

May you be inspired in your work, and develop new and deepened connections and conversations with others along the way.

Enjoy!

Richard Colledge
Chair of Conference Committee
Head of School of Philosophy, ACU

Acknowledgements and Thanks

The Melbourne Campus of ACU is situated on **Wurundjeri** Country. For thousands of generations the Wurundjeri people have cared for this land and we respect and honour that custodianship. We acknowledge and pay our respects to the Wurundjeri and thank them for their continued hospitality.

The School of Philosophy, and the Centre for the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion, are grateful for the generous financial and collegial support of the **Faculty of Theology and Philosophy** which has made this conference possible, especially Prof Anne Hunt (Executive Dean) and Prof James McLaren (Assoc Dean, Research). We would also like to thank the **ASCP executive** for their generous sponsorship of the conference reception on the opening evening.

I would like to express my personal thanks to the **Conference Organising Committee**:

- Fatih Erol Tuncer (Project Officer)
- Chris Hackett
- Jeff Hanson
- Magdalena Zolkos
- Wojciech Kaftanski (Postgraduate representative)

… as well as our student volunteers.

Finally, on behalf of the ASCP and ACU, we acknowledge and honour the memory of **Prof. Dr. László Tengelyi** – who was to join us this year as one of our keynote speakers – who passed away on 19 July. His department at the Universität Wuppertal has a warm and fitting obituary for him on its homepage: http://www.philosophie.uni-wuppertal.de. We offer our heartfelt sympathies to Prof. Tengelyi's family and his many friends and colleagues across the world.

Hosts

The School of Philosophy
www.acu.edu.au/philosophy

ACU's School of Philosophy offers a full undergraduate philosophy program on our campuses in Melbourne (Fitzroy), Sydney (Strathfield) and Brisbane (Banyo), and has an active group of Honours and PhD students. Our teaching and research draws deeply on the history of philosophy and the Catholic intellectual tradition, and contemporary debates in both the Continental and Analytic traditions.

Each year, the School runs a series of public events, seminars and workshops, including our regular national videoconferenced School seminar series, our annual *Simone Weil Lecture on Human Value* (now in its 16th year), and various other events organised each year with the generous support of the Faculty of Theology and Philosophy, and the Office of the Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Research). In 2014, this included our Melbourne-based Winter Lecture series and public seminar series.

Centre for the Philosophy and Phenomenology of Religion and the **Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry**
www.acu.edu.au/philosophy/cppr

The CPPR promotes cutting-edge research into all aspects of philosophy of religion with a particular focus on 20th century and contemporary German and French phenomenological thought and their historical precursors and interlocutors. Questions in Philosophy of Religion are explored in a way that draws deeply on other branches of philosophy, as well as fostering broader interdisciplinary collaboration with theology, psychology, the natural sciences, and contemporary secular thought.

Conference Events

Conference Reception

All are welcome to our opening night reception that (Melbourne weather permitting!) will be held on the roof top garden of the Daniel Mannix Building Room, 7 storeys above our main conference lecture theatre. In the event of inclement weather, rest assured that there is a good back up plan …

Conference Dinner

The conference dinner will be held at the *Aegean Restaurant*, 19 Brunswick St, Fitzroy (a very short walk across the road from the conference venue) on Friday evening, starting at 6:30pm.

If you have not already registered, please do so as soon as you can by going to the conference homepage (www.acu.edu.au/ascp2014), or ask one of the conference team if in doubt.

The cost is a very reasonable $50, which includes a full **banquet** of homebaked breads, dips and appetizers, saganaki grilled kefalograviera cheese, Greek salad, seafood and mixed grill dishes, fruit and sweets + **unlimited basic drinks** (soft drinks, house wine, beer, tea, coffee). *Please remember to note any special dietary requirements when completing your registration (48 hrs notice required).*

ASCP Annual General Meeting

The ASCP AGM will be held in the Phillipa Brazil Lecture Theatre on Friday starting at 11.45, immediately before lunch. As financial members of the ASCP, all delegates are welcome and encouraged to attend and participate.

Launch of the 2013 ASCP Conference issue of *Parrhesia*

Established in 2006, *Parrhesia: A Journal of Critical Philosophy* is dedicated to publishing the latest work on continental philosophy, along with new translations and interviews with contemporary

thinkers. All pieces published in the essay section of *Parrhesia* are double blind peer-reviewed. Each year, *Parrhesia* publishes a special issue dedicated to proceedings of the ASCP annual conference.

The launch of the *Parrhesia* ASCP 2013 Conference issue will take place immediately after the AGM in the Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre. Details will also be provided of plans toward the 2014 conference issue, the call for papers for which will be issued later this month.

Launch of December issue of *Colloquy*

Colloquy: text theory critique is a peer-reviewed online journal published twice annually by postgraduate students in the Literary and Cultural Studies Graduate Research Program at Monash University. All work is double-blind peer-reviewed. It publishes articles in various fields of the theoretical humanities including continental philosophy, literary and cultural studies, film and television, media theory and performance. We also publish translations, creative writing and book reviews.

This new issue of *Colloquy* will be launched during the lunchtime break on Thursday in Room MBG-08.

Conference Photo

A conference photo has been organised during the mid-afternoon break on Friday (3.15pm) on the steps leading to our parallel session rooms. We're looking for a big turn up from all present. You will be able to *prove* that you *were there!*

Conference Schedule Overview

*** See Program insert for the full Conference Schedule ****

Day 1: Thursday 4 December

9.00-9.15	CONFERENCE OPENING (Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre)
9.15-10.15	KEYNOTE ADDRESS (Philippa Brazil LT) Andreas Vrahimis *The Great War, the Demise of Idealism and the Analytic-Continental Divide*
10.15-10.30	MORNING TEA - Daniel Mannix Building foyer
10.30-12.00	PARALLEL SESSION 1
12.00-13.00	LUNCH [Includes *Colloquy* issue launch]
13.00-14.30	PARALLEL SESSION 2
14.30-14.45	BREAK
14.45-16.15	PARALLEL SESSION 3
16.15-16.30	AFTERNOON TEA - Daniel Mannix Building foyer
16.30-17.30	KEYNOTE ADDRESS (Philippa Brazil LT) Marguerite La Caze *Hannah Arendt and Self-Forgiveness: In Search of a Magic Spell*
17.30-19.30	ASCP Reception - Daniel Mannix Building Room Top

Day 2: Friday 5 December

9.00-10.30	PARALLEL SESSION 4
10.30-10.45	MORNING TEA - Daniel Mannix Building foyer
10.45-11.45	KEYNOTE ADDRESS (Philippa Brazil LT) Lee Braver *Thoughts on the Unthinkable*
11.45-12.45	ASCP Annual General Meeting (Philippa Brazil LT)
12.45-13.45	LUNCH [Includes *Parrhesia* ASCP 2013 issue launch]

13.45-15.15 PARALLEL SESSION 5

15.15-15.30 BREAK [Includes Conference photo on steps]

15.30-17.00 PARALLEL SESSION 6

17.00-17.15 AFTERNOON TEA - Daniel Mannix Building foyer

17.15-18.15 KEYNOTE ADDRESS (Philippa Brazil LT]
Genevieve Lloyd
Derrida and the Philosophical History of Wonder

19.00-21.30 Conference Dinner – The Aegean Restaurant (19 Brunswick Street)

Day 3: Saturday 6 December

9.15-10.15 KEYNOTE ADDRESS (Philippa Brazil LT)
Kevin Hart
The Irreducible

10.15-10.30 MORNING TEA - Daniel Mannix Building foyer

10.30-12.00 PARALLEL SESSION 7

12.00-13.00 LUNCH

13.00-14.30 PARALLEL SESSION 8

14.30-14.45 BREAK

14.45-16.15 PARALLEL SESSION 9

16.15-16.30 AFTERNOON TEA - Daniel Mannix Building foyer

16.30-17.45 PLENARY PANEL (Philippa Brazil LT)
Guest Panellists
Black Swan: A History of Continental Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand

17.45-17.50 CONFERENCE CLOSE

KEYNOTE SPEAKERS

Lee Braver (University of South Florida)

Thoughts on the Unthinkable

Kant taught us the truism that we can only think with our thoughts. Without the dogmatic presupposition that the way reality works has been synchronized with the way our minds work, it seems extremely likely that there are things that we cannot experience or conceive. Is there anything to say about these unthinkable topics, or must we pass over them in complete silence, as Wittgenstein said (but didn't do)? In this paper, I want to explore what we can say about that which we cannot think. I will look at some historical examinations of the topic, as well as how it informs art, to see what lessons we can draw.

Kevin Hart (University of Virginia, and Australian Catholic University)

The Irreducible

For most of those who practice it, phenomenology turns on one or more modes of reduction. Yet, as Husserl makes plain, God is irreducible by virtue of his peculiar mode of transcendence. If one makes the "theological turn," as various phenomenologists are said to have done (Falque, Henry, Lacoste, Levinas, Marion, among others), is one thereby committed to abandon reduction? Or is there a way of rethinking the relationship of Christianity and phenomenology so that another mode of reduction takes place? These are the questions I shall chiefly consider.

Marguerite La Caze (University of Queensland)

Hannah Arendt and Self-forgiveness: In Search of a Magic Spell

Hannah Arendt writes 'no-one can forgive himself … forgiving and promising enacted in solitude or isolation remain without reality and can signify no more than a role played before oneself.' (1958, 237) Rather dramatically, she suggests we are like the sorcerer's apprentice left without the incantation to break a magic spell. Furthermore, Arendt believes we cannot forgive ourselves as we cannot be both the subject and object of

experience and contends that the most profound reason we cannot forgive ourselves is that 'we are dependent on others, to whom we appear in a distinctness that we ourselves are unable to perceive. Closed within ourselves, we would never be able to forgive ourselves any failing or transgression because we would lack the experience of the person for the sake of whom one can forgive.' (1958, 243) In challenging the exclusion of self-forgiveness, my paper stresses Arendt's descriptive focus on political forgiveness, where relations with others are paramount, and they 'determine the extent and modes in which one may be able to forgive himself'. (1958, 238) This stress alters our understanding of Arendt's contentions and I explore the implications for the possibility of personal self-forgiveness, its relation to the forgiveness of others, and the ethics of self-forgiveness.

Genevieve Lloyd (Emeritus, University of New South Wales)

Derrida and the Philosophical History of Wonder

Although there is in Derrida's writings little explicit concern with the topic of wonder, they resonate with its philosophical history. This talk will address some of those resonances, and explore their significance in understanding the philosophical and political import of Derrida's thought. Central to the discussion will be Derrida's concern with the ancient idea of aporia, whose connections with wonder go back to the very beginnings of philosophy. Tensions in ancient Greek accounts of wonder -- between mental activity and passivity, motion and stasis -- become more explicit in seventeenth century philosophy. My discussion will focus especially on Spinoza's disagreements with the Cartesians about the nature of wonder and its role in the life of the mind. Spinoza's treatment of the nature and significance of singularity yields a new version of the ancient dictum that philosophical thought "begins in wonder". Against that background, the talk will discuss Derrida's use of the notion of singularity, especially in the seminars on Sovereignty and the Beast and The Death Penalty. We are thrown into wonder when habitual expectations are shaken by the experience of singularity. Attending to resonances of the philosophical history of wonder in Derrida's thought can thus help to illuminate the political orientation of his thought, especially in those late seminars.

Andreas Vrahimis (University of Cyprus)

The Great War, the Demise of Idealism, and the Analytic-Continental Divide

Prior to the Great War, academic philosophy throughout Europe was arguably dominated by Idealist schools, with Neo-Kantianism prominent in France and Germany, and British Idealism still a leading force in the United Kingdom. The outburst of the Great War, and the German army's burning of the library of the University of Leuven in particular, gave rise to a reaction by intellectuals across various fields, including philosophy. Of particular interest here is the way that philosophers sought to contribute to the war effort, thereby ushering in an international controversy between some of the chief figures in Germanophone Neo-Kantianism and their French, British, and American critics: viz, the association of a particular philosophical character with specific national cultures. Germanophone Neo-Kantians, for example, sought justification for the war effort in the writings of their German Idealist intellectual ancestors, while figures such as Dewey and Boutroux, blamed Idealist philosophy for Prussian militarism. After surveying the debates over the association of Idealism with the war, this paper will examine how idealist schools faded from prominence in interwar European academia. I will argue that the association of German Idealism with the war contributed to the formation of the idea of a divide between analytic and continental philosophy.

László Tengelyi (Universitat Wuppertal)

Here is the abstract for the keynote address that Prof Tengelyi had planned to give at our December conference. He passed away on 19 July 2014.

Philosophy as Openness to the World

The talk is aimed at defining philosophy as a comprehensive inquiry into the structure of the world. I shall argue that such a universal inquiry is only possible if it is based on two methodological principles, which may be termed as "heterological" and as "transcendental", respectively. The first of these two principles requires an exhaustive division of reality into two (or

more) areas that are strictly complementary to each other within the totality of the world; the second principle is destined to account for the fact that only a being capable of transcending its surrounding world is in a position to develop a thinking of the world as a whole. It is in the light of these two principles that the contemporary debate between naturalism and (phenomenological) transcendentalism will be considered in the second part of the talk.

PAPER ABSTRACTS

Mathew Abbott (Federation)
Spectacle, Glory, and Inoperativity: Theoria as Praxis in Agamben's Political Ontology

Clarifying how Agamben refigures the relation between theoria and praxis can provide a way of framing the radical political claims of his work, especially as developed in *The Kingdom and the Glory*. Reading theoria as spectatorship, he intertwines a quasi-Marxist critique of spectacle with a Heideggerian thesis regarding the history of being as nihilism. The resultant political ontology has at its centre a dialectical notion of theoria as a form of praxis. This is not an attempt at erasing the distinction between philosophy and politics, such that "doing ontology" is taken as an immediately political act, or to substitute for material political change. Rather, figuring theoria as praxis renders it a practical problem. Properly facing up to it would require a politics capable of rousing the human inoperativity that has lain dormant in contemplation, and which the 'blinding light' (*The Kingdom and the Glory*, 242) of glory has been obscuring from us. As a form of fundamental ontology, Agambenian thought cannot lay down a prescriptive blueprint for political action, but it can help us rethink the very concept, founding new strategies for anti-work politics.

Rajat Denzil Acharya (ACU)
The Nothing Nothings Nothingness: Towards the Comprehension of Nothing

As the negation of position and the absence of presence, nothing both teases and eludes comprehension. As such, nothing haunts history. Nonetheless, Goethe, Nietzsche and Heidegger are responsible for the radical treatment of nothing as an *élan mortel* that determines the historical process of nothingness by which *nihil*-ism approaches *nihil*-ity. This paper continues that Goethean, Nietzschean and Heideggerian treatment with a summarised contribution towards the comprehension of the nothing. §I discusses nothing as an explicitly nihilophobic concern. §II discusses the power of nothing as a diabolical mood of metaphysical and metaethical seduction. §III discusses the manner of nothing as a thanatropic rendition of spiritual transcendence to machinical immanence. §IV discusses the

tradition of nothing as a series of theocidal, anthropocidal and technocidal events that constitute the paradigmatic deaths of God, man and text and demarcate the premodern, modern and postmodern epochs. §V discusses nothing as an implicitly nihilophilic concern. This paper attempts to reveal nothing as a historical disease. It is not modest. Yet its *prima facie* dismissal as immodest would be to carelessly permit the nothingness it identifies to continue as a *fleur du mal* that cancerously flourishes incognito, which is precisely what Goethe, Nietzsche and Heidegger warned against.

Sabrina Achilles (UWS)

Bergson's Theory of the Image in Deleuze and Guattari's Political Thought.

This paper aims to press the importance of the frame, metaphysical or materialist — as expressed in Deleuze and Guattari's concept of schizoanalysis — in thinking the political. The paper brings together the traces of Bergson's theory of the image as presented in Deleuze's *Bergsonism,* in Deleuze and Guattari's materialist thinking, and in particular, in their concept of schizoanalysis. Deleuze's Cinema books, coming directly after *A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, emphasize the significance of the image in Deleuze's political thought and by extension the importance of art in thinking the political. For Deleuze, (non-populist) art functions to invoke a people (minority), which he attributes to the destabilizing of the (majoritarian) Capitalist machine, in which there are no people — "nobody". In particular, this paper will explore the importance of the fourth dimension to Bergson's and Deleuze and Guattari's non-metaphysics, (and to art). When evoked, the fourth dimension decenters the (metaphysical) subject and opens onto the assemblage and the rhizomic. The result is a glitching, a failure in the performance of the metaphysical fabric of the State/Capitalist machine. The paper visits Lars von Trier's 2011 film, *Melancholia,* to think the question of an invocation of a people (the affluent but alienated West) and a performing of the forth dimension.

Alexandra Aidler

"Je messianischer der Jude ist, um so weniger kann er auf sich selbst reflektieren, je christlicher der Christ ist, um so mehr.": *Hermann Cohen and Franz Rosenzweig on Jewish and Christian Revelation*

In the third part of his seminal study on Judaism from 1921, entitled *The Star of Redemption* (*Der Stern der Erlösung*), the German-Jewish philosopher Franz Rosenzweig marks a radical opposition between Judaism and Christianity. For Rosenzweig Judaism consists in the eternal passage of a people from creation to revelation. It suspends the divide between God's presence and its worldly manifestation. To Rosenzweig being Jewish means to be at all times with God in the world. In contradistinction, Christianity carries, according to Rosenzweig, the heavy weight of a deferred salvific moment. Constantly in anticipation of the παρουσία, Christianity is forced to live in the moment only, in a continuous distance from its redeemer, without being able to attain eternity in the present. While Judaism is therefore with God in the world, Christianity remains in a position of retreat from God and the world. Christianity, in other words, has no "immediacy" (*Unmittelbarkeit*). How can both Judaism and Christianity then live in immediacy with God in the world? What is, in other words, a distinctly Judeo- Christian mode of being-in-the-world with God? Seeking to overcome Franz Rosenzweig's insurmountable dichotomy between Judaism and Christianity, this presentation will inquire into the possibility of thinking an immediate relationship with God in the world, which will relegate neither Judaism nor Christianity to the background, by turning to the philosophy of one of Rosenzweig's "biggest names": Hermann Cohen. Following Hermann Cohen, it will be the working hypothesis of this exposition that a genuinely Judeo-Christian mode of coexistence can only take its point of departure in a position of anteriority or "origin" (*Ursprung*) which is common to both Judaism and Christianity and which culminates in a universal concept of prophetism based on the notion of a "correlation" (*Korrelation*) between man and God. This presentation will endeavour to engage in an exploration of the passage from origin to the prophetic that is constitutive to the idea of a "pure monotheism" (*reinen Monotheismus*) in Cohen's philosophy.

Paul Alberts (UWS)
Nature and Agonal Justice in Nietzsche: Contemporary Critical Potentials

A recent paper by Michael Zimmerman effectively counters any supposition that Nietzsche's philosophy can be readily appropriated for purposes of enhancing critical environmentalism. At the very most, Nietzschean naturalism strikes in opposing directions – both countering but also supporting anthropocentrist thought. 'Higher types' might surpass purported human 'degeneration'; but that might be either a further distillation of human natural character, or, alternatively, a transfiguration, a creative overcoming. While accepting such necessary caution, there are yet critical potentials in the paradigm of *agon*, which reverberated through Nietzsche's texts, brought together conceptions of the natural with conjectural arche of justice, and articulated individuality with community. The general promise of developing such a line of interpretation is that it seeks to use the critical levers of Nietzsche's genealogical excavations of moral psychology in order to open up better means to understand the political, rather than the ethical, character of contemporary environmental crises.

Aleksandra Lukaszewicz Alcaraz (Academy of Art in Szczecin, Poland)
The Event of Meeting as Appearance of Bi-personal Subject of Love in Alain Badiou's Theory

Alain Badiou, contemporary French philosopher, invites us to reassessment of the concept of subject, that has sprouted in ancient Greek and took roots in modern philosophy after Descartes, and is fundamentally connected with ideas of The Same and of identity with itself. Badiou's philosophical reflection poses a great breakthrough in this field. By referring to Plato's dialogues, especially *Parmenides*, Badiou reminds us that being was presented as multiplicity, and that only due to counting-as-one it was forced into representations fixed upon the identity of the human-animal. According to Badiou, an individual human-animal is not a subject, but happens to be one. It can occur in one of the four fields: politics, science, art and love, due to an event breaking the given situation and opening the point of emptiness, thus giving rise to the subject, which is not individual but defined in a dynamic relation with: others, being, artwork and another person. Such an event in the field of love would consist of meeting the other, where the subject of love is neither individual nor it is unity of two individuals, but it is the Two, and it is bi-personal.

Adina Arvatu (University of Western Ontario)
Nonconceptuality in Derrida and Blumenberg

In the recent tradition of defamiliarizing reassessments of deconstruction (e.g. Sloterdijk 2007), my paper proposes a critical rapprochement between Derrida and the German neo-Kantian thinker Hans Blumenberg. Though less than standard, this rapprochement is nonarbitrary and fruitful. It allows us to understand what Derrida's "metaphoricity" is *not*—namely, a 'classical' account of figurality as improper speech to be superseded in the course of conceptual maturation. Derrida's *Glas* and Blumenberg's writings on metaphorology help separate off this account from the 'nonclassical' theory of figurality that both thinkers worked towards. On the latter view, metaphor is a cipher for an irreducible nonconceptuality that both resists and makes possible concept formation and proper speech. I argue that Derrida's *Archive Fever* offers a 'theory of nonconceptuality' (Blumenberg 2007), where the archive functions like an absolute metaphor—that is, a figure that provides a point of orientation for thought and informs a particular attitude towards the world, but cannot be reabsorbed into the conceptual order that it makes possible. Pace many dissenting voices in Derrida studies, the archive is historical and pragmatic through and through. Yet this character only becomes apparent from the vantage of a critical relationship, which I try to reconstruct in my research, between the problems of historical neo-Kantianism and the concerns of deconstruction.

Michaela Baker (Macquarie)
'The slight loosening of the screws': Sartre and Aesthetics as Resistance

In this paper, I argue that Sartre's existentialist account of human reality is key both to understanding his work on colonialism and neo-colonialism, and to making sense of the potential for aesthetics as resistance that he identifies in papers such as 'Black Orpheus'. As Reynolds points out, Sartre's existentialist account of intersubjectivity 'gets at something important about human relations and provides the foundation for…political radicality' (2008, p. 71) and is thus central to understanding Sartre's thought on political resistance. Aligned with Sartre's existentialism, it is 'the capacity of [aesthetics] to speak to individual stories, agency and autonomy is particularly significant when faced with totalising narratives' (Jelinek, 2013, p. 3). This echoes Sartre's statement

that, whilst the language of political parties (and, I will argue, that of colonial and neo-colonial regimes), 'tends more and more rigorously to eliminate the subject; poetry…must in some way remain subjective' (1964, p. 17). I argue that colonialism and neo-colonialism are examples of such 'totalising narratives'. I then demonstrate, via a focus on the existentialist aspects of Sartre's politics and his discussion of the interaction between the colonial and neo-colonial situation and poetry in 'Black Orpheus', how aesthetics can function as a powerful force of resistance.

Peter Banki (UWS)

Derrida's Holocausts

An aspect of Derrida's work that has received comparatively little attention is his surprising use of the term "holocaust" as a common name in diverse contexts. In *The Post-Card*, for example, Derrida uses this term to refer to the burning of love letters, *in Glas* to the incinerating movement of the gift, and in *The Gift of Death*, to refer to the Abrahamic sacrifice on Mount Moriah. In so doing, he confesses each time to making a lateral and elliptical reference to what he calls "the great Holocaust of our era", i.e., to the event sometimes also called the Shoah, 'Auschwitz', or among the Sinti and Roma peoples, the Porrajmos (the Devouring). How to read this gesture of *de-capitalizing the Holocaust* and allowing it to resonate according to multiple and diverse literary and philosophical modalities? When challenged in Jerusalem by Michal Ben-Naftali, who said that she found his gesture disturbing, even offensive and indecent, Derrida defended himself by claiming that it was a way of "rethinking ethics, politics, philosophical discourse on the basis of categories that seem to us most appropriate to the Shoah." In this regard, Derrida allied his thinking to that of Levinas, who like him has developed concepts (such as trauma, persecution and hostage) that, on the one hand, strongly resonate with the Holocaust, while, on the other, do not need any reference to it in order to function. My paper will attempt to explore what the implications of this gesture are in response to the question of "how Western culture, dominated by what is called philosophy, by Judeo-Christian traditions, etc., could have made possible, or not have made impossible, an event such as the one named Auschwitz or the Shoah."

Ross Barham

Mary's Parable – Trans-rational Words of Wisdom

I begin by constructing a hierarchy of the various modes by which wisdom is conveyed in the esoteric philosophical writings of Sufism, Zen-Buddhism, Hasidism, Christianity, Ancient Greek Philosophy, and more. I argue that while the penultimate taxonomic category sits well with Mearleau-Ponty's/ Wittgenstein's metaphilosophical conception of wisdom as 'grammatically'/semantically transformative, the uppermost 'trans-rational' category is best characterised by the Heideggerian/Gadamerian notion of free thought/dialogue. I conclude by considering, on the one hand, the likelihood of any strictly analytic epistemology being able to accommodate the trans-rational 'logics' underlying the sentiment conveyed by instances of this lattermost category, and, on the other hand, the extent to which an answer to the previous consideration may bear on the plausibility of a purely physicalistic theory of mind. It should be a lot of fun, with plenty of choice parables, koans, fables, adages, poems, allegories, aphorisms, maxims, etc., that I've collected over the years!

Craig Barrie

Plato's Phenomenology of Education

This paper elucidates the claim that Plato's Socratic dialogues present a phenomenology of *paideia*, opening the reader to the lived experience of finite pedagogical contexts. I contrast this with readings that seek Plato's *theory* of education, or Plato's *theory* of developmental psychology. These readings often privilege Plato's "later" (allegedly mature) dialogues, such as *Republic* and *Laws*, over "earlier" (allegedly naïve) Socratic dialogues. My approach, by contrast, treats the Socratic dialogues as a paradigmatic example of the phenomenological approach to education. These dramatic representations express, for Plato, the function and limits of the specific educational practices of his day. His so called "later" dialogues tease out further aspects of the finitude residing in all pedagogical contexts. The result is neither a development of his thought, nor a perfect consistency within his *oeuvre*, but rather the unfolding of a finite understanding from out of it itself, a plenitude of what Deleuze and Guattari call 'conceptual persona' (or better still *pedagogical* persona), with signposts to indicate the transcendental, in so far as this can show itself from this side of finitude.

Jai Bentley-Payne (UAuck)

From Contractualism to a Politics of Truth

This paper will show how contractualism undermines attempts to locate genuine political agency, and as such political subjectivity must be rethought. The grounds for this rethinking can be found in the work of Alain Badiou and important interventions in Māori philosophy. Both demonstrate an innate materialism and collectivity in political engagement. While the foundational account of sovereignty in Aotearoa/New Zealand posits the Treaty of Waitangi as a social contract, I will contest this idea as a moment of foreclosure for the policing of politics. The paper will show how we are still the contemporaries of a political sequence that begins at Kororāreka (Russell) in the middle of the 1840s with Hone Heke. My intention is to establish how the Heke event reveals a political truth that can be invoked to oppose accounts of legalism or contractualism as a basis for sovereignty and citizenship. The truth of the Heke event shifts emphasis away from consensus toward a material politics of collective and universal sovereignty grounded in an assertion of equality. I argue this radically alternative conception can reveal possibilities for political change that already exist in our present.

Matthew Bishop

Remorse in Bereavement after Suicide, An Existential Therapeutic Perspective

The topic of this paper is remorse in the context of bereavement after suicide. It is written from the perspective of an existential counsellor, currently working with such bereavement. Remorse, also named guilt, is common among suicide-bereaved people. Often it is irrational, in the sense of unwarranted or disproportionate, to a degree that it is harmful. It is best overcome. However some mental health professionals take the attitude that all such guilt or remorse after suicide is irrational. They pressure the grieving person to "let it go." It was the frustrations of some clients which first alerted me to this issue: that sometimes a previous counsellor had unwittingly pressured them to abandon their moral lucidity for the sake of increased emotional well-being. With reference to the work of Raimond Gaita I will suggest that the attitude of those professionals seems to express a reductive conception of morality. Drawing on Gaita's work I will propose a different vision of what it can be to hold oneself morally

accountable in the context of another's choice to suicide. This alternative vision makes sense of some remorse as lucid rather than irrational. I will explore how, when the counsellor brings this moral philosophical perspective into the therapy, it is often possible to encourage a mutually beneficial increase of moral lucidity and emotional well-being.

Michelle Boulous Walker (UQ)
The Aesthetic Dimension of Reading: Attention, Discernment, Stimmung, Rapture

An exploration of Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht's approach to reading for *Stimmung* where one follows "configurations of atmosphere and mood in order to encounter otherness in intense and intimate ways" (Gumbrecht). The paper frames Gumbrecht's work on intensity in the context of a broader discussion of the aesthetic dimensions of reading – experimental modes that bypass the limited ambitions of interpretation and systematic method. Simone Weil's work on gravity and grace, Teresa Brennan's work on discernment, Martin Heidegger's work on rapture (*Rausch*) and meditative thought, come together with Gumbrecht's focus on *Stimmung* and intensity in order to suggest the quality of attention as central to any aesthetic appreciation of what it means to read. Attention involves a sinking into the world that permits an emptying or evaporating of the "heavy self", a kind of rapture or release that allows us to extend toward the other (or text); an "ascent beyond oneself" (Heidegger) that binds and connects without force or restraint. The aesthetic dimensions of reading inhabit spaces of suspension and expectation where one pauses and meanders, bringing the everyday world of nearness into the strange and the surprising – a state of being lost in focused intensity, where we "connect with a layer in our existence that simply wants the things of the world close to our skin" (Gumbrecht).

Sean Bowden (Deakin)
Looking at Shared Intentions through an Expressive Lens

It is noteworthy that most Anglo-American philosophers of collective action treat shared intentions as intentions aiming at a specific goal, final state or end-product. Moreover, these authors tend to think of a specific goal-oriented shared intention as something that is clear in the minds of individual group members prior to the group action which issues from it. It would thus be appropriate to ask whether such accounts are appropriate

for cases in which a shared intention comes into view only after some shared activity has begun (e.g., in the apparently spontaneous emergence of coordinated activity from out of uncoordinated mob behavior), or for cases in which the content of a shared intention cannot be non-trivially specified in advance of some way of successfully realizing it in practice over time (e.g., the shared intention of two people to love and nurture a child). My aim in this paper is to explore the extent to which an 'expressive' approach to individual agency and intentionality – as seen in recent work on Hegel and Nietzsche by Taylor, Pippin, Owen, Ridley and others – might be applicable to these kinds of collective action cases.

Daniel Brennan (Bond)
World War One in the Philosophy of Jan Patocka

In Jan Patočka's philosophy of history, World War One stands out as an event that represents both a crisis point for Europe and the world, and an opportunity for recovering a lost mythology which the world can use for its salvation. This myth is found in the experience of the front-line soldier who risks their life to destroy the world that sent them to the front in the first place. My paper explores the significance of World War One in Patočka's thought and offers a critique of Patočka's mythologising of the war.

Shannon Brick (UMelb)
Merleau-Ponty and Deep Ecology: Towards an Ethics of Flesh

Whilst there is consensus that Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology harbours transformative resources for rethinking the 'natural', there is a marked lack of agreement as to what it might mean for environmental ethics specifically. Centered around the unique new concept 'flesh', Merleau-Ponty's ontology successfully undercuts the Cartesian ontology of the object and the associated fact/value distinction, showing that value is founded on the ontological level and is not a distinctly human enterprise. The lack of consensus as to its ethical implications might thus move from the failure to fully grasp the extent to which flesh undercuts traditional frameworks that inform much normative ethics. I argue that Merleau-Ponty's contribution to environmentalism is best understood by bringing his philosophy into conversation with deep ecology approaches which seek to realise a greater respect towards the non-human via refiguring our concepts of self and other. While a

Merleau-Pontian ontology contributes much to this project, it vindicates the ecofeminist critique of deep ecology's emphasis on the self. Against this background, flesh can be understood as a powerful resource for thinking nature, the human and the ethical. Moreover, it avoids many of the challenges which continue to dog other approaches in environmental ethics.

Petra Brown (Deakin)
Schmitt, Bonhoeffer, Exceptional Violence and the Ethical Demand

In this paper, I investigate the idea of exceptional violence and the absolute demand of the ethical through a comparison between the ideas of the German jurist, Carl Schmitt, and the German theologian, Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In the first part of this paper I examine the idea of exceptional violence through Schmitt's concept of the 'state of exception' in *Political Theology* (1923) and Bonhoeffer's concept of 'the extraordinary' in *Ethics* (1943). Through a comparison with Schmitt's political concept of 'the state of exception', I draw attention to the political theology that I argue lies inherent in Bonhoeffer; a political theology that enables Bonhoeffer to act as a conspirator in an 'extraordinary situation'. I investigate the consequences of this using Agamben's critique that states of exceptions may lead to violence without reference. In the second part of the paper, I show that Bonhoeffer's justification of violence in an 'extraordinary situation' is challenged by his own claim of the 'absoluteness of the ethical demand' of the Other, which appears as a threat to my self. Yet, unlike Schmitt, Bonhoeffer does not reduce the threat to a friend-enemy distinction. Instead, the ethical demand reorders the self so that it can live in proper relationship with others, an ethical relationship that overcomes the desire for self-preservation. This may act as a check to the violence required in an 'extraordinary situation'.

Diego Bubbio (UWS)
Hegel: Death of God and Recognition of the Self

This paper covers the theme of the death of God, considered from an Hegelian standpoint. For Aristotle, the image of God as 'thought thinking itself' was an image of the knowledge aspired to in philosophy. With the notion of God becoming man and his insistence on the icon of the Cross, Hegel challenged the Aristotelian goal of philosophy as immutable knowledge of an 'ultimate' reality. Hegel viewed the crisis of normativity

(the death of the Cartesian divine guarantor) as strictly linked to the conception of the self. It is Nietzsche who is best known for alluding to the full significance of this image for modern life, but Hegel's thought on the complex relations of philosophy and religion in the modern world can be regarded as an attempt to think through this same historical phenomenon. In this paper, I focus on the philosophical relevance of Hegel's notion of the death of God. I argue that unpacking the significance of the "truths" presented symbolically in modern Christianity is crucial in understanding the requirements that an idealistic philosophy must meet.

Louise Burchill (UMelb)

Of an Alterity Irreducible to Auto-affection: Revisiting Derrida's Explication with Phenomenology.

This paper revisits "the explication with phenomenology" that Jacques Derrida initiated in texts such as *Voice and Phenomenon* and *Of Grammatology* in the 1960s before taking it up concertedly once again in the context of his later focus on "the logic of spectrality". Qualifying the latter as inseparable from the theme of deconstruction—indeed as a "deconstructive logic"—Derrida's analyses in, for example, *Spectres of Marx* (1993) pursue the problematization of the values of presence, presentation and the living present begun in the 60s by way of showing that, as "something" neither visible nor invisible, sensible nor insensible, living nor dead, *spectres* do nothing less than scramble philosophy's determination of being as presence. Yet while Derrida specifies that "a phenomenology of the spectral" would simply have needed to "realize" the resources offered by Husserl's identification of the noema (or phenomenological object) as an intentional but "non-real" component of lived experience—underlining thereby that differance finds its home as it were "at the heart of the living present—I will argue that Derrida's definition of the noema as a *trace* that renders any reanimation of the manifest evidence of an "originary presence" impossible critically depends on his quite deliberately *occulting* Husserl's emphatic insistence upon the status of the "originary impression" (positioned as the "correlate" of the living present") as "foreign" to any noematic object of lived experience. Not only does this show up what might best be called a constitutive blind spot in Derrida's problematization of the living present; it simultaneously opens up the question of an "alterity" that might be seen as the guarantee of a "real" irreducible to the movement of temporality as auto-affection.

Michael Campbell (UCanberra)
***Cartesian Poetics: Temporality, Causality, and Character in Descartes'* Meditations.**

As Genevieve Lloyd (1993) highlights, Descartes' theories of time and causality within the Third Meditation reveal a fragile relationship with time, in which one's existence across a lifespan is not self-assured, but is dependent on the 'preserving power' of God. Commentary on this passage (E.g. Arthur 1988; Secada 1990; Levy 2005; Gorham 2008) has often overlooked that the 'I' of the *Meditations* is not the historical Descartes (see Frankfurt 1970; Wilson 1978; Carriero 2009), but, as this paper will argue, a *fictional character* (see Kosman 1986). This fictional character, the Cartesian Meditator, is speaking within a fictional temporal space (the six 'days' of the six meditations). Uri Margolin argues that characters should be seen as concepts, rather than entities, since 'they do not exist in real space and time' (2007, p. 68). This paper seeks to explore what impact this notion might have on Descartes' ideas of temporality and causality, since these ideas are being articulated by a 'fictional' narrator. When viewed in this light, how can Descartes' theory of temporality be applied to fictional characters in literary works, whose existence is 'preserved' by the 'God-like' power of the author? Michael Campbell is a PhD candidate at the University of Canberra in the Faculty of Arts and Design. His research explores the links between literature and philosophy by reading Descartes' *Meditations* via theories of narrative.

Leah Carr (UQ)
Nietzsche's Queer Therapy

We are all familiar with Nietzsche's dark side. His critique of ascetic ideals and slave morality appears to open the door to an unsavoury return to the unbridled egotism and violence of the "blonde beasts of prey" of yore. This is not exactly aided by Nietzsche's appeal to Nazism and his deployment by Randian objectivists in the service of a rational egoism that supports capitalist hegemony. In short, it's hard not to let the name Nietzsche pass your lips without it soon being followed by "fascism", "eugenics" and "right-wing neoliberal politics" . However, one unquestionably liberationist political movement of the 20th century that I believe Nietzsche's thought can be of benefit to is the LGBTI movement. A critique of Christian morality and ascetic ideals opens the door to affirmation of one's most ineradicable desire. My aim in this talk is to

establish a reading of Nietzsche's "On the Genealogy of Morals" as the first diagnostic step in a therapy to transform queer shame into queer pride.

Monica Carroll (UCanberra)
Dichten ***and Description: Poetry in Observation***

Classical phenomenology offers both a theory and method for the process of writing of first-person experience. Phenomenology is not often discussed as a two part process, yet there are distinct challenges to both the observational aspect of conducting a phenomenological reduction (i.e., an act of perception) and the subsequent disclosure of findings (i.e., an act of writing-it-down). These are distinct acts; yet little discussed in phenomenological literature is the question of how we are to bridge the gap between them. In Culture and Value, Wittgenstein wrote, "Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten". This paper argues that Wittgenstein's idea of dichten, or poeming (the verb form of to poeticise), can be used to bridge the gap between experience and description. Aspects of the experience of poeming will be discussed with a view to grasping the structure and experience of poeming.

Will Church (UQ)
Oakeshott and Santayana: Scepticism and Philosophical Imagination

The late English philosopher, Michael Oakeshott, has traditionally been associated with two legacies. Firstly, he is remembered as a political theorist for his idiosyncratic revision of Thomas Hobbes. Secondly, he is associated with his magnum opus *Experience and Its Modes* which sought to redefine and defend the core principles of British Idealism. More recently a coterie of Oakeshottian scholars have emerged giving rise to some diverse readings. Oakeshott's *oeuvre* tends to suggest that above all he was an eclectic thinker who cannot be easily subsumed within specific schools of thought. Most interesting is Oakeshott's praising review of George Santayana's *Powers and Dominations* as, "an achievement of philosophical imagination such as we have become unaccustomed to in these days of minute analysis." This paper seeks to explore the continuities between Santayana and Oakeshott and in particular their shared scepticism about the certainty of human knowledge. It will be argued that for both this scepticism gives pluralism and entails a rejection of human perfectibility. Oakeshott and Santayana fundamentally agree that there is no rational

"good life." In Oakeshott this is a persistent theme throughout his thought and is revealed in his theory of "civil association."

Tessa Clews (UAuck)
Michel Foucault and the Trouble with Lesbians: Problems in Constructing a Genealogy of Female Same-Sex Desire

Michel Foucault's History of Sexuality, while one of the most important works to emerge in the philosophy of sexuality, has proved somewhat controversial in queer philosophy. Foucault's tracking of the epistemic shift from sexual practice to sexual identity has been discussed at length with regard to male homosexual and heterosexual practices, yet there remains a somewhat elusive figure within the history of sexuality – the historical "lesbian" is conspicuously absent. Those few scholars who have written on the subject of historical female same-sex practices have attempted to apply the same Foucauldian model used for the genealogy of male same-sex practices, however these discussions have tended to reveal large disparities between both genealogies. For this paper I will discuss problems in finding and constructing comprehensive lesbian genealogies. These include issues such as the lack of historically tangible laws banning female same-sex acts and dominance of male-centred pre-19th century narratives of lesbian sex that have overwhelmed and obscured the realities of the actual women involved. However, I also aim to show that Foucault's *History of Sexuality* does provide a number of useful and important discursive tools for a genealogy of female same-sex desire, particularly in the area of subject formation.

Dale Clisby (Deakin)
Deleuze's Secret Dualism?: Exploring Competing Approaches on the Relationship between the Virtual and the Actual

In his Difference and Repetition, Gilles Deleuze sets out a novel approach to the classic transcendental question: to explain the genesis of objects in the world. Key to this account are the dual concepts of the actual and the virtual, concepts Deleuze defines as the 'two halves of being.' This paper will provide an initial outline of the debate over the details of this conceptual couple in the secondary literature on the subject. More specifically, there is debate over the details of the relationship between the actual and the transcendental virtual. I will explore two approaches to this distinction. Firstly, those who read in Deleuze a 'virtual priority,' wherein

the actual is impoverished due to a uni-directional flow of the virtual. Secondly, philosopher's who understand the relationship between the virtual and the actual in a more reciprocal nature. Furthermore, I will show how the concept of intensity is crucial to an understanding of the virtual and the actual, a topic also subject to some debate. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn based on a close reading of these concepts as they appear in Difference and Repetition.

Richard Colledge (ACU)
Transgressive Realism and Heidegger

In a couple of very recent articles, Lee Braver has discussed a theme he has observed in the work of a range of Continental thinkers – from Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Levinas – which he has come to term, "Transgressive Realism". In this paper, I will focus primarily on his account of how this plays out in the work of Martin Heidegger. In broadly affirming Braver's observations, I take issue with his interpretation on two points. First, contrary to his view that this is a theme that emerges only in later Heideggerian thought, I claim that it is central to Heideggerian thought from the beginning. Second, and more significantly, I question the coherence of maintaining that Transgressive Realism leaves the hegemonic correlationism of phenomenology untouched. To the contrary, I maintain that the Transgressive points explicitly to *das Reale* which Heidegger famously distinguishes from *Realität* in *Sein und Zeit* (SZ 212/196). As such, it ruptures and points beyond Heidegger's phenomenologically delimited ontology of the *innerweltlich*.

Ashok Collins (ANU)
A Post-Deconstructive Spinoza? Transcendence and Immanence in Jean-Luc Nancy

Like in many other intellectual domains today, Spinoza serves as an enduring point of reference in post-Derridean French philosophy's engagement with the recurring spectre of the religious question. Spinozism, perhaps like no other philosophy, casts the divide between atheism and theism, religion and secularism, into doubt, while leaving open questions about metaphysical determination and the role of hermeneutics. As well as an engagement with Derridean deconstruction and Heidegerrian ontology, the contemporary French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy's 'deconstruction of Christianity' project also contains Spinozist

overtones that have often gone unnoticed in contemporary scholarship. My paper will seek to redress this gap by positioning Nancy's re-reading of the theist-atheist opposition within a current of thought emerging from Spinozism. Does the deconstruction of Christianity represent a departure point for a post-deconstructive Spinozist philosophy in which the opposition between theological transcendence and material immanence is radically transformed into what Nancy terms a *transimmanence*? In sketching out a response to this question, I will seek in particular to tease out the threads of what I will define as Nancy's Spinozist critique of Heidegger in order to highlight how his unique thinking on transcendence and immanence offers new avenues for engagement with Spinoza's 21st century legacy.

Daniel Connell (Deakin)
Nietzsche's Regional Ontology

Nietzsche's ontological philosophy has often been under explored, with his theories of (un)truth, power, and morality providing a fertile ground for exploration. However, in Nietzsche's latest works, particularly *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche starts to toy with an idea of a relational regional ontology which helps further develop his perspectivist epistemology. Nietzsche starts to explore a concept of regionality and relationalism of objects, where not only do judgements themselves, but objects as well possess a regional ontology. This helps underscore his perspectivist understanding of truth, where knowledge emerges from an entry into referential circle, both in terms of our judgements of the world, as well as the objects themselves. n analysing Nietzsche's ontology, as readers, we can get a better understanding of what Nietzsche means by truth and being, which helps redirect the reader away from postmodern anti-realist understandings of Nietzsche towards a more realist understanding of his work, where ideas such as truth, objectivity and realism are defended, not rejected.

Jane Connell
Freud, the Baroness Moser and Clinical Failure: The Meta-psychological Standing of the Compulsion to Repeat and the Deification of the Death Drives

Bridging the troubled theoretical waters between the *pleasure principle* and the *death instincts*, the *compulsion to repeat* is crucial to the Freudian

metapsychological schema and yet remains elusive *a propos* definition. Its empirical substantiation rests on reference to three patients—all women who left treatment against Freud's advice. His case study of the Baroness Moser, "Fraü Emmy," the sole developed clinical exegesis of the trope, is marked by inconsistencies that mirror these theoretical tensions. Freud came to see this treatment as flawed and naïve, calling it "a senseless and worthless proceeding." The Baroness, a recognised intellectual of her time, independently concluded that the treatment was superficial and repressive. Nonetheless Freud retrospectively attributed her departures from treatment as "a genuine case of the *compulsion to repeat*". It will be argued here that Freud's logics of praxis *vis-à-vis* the epistemological standing of patients' opinions and the heteronormative operations of his time led him to gratuitously attribute certain clinical failures to the *compulsion to repeat*. That the trope carries the imprint of this crisis of authority bears on the curious phenomenon of the persistent interpolative rebranding of the *death instincts* as Thanatos, as exemplified in Ricoeur's interpretation of Freud who, himself, never used the term.

Samuel Cuff Snow (Monash)
Tragic Politics: The Aesthetics of Revolution in Kant and Schiller

This paper will examine the connection in Kant and Schiller between the French Revolution and the aesthetic category of the sublime. In *The Contest of the Faculties*, Kant favours the standpoint of the aesthetic spectator over that of the political actor. The spectator is in the position to maintain the requisite distance from the fervour of the enthusiasm of the revolutionaries to take it as the basis for an awakening of her moral vocation. Such a distance, and the sympathetic participation (*Teilnehmung*) it permits – without the supposed perils of actual participation (*Teilnahme*) – is characteristic of the power of reflective judgement in its *aesthetic* mode. I will argue that Schiller, in a handful of philosophical-aesthetic essays from the 1790s on the sublime, the tragic and the pathetic, extends Kant's interconnection of the Revolution and sublimity in a number of important ways. First, for Schiller, sublimity falls on the side of the subject and the object. Or in other words, by examining sublimity and thus the Revolution in terms of his theory of tragedy, Schiller is concerned with the moral character of the protagonist as well as the spectator. Second, the sublimity of the Revolution can be set in service of Schiller's broader educational project. Finally, he embeds the Kantian division of the subject into its

rational and sensible sides within a philosophical anthropology of the vital, subjective drives (*Triebe*) and thus provides the resources for seeing the productive role of sensibility in the development of moral character.

Sarah Curtis (Independent Researcher)
Romantic Protestants and Psychoanalysis, or, The Desire of Lord Triumphs, when the Demands of Satan Relax.

"The last vomit of Satan" was coined by George Campbell Morgan to describe the Asuza Street Revival (1906-15) the birthplace of a global Pentecostal movement. Morgan's antipathy formed part of a charter by a group of clerics who composed *The Fundamentals* (1910-15) from which the current usage of the term 'fundamentalist' originates. On its face value, the Fundamentalist obsession with naming the apostate formed a pathological equal to the Pentecostal symptom of glossolalia. But is this all there is to say about these spheres of polemic affect? This paper will survey how contemporary Protestant experiments in religious communitarianism can be canonically related to a historical oscillation between desire and demand. Beginning with the 19th century Keswick Movement, it will trace how various protagonists embraced a Romantic impulse (Bebbington) by identifying liberal utilitarianism as the Other, and forming as their symptom a religious avant garde. It will consider how this symptom can be interrogated in relation to the argument on whether Christianity is dialectical (Žižek) or paradoxical (Millbank), and the difference between a church as a name-of-the-Father and the foreclosure of a nihilistic cult.

Mark Cutler (UQ)
Merleau-Ponty on Language

In his unfinished works, *The Visible and The Invisble* and *The Prose of The World*, Merleau-Ponty laid the groundwork for the next half-century of continental philosophy by radically rethinking language and its relationship to the subject. Though it retains an observed supervenience upon situated, bodily experience, it comes to a place of *'ontological'* priority. For a broad spectrum of human experience, language is no longer secondary to and derived from originary consciousness, but is itself the source of the consciousness which it also articulates: "linguistic expression is 'paradoxical' in the sense that it reveals the original mute meaning of perception yet remains a translation." I contend that Merleau-Ponty's 'paradoxical' conception of language—as both active and passive, both

originating and completing expression—has radical implications for the way philosophy itself is done. This paper outlines what it means to bind language to responsible, embodied subjects, and the implications of this conception for philosophy itself and the way we are to proceed therein.

Anya Daly (UMelb)
The Social Matrix: A Neuro-phenomenological Interrogation of Human Destructiveness in terms of the "I" and "We" Perspectives.

This paper seeks to better understand human destructiveness by definitively bringing to the fore Edmund Husserl's claim that "subjectivity is an intersubjectivity" as it corresponds to Trevarthen's three tiered account of subjectivity – specifically that at the level of primary subjectivity there are both the 'I' perspective and the 'we' perspective. In the current literature, this is again garnering attention - so that when first person perspectives are discussed, these not only refer to the 'I' perspective but also to the collective, plural 'we'. And so we need to go beyond ipseity, the 'me-ness' of experience to interrogate the 'us-ness' – at this primary ontological level, when identification expands beyond the atomistic individual 'I am' to encompass a 'belonging to' – and this comprehends race, family, culture, species and arguably sentience. This paper interrogates the dynamics of human destructiveness by drawing on the work of Husserl, Scheler and Merleau-Ponty and bringing this into useful dialogue with current findings in psychology and neuroscience. I propose that ethical failure can be understood as a kind of self-induced psychopathology.

Emma Davies (ANU)
Deconstructing the Human: Grievability and Nonhumans

In this paper I seek to offer a reading of Butler's investigation of grievability as a deconstruction of the human. Judith Butler's post 2001 work has engaged with ethical and political questions related to precariousness, vulnerability and grievability. Politically contextualising her inquiry into grievability, Butler argues that in order to make ethical claims about the rights of protection, entitlement, persistence and flourishing it is necessary first to reconsider the human subject and the grievable life. Her work on grievability has focussed on the regulation of affect, and while this enquiry has mostly engaged with the differentiation of grievability between human lives, I seek to explore what contribution

her enquiry might offer for ethics in the human-nonhuman relationship. From this lens I will explore what conceptual resources Butler's account might offer to inform ethics in the human-nonhuman relationship. I offer an ecofeminist reading of Butler's understanding of construction that links her discussion of abject bodies to nonhuman lives. In offering a reading of Butler's work on grievability as a deconstruction of the human, I explore the regulation of grievability with respect to nonhumans, calling into question the implications of her investigation for recognising grievability in the nonhuman sphere.

Max Deutscher (Emeritus, Macquarie)
Just imagine : J-P Sartre and Gilbert Ryle

In a striking similar fashion, Sartre (*L'imaginaire* 1936) and Ryle (*The Concept of Mind*, 1947) diagnose the tendency to reify mental images. Ryle's rich account of varieties of imagining is vital to his finding a way between dualism and behaviourism . Sartre puts to work the main ideas of *L'imaginaire* in *L'être et le néant* (1947?) as a vital to his project of deconstructing consciousness as *néant*. Like Ryle, this permits him also to make behaviour central in his philosophy of consciousness while not falling into a reductive physicalism. Thus, Sartre's dramatic language of consciousness as *néant* maps Ryle's conceptual deconstruction of mentality. I argue that each of them, in their radically different styles, make use of both cognitive and fictive versions of imaging, both in describing these phenomena and, more deeply, in the methods by which they accomplish their extensive projects.

Adam Dickerson (UCanberra)
Genealogy, History, Myth

The 'genealogical method', we are told, can be found in thinkers from Nietzsche (of course) to Foucault to Bernard Williams. The purpose of this method is to undermine or dissolve 'taken-for-granted' identities. It does this by showing, historically, that such identities lack a real, underlying *unity* or *essence* —precisely because they turn out to be something which history has knocked up from assorted odds and ends. In this way, genealogy is the use of historical narrative to prise away some of the 'musts' that constrict our thinking, and thus help us to free our theoretical imagination from constraints so overly familiar that we have forgotten that they are constraints. In this paper, I examine this notion of 'the

genealogical method'. I focus on two closely connected questions. First, how important is the *historical* dimension of genealogy? Nehamas remarks that genealogy "simply *is* history, correctly practiced," but is this true? Does the claim to be fact-stating play an essential role in a genealogy, or could the same job of 'dissolving unities' be achieved by something that explicitly announced itself as fiction? Secondly, how important is the *particularity* of genealogy? That is, what can a genealogical narrative achieve that an abstract argument cannot (e.g., an anti-essentialist argument about some particular phenomenon)?

Sarah Drews Lucas (USyd)
Plurality, Natality, and Narrativity: Finding Feminist Resources in Hannah Arendt

In this paper, I do three related things. First, I endorse the point of view of those feminists who look to Arendtian political theory as a productive counter approach to identity politics (Benhabib 1992; Allen 1999; Zerilli 2005, Borren 2013). Arendt's politics allow us to avoid the pitfalls of identity politics, which include essentializing identity, projecting sameness when there is none, and privileging claims based on collective identity at the expense of meaningful interactions between individuals. The fluctuation between identity and non-identity that Arendt describes makes room for a more nuanced account of politics because individual agents are able to align themselves (and re-align themselves) according to shared interests that arise between them rather than according to pre-determined things held in common. Second, I describe a model of feminist politics that illustrates this process of shared interest and collective action by drawing on two fundamental aspects of Arendt's theory of action—plurality and natality. Plurality is the field of uniqueness which forms the context for action. Natality is the inescapable initiative to appear within this public sphere as a unique agent. Third, and finally, I gesture toward the possibility of narrativity—which is the mode through which all action, and not just effective action, is expressed—as progressive feminist methodology.

Simone Drichel (Otago)
Cartesian Narcissism

In his analysis of various philosophical "visions of narcissism," David Michael Levin includes a brief discussion of Descartes' Meditations,

framing them as "a psycho-logic of moments in the symptom formation of narcissistic pathology." This paper draws on the work of D. W. Winnicott to explore Levin's proposed conjunction between the Cartesian cogito and narcissism from the point of view of psychoanalytic object relations theories. In Winnicott's "anti-Cartesian meditations," authentic self-experience emerges not in isolation, as it does for Descartes' cogito, but through an encounter with another. In fact, Winnicott fundamentally reconfigures Cartesian subjectivity, replacing the Cartesian formula of the self-founding cogito with a relational understanding: "When I look I am seen, so I exist. I can now afford to look and see." Read through a Winnicottian lens, the Meditations hence present as the documentation of pathological self-development: a narcissistic form of development in which what Winnicott calls "the overgrowth of the mental function" is a response to unsatisfying object relations. Instead of testifying to wholesome rational self-certainty, the cogito, under Winnicott's analysis, may therefore more aptly be viewed as a defence response to relational trauma—a reinterpretation which, I propose, challenges us to reframe, and renegotiate, the Cartesian legacy.

Alicia Evans (ACU)

Foucault and Lacan: Sexuality, Language and Psychoanalysis

In *The History of Sexuality* Foucault problematized the concept of sexuality. He argued that, in the nineteenth century, sex acts became an object of medical science and subject to a pathologizing classification system. He also critiqued a classifying aspect of Freud's work, and proposed that psychoanalysis aimed at normalization via its listening and interpretive methods. Foucault's view of psychoanalysis was complex though, and not limited to this critique. However, in this paper, I take up this particular critique of psychoanalysis to consider methodological approaches to psychoanalytic practice as well as various concepts of the unconscious within psychoanalysis, in relation to the concept of sexuality. I then turn to a consideration of some of Lacan's work, particularly his concept of the signifier and his famous dictum: There is no sexual relation. I will argue that psychoanalysis is premised on the notion of an unconscious that produces both a lack of complementarity and balance – this lack of relation. It is this premise that must be maintained in order to answer Foucault's critique and illustrate how sexuality is a redundant concept in

psychoanalysis. Rather, sex is an act that speaks of the particularity of pleasure and the way language is entwined in this.

Ingo Farin (UTas)
Heidegger's Black Notebooks in Context

In March 2014 Heidegger's so-called *Black Notebooks* were published. The first responses were entirely focused on Heidegger's anti-Semitic remarks, culminating in the charge that Heidegger's history of being is based on an anti-Semitic prejudice and entirely beholden to it. In my paper I attempt to show that this condemnation is not defensible at all. There is no sufficient textual evidence for that claim, although there is evidence that Heidegger held anti-Semitic views. A hermeneutically informed reading of the *Notebooks* shows that after his enthusiasm for the Nazis in the early 1930s Heidegger actually works on a philosophical critique of Nazism. In fact, the *Notebooks* reveal a criticism around the "barbarism of the heart" that is worthwhile exploring. In my paper I shall analyse whether this position is consistent with Heidegger's own anti-humanism. Apart from this, my paper explores Heidegger's critique of the technological imperatives of our modern civilization that threaten to make a wasteland of the earth. I shall argue that Heidegger's critique in the *Notebooks* is still pertinent in an age where globalization and technological barbarism undermine the very essence of humankind.

Joanne Faulkner (UNSW)
Homelessness, The Uncanny Child and Settler Colonial Sovereignty

The legacy of settler colonialism sits uncomfortably upon the Australian nation state, as we presently contemplate amending the constitution, but in lieu of dealing with the implications of Aboriginal sovereignty and dispossession. Tony Abbott — even as he calls himself the "Prime Minister for indigenous affairs" — has also stated, in triumphal tones, that the arrival of the first fleet is Australia's most defining moment. This paper argues that we can understand such incapacity to contemplate the nation's debt to Aboriginal people, and our own tortured relation to 'home,' in the *unheimlich* figure of the child in the Australian social imaginary. Particularly the fascination with Aboriginal children in recent years — in both cultural and political life — signals the exhaustion of 'the child's' usefulness in negotiating the meaning for Australians of home and belonging.

Tom Frost (University of Sussex)
The* Dispositif *Between Foucault and Agamben

This paper explores how Giorgio Agamben and Michel Foucault conceive of the relationship between life, power and controlling apparatuses, or *dispositifs*. Although many scholars think Agamben is derivative to Foucault, this article argues that both philosophers conceive of resistance in differing, and important, ways. Foucault uses the *dispositif* as a genealogical tool to demonstrate how modernity has attempted to define man within an 'analytic of finitude'. Foucault contends that the *dispositif* is not totalising – there is always room for thought from the outside, with the subject being prior to and in excess of power relations. Whereas Foucault sees life as containing a transcendent, illimitable force, Agamben contends that resistance, in order to be effective, must take place on the plane of immanence. Only by thinking an immanent life, not a passage to a new body which would escape the powers of capture, is it possible to escape the control of the *dispositif*. It is through exploring these crucial differences in Agamben's and Foucault's thought that they open up new and divergent ways of theorising both life and resistance.

Christian Gelder (UNSW)
Between the Poem and the Matheme: Meillassoux and Mallarmé

Recent French philosopher Quentin Meillassoux is one of the leading figures associated with the Speculative Realism movement in philosophy. Meillassoux's thought has attempted to enact a return to realism proper; a return to thinking what falls beyond language, consciousness, and the subject. Nonetheless, throughout his career Meillassoux has exhibited a curious fascination with the poet Stéphane Mallarmé. In 2012, this culminated in a monograph that gave a numerological reading of Mallarmé's final poem, the *Coup de dés*. This paper will argue that the critical reception of Meillassoux's work has foreclosed his literary theory; that for Meillassoux literature represents the most foundational discourse; and that viewing his project in light of this necessitates a repositioning of the way literature, science, and philosophy operate in his work. I will defend Meillassoux's thought against accusations of scientism, while also attempting to provide a systematic examination of Meillassoux's philosophy that takes into account the premium he places upon the literary.

R.A. Goodrich (UMelb)
Kurt Goldstein and the Abstract-Concrete Distinction

Physician-philosopher Kurt Goldstein, especially in his collaboration with psychologist Adhémar Gelb, is possibly best known for developing a holistic (or "organismic") conception of mind based upon patients with brain trauma seen during the Great War in the neurological institute at the University of Frankfurt. The implications of this re-conceptualisation form the focus of this paper.Goldstein effectively synthesized his thinking in his arguably most influential 1934 monograph, *Der Aufbau des Organismus*. Although it failed to gain much traction with upholders of prevailing Anglo-American behaviourist orthodoxies, early twentieth-century intellectuals outside his immediate neurological domain remained in dialogue with him. Amongst them were such philosophers as Ernst Cassirer and Maurice Merleau-Ponty as well as the developmental psychologists Heinz Werner and Lev Vygotskii. In this paper, we shall critically examine one of Goldstein's central contentions about the holistic nature of mind, particularly his conception of an abstract-concrete distinction revealed by pathological cases. This distinction will be assessed in terms of both the arguments stemming from the above-mentioned continental thinkers and those associated with the analytical tradition during the same period.

Simone Gustafsson (UMelb)
Merleau-Ponty and Schelling on Kant's Concept of Nature

For Merleau-Ponty, Kant's Copernican revolution installed humanism "at the center" of the intelligible world; in Kantian philosophy it is the human subject who "carries Being." Merleau-Ponty outlines what he terms the 'double meaning' of Kant's revolution: the anthropological meaning, and the absolutism of the subject. In the first *Critique*, Kant thinks Nature "cavalierly as a correlation of subject to object," while in the third *Critique* the "the solidarity of the constructed with the given" is loosened (*Nature*, pp. 83, 24). Nonetheless, for Merleau-Ponty, Kant's concept of nature is an impoverished one. Merleau-Ponty then turns to Schelling, who in claiming to 'follow' and indeed remain faithful to the spirit of Kant, developed his philosophy of nature as part of an attempt to establish a system of transcendental idealism. In Schelling's nature philosophy, ontology and epistemology converge: "it is not, therefore, that we know Nature as *a priori*, but Nature is *a priori*" (*First Outline*, pp. 198). Schelling's philosophy

offers a concept of Nature that is much more in line with Merleau-Ponty's later thought. This paper will outline Merleau-Ponty's critique of Kant and discuss the significance of Schelling's philosophy of nature for Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontological project. (194 words)

Maurita Harney (UMelb)
The Philosophy of C.S.Peirce – A 'Continental' Perspective

American philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914) is something of an enigma in philosophical circles. Although popular and influential in some analytical circles, he is arguably more relevant, and his ideas more congenial to, thinkers in the continental tradition. Peirce himself seems to have been indifferent to the growing phenomenological movement in Europe and critical of Husserl. However, in this paper, I argue that Peirce's philosophy has a very rich contribution to make to continental philosophy, especially as it has evolved in recent years. I focus specifically on the themes of mind, nature, and cognition, showing how Peirce's ideas on these topics can further illuminate, and be illuminated by, recent work on the phenomenological philosophy of the later Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Sam Harper-Russell (UQ)
Nietzsche and the Problem of Hubris

Orientated within Genealogy, this presentation examines Nietzsche's intuitions regarding epigenetic inheritance (pre-historical influences on gene expression) and how they function in his philosophy. It is intently guided by Nietzsche's particular notion of Hubris, which is considered to be an index to a series of problems that are ever more pressing in modern life. Similar to other unconscious mechanisms, human Pride expresses the general aim of the instincts: conservation of the agent. Hubris is an excessive form of pride – an unconscious mechanism designed to conserve the integrity of the agent in threatening situations – which transforms into an imprudent reaction. It is the result of a crisis of confidence caused by prehistoric influences (namely, the epigenetic inheritance of self-cruelty), and following such a crises, its character expresses itself as an aggressive type of repressive attitude. The most general effect of hubris is the tendency to paralyse inventive moves. It impedes self-cultivation, and via its excessive force can influence intersubjective codes and contaminate others. It is an internal impediment in incorporating the nascent notions of existence, and expresses itself externally as a self-referential voice against

allowing new voices to exist in others. This is a problem for the type of philosophy Nietzsche espouses, which has, "Two tasks: to defend the new [ideas] against the old, and to connect the old with the new" (Philosophy and Truth 109). More generally speaking, it is a problem for notions of critical theory, education, and self-cultivation.

Aaron Harrison (LaTrobe)
Wittgenstein's Phenomenological Voice

It seems we are on the threshold of a new orthodoxy in the reception of Wittgenstein's philosophy. At one time, a scholar trying to discuss Wittgenstein alongside some continental phenomenologist would be fighting an uphill battle. Now it is often taken as given that Wittgenstein (especially in his later philosophy) has more in common with the post-Husserlian phenomenological tradition than with the most prominent strains of contemporary analytic philosophy. I argue that there certainly is a phenomenological strain in Wittgenstein's thought. I attempt to briefly characterise this strain and to locate it in his work, especially those remarks composed after 1946. I use the motif of a 'phenomenological voice', modeled on David Stern's identification of multiple voices in Wittgenstein (Stern, 2004), to show how we can recognise that the affinities between Wittgenstein and the phenomenological tradition do indeed run deep, while showing at the same time how the structure of Wittgenstein's thought puts some distance between the entertaining of a phenomenological outlook and its outright endorsement.

Paul Healy (Swinburne)
Hermeneutic Truth as Dialogical Disclosure

Notwithstanding its prominence in the title of Gadamer's major work, the concept of truth remains implicit, underspecified, and correspondingly enigmatic in Gadamer's writings. Not surprisingly, then, it is often assumed that the Gadamerian truth conception closely resembles the Heideggerian, with its emphasis on a sudden, disclosive truth event, as epitomised by metaphors of "lighting" and "lightening". But while this interpretation resonates well with Gadamer's own emphasis on aesthetic truth and the model of play (*Spiel*) in the first part of *Truth and Method,* it fails to do justice to his emphasis in the second part on the need for investigating a topic dialogically. In the process, it leaves hermeneutic truth open to charges of arbitrariness, subjectivism, and relativism,

especially in light of Gadamer's well-known dictum that we always "understand in a different way, if we understand at all". In response, the present paper seeks to develop a conception of hermeneutic truth which counterbalances these strands in Gadamer's thinking, in the process differentiating Gadamer's conception of hermeneutic truth from that of Heidegger and thereby rendering it less prone to charges of arbitrariness, subjectivism, or relativism.

Jay Hetrick (American University in Dubai)
Against "Vitalism": The Uses and Abuses of Bergson in Critical Theory

Maurizio Lazzarato has recently stated that 'while Marx indicated the methodology with which to discover living labor beyond work, he is of no help in discovering the forces that underlie ... the conditions of contemporary capitalism.' Lazzarato then continues with the rather startling claim that it is in fact 'Bergson who should be understood as the conceptual personae who has constructed an ontology' adequate to our era of post-Fordism and immaterial labor. This paper will attempt to highlight the conditions under which Lazzarato is able to make such a startling move by revisiting the historical debate surrounding Bergson and then constructing a kind of counter-lineage to the normal reception of critical theory. I will examine the various explicit as well as more ambiguous dismissals of Bergson in the works of Bloch, Lukács, Horkheimer, and Adorno. I will then analyze Benjamin's relation to Bergson in order to show that it is here that such a counter-lineage should begin. But while Benjamin limits the use of Bergson for his conception of time against Marx's historical materialism, Lazzarato takes one further step towards Bergson, embracing his metaphysics in order to construct an entirely new political ontology devoid of negative dialectics.

Alison Horbury (LaTrobe)
Femininity in Aronofsky's 'Black Swan': Tragedy, Sublimation, and the Real

Exploring Darren Aronofsky's dark fairy-tale *Black Swan* (2010), I consider how the film dramatizes something of the psychoanalytic Real in its staging of the ballerina whose performing body disturbs contemporary thoughts on gender. I suggest that in the discomforting mix of body-horror and psycho-melodrama, the film might productively be understood

as approximating the effects of Tragic Art. The ascetic femininity of ballerina heroine Nina (Natalie Portman) jars with the erotic representations of women in post-feminist cultures, yet reductive readings of the film as nothing but the objectifying male gaze of Aronofsky nevertheless followed. Where the film approaches the Real through erotic discovery and sublimation, it was also derided: as one reviewer put it, "The presumption of the film is that disinterest in sex automatically means sexual repression, which automatically means aesthetic blockage. Art must be erotic, according to these terms. This is stupid." I revisit the function of sublimation in Tragedy and consider, following Nietzsche's *The Birth of Tragedy*, how Dionysian and Apollonian impulses work in *Black Swan* to articulate a crisis of the Real in feminine subjectivity around the performing body of the ballerina. It will be my contention that in *Black Swan*, Nina's ascetic ballerina provides a metaphor for contemporary feminist structures that negate the Real, staging the tragic consequences of this negation through her spectacular psychosis.

Wayne Hudson (UTas)
Creative Enlightenment After Hegel

In this paper I argue that a contemporary form of global Enlightenment is needed which learns from philosophical and spiritual traditions world-wide, while addressing institutional specificities in politics, law and economics. Such philosophy is not narrowly theoretic, but both moral metaphysical and institutionally reformist. It is less Eurocentric than what is usually called 'continental philosophy' and also more interested in specific changes of organizational form and practice. Drawing inspiration from Hegel, philosophy of this type crosses cultural and disciplinary boundaries and has the capacity to impact both on our understanding of Enlightenment and on contemporary debates about the postsecular.

Joshua Hurd (Otago)
Revealed yet Hidden: Kierkegaard on the Divine Incognito

Kierkegaard's account of divine revelation is, both in form and in substance, deeply paradoxical and dialectical. Indeed, Kierkegaard arguably spends as much time emphasizing divine concealment as he does speaking about divine revelation. Yet he often stresses hiddenness when he considers it appropriate to the subjects at hand (e.g. faith, sin, and the incarnation). Hiddenness is especially fitting to a discussion of the

incarnation, which one of his pseudonyms proclaims "is not an event like other events, which once they are over pass into history and then, as the distant past, pass into oblivion (PC, 9)." In this paper I will examine the role that divine hiddenness plays in Kierkegaard's account of divine revelation. I will limit this investigation principally to Anti-Climacus's *Practice in Christianity*, and more particularly to his discussion of the divine incognito. Lastly, I will argue that Kierkegaard takes the act of divine revealing also to be an act of divine re-*veiling*, and that this re-*veiling* does not undermine divine revelation but actually secures it.

Heikki Ikäheimo (UNSW)
Conceptualizing Causes for Lack of Recognition

In contemporary Hegel-influenced philosophy recognition (*Anerkennung*) is mostly thought of as a good thing. Some see it as a pre-condition of positive, individual or collective self-conceptions or -identities, others even as ontologically foundational of the human life-form and thus as something without which we could not exist as human beings at all. But if recognition is indeed such an important and good thing, and if it is in principle something humans can give each other, why should there ever be lack of it? There are several candidates for explanation. First, it may be that recognition—the giving or receiving of it or both—requires capacities or skills that are not always available. Secondly, it may be that recognition, even though all things considered good, involves costs, which leads to reluctance. Thirdly and relatedly, even if recognition is objectively good for the individuals or groups involved, fathoming this, or being able to experience its goodness, especially against experienced costs that it may incur, may nevertheless require intellectual capacities or wisdom that the concerned individuals do not necessarily possess. This paper discusses these candidates, utilizing the Hegelian concept of concrete freedom.

Andrew Inkpin (UMelb)
Phenomenology of language in a 4e-world

In recent years there has been much productive interaction between phenomenology and ('4e') cognitive science emphasizing the embodied, embedded, enactive and extended nature of cognition. So far, however, little attention has been paid to the theme of language, which 4e cognitive science continues to conceive in terms of propositional meaning and rule-governed symbol use. This paper argues that a phenomenological

approach to language can enrich and critically complement 4e cognitive science. Drawing on Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, I first outline a phenomenological conception of language which, in addition to overcoming traditional dualisms, focuses on contextually situated pragmatic and presentational feats of language use that underlie propositional and context-independent understanding. After noting some important convergences between this conception and 4e cognitive science, I consider the objection that the latter's scientific approach leaves no task for a phenomenology of language. In response I argue that the need to articulate and converge with a phenomenological conception of language is inherent in the function 4e cognitive science attributes to environmental 'scaffolds'. This need both distinguishes language ontologically, as a cognitive artefact rather than mere matter, and grounds the need for phenomenology and 4e cognitive science to complement each other in the study of language.

Jack Isherwood (ACU)
Civility and Political Contestation

This paper argues that norms of civility constitute an essential regulatory ideal for public political discourse in two senses. From an epistemic perspective, they provide principled criteria to guide reasoned, sincere and informed dialogue whilst also facilitating the public critique of deceitful, manipulative and inflammatory kinds of political rhetoric. From a normative perspective, they embody a performative stance of respect for the dignity and autonomy of other individuals whilst also encouraging greater receptivity towards different perspectives and viewpoints. Furthermore, I also stress that civility norms are essential to maintaining a political climate where principles of democratic equality are valued, illustrating through the example of 'hate speech' how forms of 'uncivil' discourse can marginalize and exclude individuals from public life. Consequently, I argue that norms of civility ought to actively promoted by public institutions and I shall make a number of proposals to how this might be achieved. I will conclude the paper by noting some of the criticisms presented against the notion of civility and suggest that they can be accommodated if norms of civility are encouraged alongside widening the opportunities and capabilities of people to contest prevailing political arrangements.

Richard Iveson (UQ)
Spectral Leaps: Diagram, Discontinuity, and the Law of Anachrony

The law of anachrony, insists Jacques Derrida in *Specters of Marx*, is given by a *fantastique générale* or *imagination transcendentale* that, as other to the schematic constitution of linear time and the time of exchange, must give its law of general economy to an 'invincible' spectrality that is synonymous with virtuality. Such a givenness, in short, requires a *quantum leap* outside of schematic models of time and of classical causality and, indeed, outside of temporality itself. As such, its event can be recognized 'by nothing other than the excess of this untimely dis-identification, therefore by nothing that is.' In further exploring the relation of Derrida's 'law of anachrony' to the spectral temporality of the quantum leap, however, this paper considers the possibility of *diagramming* (in the Deleuzian sense) the logic and event of spectrality by way of readings of Manuel DeLanda's algorithm of emergence and Gilbert Simondon's axiom of individuation, showing too that Simondon's *analogical* separation of concretization and individuation cannot be maintained and must therefore be replaced by a relation of *complementarity*.

Katrina Jaworski (UniSA)
The Gift of suicide

A person suicides. On the one hand, something about their will to die remains distinctly their own, shrouded by the privacy of the material act of suicide. On the other hand, their will to die is interpreted as selfish and irrational by those haunted by grief and loss. How do we respond to this schism, which more often than not contains deeply moralising overtones? How do we acknowledge the loss of those who grieve without undermining the agency of those who choose to die? Suicidology, namely the field committed to the study of suicide, does not offer any help, but philosophy and cultural theory do. Drawing on the work of Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and Emmanuel Levinas, I propose we address this schism by theorising suicide as an ethical gift. I begin by problematising the ontological status of suicide as an individual act. I then use my critique to develop suicide as an ethical gift as means of wrestling with its incongruous and painful nature.

Campbell Jones (UAuck)
The Work of Others

While the world of work for most today remains drudgery without end, almost all consideration of the present economic formation and the social relations that accompany it remain within the orbit of what can be called the ordinary or 'vulgar' conception of work. On this conception, work is taken to be the activity of one individual at one moment in time. Against this conception, which remains largely unchallenged in most efforts to contest or reform capitalism, the challenge is to construct a concept of work that makes visible the range of productive activities that take place but are occluded by the vulgar conception of work. Alongside other important philosophical developments in the concept of work, in this paper I reactivate first Hegel's critiques of atomism and mechanism and his thinking of the other and second some of the diverse efforts of the past seventy years to think the corporeal, symbolic and affective dimensions of the other. These lines of thought offer, I argue, grounds for constructing a concept of work that is attentive to the range of exertions that are the concrete grounds of historical and present economic life. Against the vulgar conception of work, thought attentive to the work of others produces potent new prospects for radical economic and social change.

Wojciech Kaftanski (ACU)
Kierkegaard's Imitation as Phenomenological Reduction

This paper argues that Kierkegaard's imitation is a devotional and meditational exercise that can be read as a sort of phenomenological reduction. The practice offered by Kierkegaard aims at suspending the unquestioned understanding of the world and the natural attitude towards oneself. This rigorous undertaking results in disclosure of the self in direct presence to oneself—a moment Kierkegaard calls "truly to be present to oneself in this *today*." The moment is preceded by the experience of the self's "being before God," which establishes the transcendental dimension of the subject. As such the subject is reaffirmed as meaningful, because, on the one hand its very essence is grasped in "the simple" of this *today*; and on the other hand it has transcendental/theological breadth. Disclosure is the outcome only of intuitive observation, which Kierkegaard juxtaposes with disinterested perception, which is by contrast directed merely at the appearance, semblance, or re-presentation of both the self and the world. Contrary to what has been asserted by some scholars that Kierkegaard's

imitation is irrational and unstructured, and moreover, that it has only individual and religious dimensions, I show the meditation as diligently planned, intended for repetitive realization and as to be undertaken with methodical strictness.

Max Kaiser (Monash)
Wendy Brown, Alain Badiou and Capitalist Realism

This paper is an examination of the ideological conditions of our contemporary world. I utilise and expand upon Mark Fisher's concept of 'capitalist realism' to outline a general theory of these ideological conditions with a particular focus on the current juncture of political thought. Fisher provides us with a new critical periodisation which builds on yet modifies Jameson's concept of 'postmodernism'. Through an in-depth examination of the theories and philosophies of Alain Badiou and Wendy Brown I fill out and expand on the concept of 'capitalist realism'. Badiou provides a philosophical and ontological basis for thinking 'capitalist realism'. Brown elucidates a theory which provides a fuller depiction of the subjective basis of 'capitalist realism'. As well as comparing and contrasting Badiou's and Brown's thinking, I suggest that tendencies in their writings are symptomatic of larger problems within current left anti-capitalist thought. Drawing upon psychoanalysis and affect theory I suggest some provisional approaches for thinking through these problems.

Onur Karamercan (UTas)
Ethics of Language, Heidegger

My point of departure is the necessity to explicate the imminent ethical relation between the notion of language and dwelling in Heidegger's philosophy. Heidegger's statement that "language is the house of being" is either taken for granted or disregarded as a mystical statement, which is one of the reasons why it requires more critical scrutiny. In the contemporary discussions there is a real lack of direct engagement with this topic. My theses are that (1) language can be conceived of as a dwelling-place, which is a view that Heidegger proffered, but left unarticulated, and (2) in order to understand what "place" is, one needs to conduct an investigation that departs from the notion of "ethos", which originally means 'abode, habitat', and arrives at "topos". Accordingly, language is that on the grounds of which inhabiting a place becomes

possible. Therefore, I will also discuss how Heidegger's "topology of being" facilitates an ethical reading of Heidegger's later work. In doing so, later Heidegger's broad understanding of language will also be defended against the view that restricts language to "philosophy of discourse".

Mark Kelly (UWS)
Discontinuity in Late Twentieth Century French Epistemology

In this paper, I provocatively suggest a binary division of late twentieth century French philosophy into two camps, based on a division between two distinct positions on the relation of knowledge to reality, one arguing for a continuity of the two, the other a fundamental discontinuity. In the latter, 'discontinuist' camp, I place most notably Michel Foucault and Jacques Lacan; to the former, 'continuist' camp, I assign principally Gilles Deleuze and Jacques Derrida, whose discourses of 'difference' I interpret as being an attempt to reconcile knowledge and reality without acknowledging the necessity of scission and suture to the relationship of humans with their world. Rather, continuists I argue attempt through an acknowledgement of difference to repress an insurmountable rift between words and things. This leads them to posit nefarious historical forces as perpetuating the rift, and to cast themselves as engaged in an epochal struggle for its reparation. This division derives originarily, although eccentrically, from Foucault's reading of contemporaneously recent French philosophy as made up of two strands, one influenced by the French philosophy of science, the other primarily by phenomenology.

James Kent (Monash)
Kracauer as Reader of Collingwood

Siegfried Kracauer's reading of the work of R. G. Collingwood illuminates the crisis point in the relation between philosophy, history, and how the present is thought. Kracauer, in what would amount to a dismissal of Collingwood's philosophy, what he considers a remnant from the eschatological rubble of nineteenth century historicism, conjures the journey of Orpheus into the underworld as representative of the historian's task. Kracauer's attempt to broach a new philosophy of historical time took as its point of departure the philosophical desire to radically re-imagine the present. Collingwood who, I will argue, shared Kracauer's hopes of rescue, and grounded his project within a similar ontology of 'humanity' relates the historical task unambiguously to the role of the

present, but also writes with an understanding of the underlying tragedy of history as being crucial to the formulation of the philosophical task in the present, and the subsequent implied necessity, of the present's shaping of the philosophical task. Kracauer's reading of Collingwood resonates with a surprising urgency, not simply because it is mistaken, but also because the Orphean metaphor which Kracauer intended to dismiss Collingwood's position, illuminates precisely why Collingwood shared Kracauer's historico-philosophical hopes. The historical task in being linked with the philosophical, must embody some hope for the present. The Orphean journey, fate dictates, demands a return.

David Lah (UNSW)
The Hegelian Person: From Nature to Spirit.

Hegel's absolute idealism is often seen as incompatible with a naturalistic or non-metaphysical account of what it means to be a person by commentators from both the Anglo-American and Continental schools. However, given the claim made by Hegel in the 1832 *Science of Logic* that, all grounds are in some way mediated, I show that there is a reading of Hegel that permits a naturalistic understanding of the development of personhood while still being sensitive to ontological or metaphysical structures. The focal work in this exposition is Hegel's 1817 *Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, with an emphasis on later two volumes: the *Philosophy of Nature* and the *Philosophy of Mind*. This allows me to trace the development of personhood from its biological origins, through to the uniquely Hegelian notions of Objective and Absolute Spirits, while at the same time showing profound interaction between supposedly disparate elements like teleology and empiricism and the first-person perspective and inter-subjectivity.

Latip, H.A & Said, S.A (University Malaysia of Sarawak)
Action Readiness towards Changes and Innovation in Service Industry: The Impact of Philosophical Mood

This paper discusses the relationship between mood and thinking in philosophy, in specific context of business changes and innovation. As emotion control can itself result from a motive state or state of action readiness, we argue that philosophical mood has the potential to affect selective attention to information, perceptions and to action readiness capacity. The qualitative effects of philosophical mood on positive and

negative affective state were analyzed based on multiple-case study of selected players in service industry, i.e., consulting firm, government agency, a non-government organization (NGO), and private higher education institution. The paper contributes by providing a conceptual framework that illuminates the impact of philosophical mood on manager's action readiness towards changes and innovation in service industry.

Martin Leckey (UMelb)
A Speculative Realist Model: Heidegger's Nightmare or a Glimpse of Ereignis?

This paper considers a particular realist model of space and matter in light of recent debates about realism in continental philosophy. I outline my own speculative model of "prespace" metaphysics and a modified quantum mechanics, whereby space is broken up into a lattice of points and where physical quantities are discrete rather than continuous. In explicating this model I use a computational metaphor, namely the hardware\software relationship, to help express the relation between prespace and space, and to explain extensions of the model beyond microphysics. The model is both reductionist and holist in character. I situate this framework within the field of speculative realism, particularly in comparison to the object-oriented ontology of Graham Harman. In doing this I utilise Harman's interpretation of Heidegger's fourfold, and consider my model's implications with respect to Heidegger's understanding of being in the age of technology. Does my model reinforce the technological-metaphysical picture of the world that Heidegger warns us about, or might it point the way to a different and less harmful ontology, more in keeping with Heidegger's hoped-for post-technological age of *Ereignis*?

Martyn Lloyd (UQ)
Philosophy without Reason: The Case of Diderot and the Effect of Helvétius

In striking contrast to the manner in which enlightenment philosophy is generally represented much of the period was in fact extremely suspicious of abstract reasoning. As the period's progressive philosophy increasingly inclined toward materialism this suspicion extended to a series of sustained attempts to eliminate the faculty of reason and reduce its

functions to the single faculty of sensation and so to the passions. This tendency is marked in Denis Diderot's early writings and particularly in Helvétius's notorious *De l'esprit* a text which has been described as the most 'extravagant exaltation of the passions in the eighteenth century.' Yet this elimination was not without intellectual costs and it generated anxieties including for the mature Diderot whose writings show nostalgia for universal rational truth. What was at stake was this: in the philosophy of mid-eighteenth century France, the ambivalent relationship between reason and the passions was an effect of the fact that the *philosophes* sought, on the one hand to eliminate the faculty of rationality and reduce reason to sensation and the passions, and on the other hand to maintain the enlightening status of philosophy and of reason.

Simon Lumsden (UNSW)
On the Limits of Community in Hegel's Social Philosophy

Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right' seldom uses the term community. His primary frame of reference for understanding communal life is the state and civil society. Hegel was acutely aware that modern life had primarily produced an individualised freedom and that such freedom was largely incompatible with the type of communal shared project that was for example at the heart of Greek ethical life. Nevertheless running through the heart of Hegel's project is a concern with reconciliation and an aspiration that we be at home with ourselves. Given that Hegel thinks such individualised freedom is fundamentally unsatisfactory this paper examines if Hegel thinks the modern state forms the modern domain in which humans can satisfy the demand for wholeness and to be at home with themselves?

Wendyl Luna (UNSW)
The Re-conceptualization of the Kantian "Critique": A Foucauldian "Kehre"

In some of his later writings, Foucault aligns himself with the Kantian critical tradition and identifies himself as a "Kantian" in some sense. Given his strong criticism of Kant in the early part of his philosophical career, Foucault's later association with Kant makes him appear contradictory and inconsistent with himself. The aim of this paper is to present Foucault's re-conceptualization of the Kantian "critique" as a "kehre" or turn in Foucault's thought. When taken into consideration, this Foucauldian

"kehre" sheds light not only on Foucault's discordant reception of Kant but also on the broader consequences of this change of view for his philosophy. Among the implications of this turn that will be elucidated in this paper is Foucault's emphasis on the need to ground the conception and practice of "critique" on historico-political experience. Foucault engages in a "transcendental" analysis of the "conditions of possibility", as shown, for example, by his seemingly contradictory idea of "historical a priori". However, the Kantian transcendental critique is highly problematic for him and hardly a model for his own philosophical project. He finds Nietzsche as his model and inspiration for his archaeological/genealogical criticism.

Craig Lundy (UOW)
Counterfactuals and 'What If' Accounts of History: A Critique of Possibility

The use of counterfactuals in historical analysis, or what is other referred to as 'what if' accounts of history, is a point of contention amongst historians and philosophers of history. While some have argued that the positing of counterfactual possibilities are a part of all explanations into 'what actually happened', others such as E. P Thompson and E. H. Carr have denounced the contemplation of counterfactuals as 'unhistorical crap', or at best a 'parlour game'. Common to both advocates and detractors, however, is a conventional conception of possibility, whereby an occurrence is said to be 'possible' before it is 'realised'. This paper will forward a critique of the paradigm of possibility that is presupposed by all sides of the debate over counterfactuals. By drawing on the metaphysics of Henri Bergson and Gilles Deleuze, I will outline an alternative understanding of counterfactuals as virtual but not actual, real and ideal but not possible or abstract. As such, this paper will suggest a new role for counterfactuals in the analysis of historical reality, and by extension our contemporary condition.

Jane Lymer (UOW)
Alterity and the Maternal in Adoptee Phenomenology.

In March 2012, the Australian NSW Government released the findings of an enquiry into adoption which found that identity formation in adoptees was profoundly shaped by the fact of their adoption. Previous research has also identified that disproportionate percentages of adopted children

experience increased psychological vulnerability and are overrepresented in specialised schools for learning disabled children. The conclusion drawn is that although adoptees can flourish, they nonetheless must negotiate an unusual developmental pathway which leaves them vulnerable to certain pathologies not experienced by children raised within their biological families. In this paper I draw upon theories of developmental alterity proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Emmanual Levinas in order to attempt to trace this unusual developmental pathway. I take as a starting point the role of the maternal body which I propose as a primal alterity in the development of foetal ipsiety and alterity. Then, drawing upon theories of infant bonding and attachment, I identify that it is a disruption to the continuation of the gestational maternal foetal relation that seems to best account for adoptee symptomatology.

Shane Mackinlay (University of Divinity)
The Hermeneutics of Banal Saturation

When Jean-Luc Marion first introduced saturated phenomena, they were presented as exceptional. However, he became increasingly clear that saturated phenomena are of interest not only in themselves, but also because they are paradigms for phenomenality in general. He also gave increasing attention to ways in which the appearing of saturated phenomena might be obstructed or prevented. Both of these developments suggest that saturated phenomena should be regarded as much more common than was indicated earlier. Marion himself confirms this interpretation in his essay "The Banality of Saturation."This paper will trace the development outlined above and then examine two issues that arise from it. First, in instances when saturated phenomena are distorted, it is questionable whether they actually appear as saturated, and therefore whether they should still be described as saturated *phenomena*. Second, and more importantly, if the appearance of a saturated phenomenon depends at least in part on the way in which they are received by the one to whom they appear, hermeneutics needs to be incorporated into the account of saturated phenomena, so as to embed interpretative receiving in the very structure of their appearing. This requires a refining of Marion's phenomenology of givenness and of his account of the *adonné*.

Jodie McNeilly (ACU)
Overcoming the Problem of Presentation in Husserl for a Phenomenological Aesthetics of Political and Religious Thought

In this paper, I will take up the aesthetic turn in political thought to consider the aesthetic dimension of belief constitution in religious experience. In part one I will look to the issues of 'recognition' and 'representation' in political theory that have created this turn, and will draw out these same problems in religious thought when thinking through the social and political in interfaith studies. Essentially I will argue towards a Husserlian inspired phenomenological aesthetics to address these very issues. Identifying the problems of "representation" in Husserl as a challenge made through Levinas, I will defend Husserl through a more refined articulation of the noematic dimensions of the structure of intentionality from his 1913 thesis (Ideas I). With these presentational possibilities, I will in part two, draw out the kinaesthetic dimensions of his philosophy (Ideas II and III) through the work of Maxine Sheets-Johnstone (2011), and suggest that by describing these foundational structures at the lower levels of receptivity—along with this more refined understanding of presentation—we can begin to surmount the problematic emphasis on concept driven normativity in political and religious thought, and so contribute to the aesthetic turn with Husserl's phenomenology.

Mark Manolopoulos (Monash)
A Plea and Programme for Revolutionary Philosophy

With the multiplying and intensifying crises that envelop us (ecological, political, economic, etc.), philosophy is ethically compelled to transcend the descriptivism, analyticism, and hyper-abstraction that pervade it and to return to its most courageous ambitions: to contribute to society's re-conception (Plato), to change the world (Marx). In other words, philosophy must become revolutionary. My presentation offers an outline of one particular path that could lead to social transformation, paying particular attention to philosophers' roles within the revolutionary programme. First, we establish a global network of revolutionary thinkers who collaboratively produce a thoroughly rational blueprint of a new global society. Advocacy of the blueprint would follow, precipitated by intellectuals, students, activists, unionists, etc., eventually generating greater traction among the general public. Having gained critical mass, we would then call on the powerful to relinquish their power. In the face of

overwhelming mass solidarity, the intention/hope is for a peaceful transference of power, but the revolutionary programme must also allow for the admittedly daunting possibility of the use of revolutionary force or "ethical violence" (Žižek)

Jessica Marian (UMelb)
Glas, Glas-*style and the Rationality of Desire*

It is well known that Jacques Derrida's *Glas* (1974) departs from the more staid conventions of philosophical writing, that it blurs the boundaries between philosophy and literature. The relationship staged between the text's two columns is regularly understood as one of Hegel against Genet and Genet against Hegel. This opposition is then readily imbued with a range of implied binary oppositions such as absolute/fragmentary, hetero-normative/homosexual, Christian/criminal and so on. Taking Derrida's discussion of the word 'contre' (counter or against) in "Countersignature" (2004) (Derrida's first text on Genet since *Glas*) as a starting point, this paper will consider how the notion of *Glas*' two columns against – as in, *opposed to* – one another is repeatedly undermined by an inseparable relation of the two columns against – as in, in *near proximity* to or *contact with* – one another. This argument will be focussed through an extensive engagement with key passages concerning the relation of desire and rationality in Hegel, Genet and Derrida and the recurring allusions to the names of fathers and mothers found throughout *Glas*. In this light the paper hopes to also offer some consideration of the role and impact of *Glas*' stylistic aberrances and bi-columnar textual layout.

Philip Martin (Macquarie)
Anime-Worlds: Animetic Thinking at the Limits of Film-Philosophy

The relationship between film and philosophy has been thoroughly explored in recent years and has given rise to a number of distinct frameworks and lines of inquiry. A significant stream in this field often called 'film-philosophy' explores general questions like why film matters, how it can be philosophical and in what ways it can contribute to philosophical thinking. However, although non-live-action alternatives to traditional film are beginning to be explored, some film media are still neglected by philosophy. One such medium is Japanese anime. In this paper, I intend to develop a concept of 'anime-worlds' which can be used to understand the particular philosophical condition of anime and its

relationship to other film media. To explore this notion I will draw on the work of animation theorist and philosopher of technology Thomas Lamarre and film philosopher Daniel Yacavone. The concepts of film-worlds and anime-worlds can be used to unify the narrative, aesthetic and technical elements of film and illuminate the philosophical qualities of individual anime and anime generally. It is my contention that through anime worlds, anime engages in a special way of thinking that traverses such philosophical concerns as technology, creativity, ethics and ontology. I suggest that the notion of anime-worlds is essential for understanding what I call 'anime-philosophy': a way of philosophising that pushes the boundaries of film-philosophy into new frontiers.

Christopher Mayes (USyd)
***The Groundless Politics of Hannah Arendt: Reassessing Land and Agriculture in the* Vita Activa**

This paper critically engages with Hannah Arendt's dismissal of land and agriculture as providing the possibility for political activity. In her tripartite hierarchy of the *vita activa* (labour, work and action), Arendt does not consider land or agriculture as capable of producing the world of action – freedom, plurality, solidarity – but only the reproduction of biological or animal life. I argue that Arendt was too hasty in dismissing land and agriculture and that the Jeffersonian agrarian tradition provides some clues for the political relevance for agriculture. Many of Arendt's contemporary interpreters repeat the mistake of dismissing or ignoring land and agriculture. I argue that this diminishes the relevance of their work to address contemporary political problems associated with land. Although there are significant difficulties with a politics based on land (colonialism and Zionism), I contend that the incorporation of agrarian political thought and practice with Arendt can provide some important clues in developing a politics in the face of neoliberal land-grabs, speculation on agricultural commodities and food insecurity.

Catherine Mills (Monash)
Undoing Ethics: Butler on Precarity, Opacity and Responsibility

The concept of vulnerability has been an important point of reference for recent feminist interventions in ethics and political philosophy. Judith Butler presents a case for the ethical and political importance of recognizing the vulnerability that necessarily attends subjectivity insofar

as the subject is given over to others from the start. In this paper, I trace the development of Butler's approach to ethics, arguing throughout that it cannot strictly be understood as an ethics of relationality, since responsibility is for her primarily responsibility for oneself. As I will show, this opens a problem in terms of the normative status of the other, or in other words, of the 'ought' of ethics. This problem is resolved in a turn to the thematic of substitutability. But this ultimately means that her emphasis on the common, on what we humans share with one another, ties her efforts more strongly to traditional ethical thinking than she may really wish. Thus, while challenging 'sovereign' conceptions of subjectivity, her ethics nevertheless founders on the twin of this view – community conceived as commonality.

Joeri Mol (UMelb)
Price at Face Value: Hjelmslev on the White Wall of the Market

By making use of Deleuze & Guattari's conceptual apparatus of 'faciality', we distinguish between evaluative regimes on the one hand, and the market on the other, in order to drive a wedge between value and price. For Deleuze & Guattari the faciality system brings together a process of subjectification and a process of signification. Whilst these processes comprise distinctly different semiotic systems, they act in concert for the face to manifest itself. With the black hole firmly in place, the faciality regime becomes a 'deviance detector'; any departure from the black hole is seen as a lessening, or a decrease in worth; a move towards it as a promotion, or an increase in worth. As such, faciality describes a system of ordering worth; an evaluative regime that at once orients worth with regard to an apex of value whilst also providing a taxonomy that facilitates signification. Whilst this seems to offer an adequate account of value, how should we conceive of price? In this paper, we propose that whilst value can be seen as a Hjelmslevian double articulation of both content and expression oriented towards a black hole, price is a single articulation of expression oriented towards the void of the market.

Bryan Mukandi (UQ)
Turning Each other to Stone: A Phenomenology of Intersubjectivity

In 'The Iliad, or the Poem of Force', Simone Weil defines force as that which, when directed at a person, turns that individual into stone, or makes of them a thing. This idea calls to mind Medusa, who according to

Greek mythology, had the power to turn those she gazed upon into stone. A significant difference, however is that according to Weil, it is not only the person subjected to force who is turned into a thing. Those who wield this force are purportedly subject to the same fate: they too become the logical contradiction that is a living thing or a corpse that is not yet actually a corpse. Weil is essentially correct, I argue, but because of too narrow a conception of force, she prematurely brings her argument to a close. I argue for a more radical conception of 'thingification'. Based on Sartre's views on intersubjectivity, Levinas' of the predisposition to reduce the other to the same, and a conception of signification derived from Derrida's oeuvre, I will show that things are worse than Weil realised. We all posses the power of Medusa, and are all engaged in a perpetual struggle to deflect the efforts of other to reduce us to 'thing', all the while attempting to perpetrate that very same violence on others. In a sense, the 'state of nature' is in fact 'a war of all against all'. As such, I look for resolution in an ethics of self-awareness as well as in perpetual struggle.

Helen Ngo (SUNY Stony Brook)

A Place of Retreat? On the Porosity of Home and the Intercorporeality of Bodies

Throughout the history philosophy we encounter various comparisons of being, thinking,
and acting to the home: Heidegger speaks of philosophy's homelessness, Merleau-Ponty's lived body is a body *inhabited*, while Plato urges us out of the home and into the polis. But what is the home, such that it animates these varied invocations? Is it a place of respite, hermetic withdrawal, or neither or both? In this paper, I trace the concept of home through two nodes – house and dwelling – in order to think through its different valences. In doing so, I argue that despite its inward tendency, home is marked by an essential and constitutive porosity which in turn marks how we dwell as beings among place, things, and others. Tracking this argument onto a phenomenological account of embodiment (the body itself being a home), I argue that this constitutive porosity corresponds to an intercorporeality, posing questions for the conception of bodily and social identity.

Augustine Obi (ACU)
Heidegger's Reading of Aristotle on* Phronēsis*: A Framework for his Ontological Ground of Ethics

This paper attempts to show that in order to explore the question of how Heidegger implicitly lays the ground for ontological understanding of ethics in his fundamental ontology, one needs first to fully grasp how Heidegger retrieves Phronesis within his fundamental ontology. The paper seeks to provide the main interpretive framework for establishing the way Heidegger takes a key concept in Aristotelian ethics and redeploys this key concept in his fundamental ontology. I argue in this paper that regardless of the fact that Heidegger undermines the edifying moral connotations in Aristotelian Phronesis, Heidegger's retrieval of Aristotle's key components of Phronesis still contain nascent ethical frameworks. Through his retrieval of the components of Aristotelian Phronesis, Heidegger inexplicitly constitutes and clarifies the structural apparatus for the development of his ontological ground for the understanding of ethics.

Anne O'Brien (ACU)
Attending to the Distress of Ecological Objects: A Holding Space for Soils?

My research focuses on soil degradation and regeneration, and how land stewards are learning to use microscopy and microbial inoculation to help to promote ecological integrity in soil assemblages. In this talk I will use the object-relations and child development theories of Winnicott, as well as theories of receptivity to examine practices of care for barely visible qualities and life forms of soil. These practices require the phenomenological interpretation of distress signals that are not easy to recognise, because they do not manifest in languages or forms that immediately make sense. As such there is a demand on modern humans in the anthropocene to gain skills of listening, interpretation and adaptability to change technological and scientific assemblages to accommodate more open-ended experimental and democratic ontologies in land stewardship.

John O'Neill
Towards a Fuller Cosmotheandric Vision

I will extend Raimon Panikkar's cosmotheandric trinitarian philosophy to the work of three contemporary philosophers. His vision is that the three irreducible, inter-independent, constitutive dimensions of reality are the cosmic, the divine and the human. William Franke shows the ambiguities through the history of western apophatic discourse over whether it entails an experience of total union in the indistinctness of the One or rather the shock of absolute alterity. Both currents of unity and difference cannot be absolutely distinguished from each other and both are inadequate for articulating what cannot be said. They have links with negative theology eg Marion. The future of apophasis can point beyond what is said to what is done Richard Kearney with his hermeneutic narrative approach speaks of welcoming God in hospitality to the stranger, the Other, after passing through atheism - God after God. John Caputo writes of cosmopoetics as a song sung in response to calls from the cosmos, in which religious experiences are grace-filled this-worldly events. These three together show ways in which the divine, the human and the cosmic are interconnected. Acknowledgement of the presence of the divine in humanity and the world is a potent recognition of human dignity and a call to social justice for all as well as to care for the planet.

Toshiro Osawa
A Scene from the Making of Kant's Ethics: Baumgarten's and Kant's General Conception of Duties towards Oneself

The ethics of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten (1714-62) exerted significant influence on the formation of Kant's ethics. The extent of this influence, however, has not been sufficiently investigated in Kant scholarship. This paper seeks to explore this influence with special focus on Baumgarten's general conception of "duties towards oneself" and its relation to Kant's re-conceptualisation. For this purpose, I will proceed as follows: first, I will examine Baumgarten's general conception of duties towards oneself; second, I will discuss Kant's re-conception of these duties; and third, I will explore how Kant re-deployed Baumgarten's division of duties towards oneself in his system of ethics as a whole. I will conclude that Kant retained many of the topics, concepts, and questions, which Baumgarten initially dealt with in his Ethica Philosophica (first ed. 1740), and that he

critically re-deployed them in his project of ethics in a significantly comprehensive manner.

Knox Peden (ANU)
Which One? Laruelle, Rosset, and the Opacity of the Immediate

At the center of François Laruelle's project in "non-philosophy" lies a thinking of the One (or "Real") as at once absolute identity and absolute anteriority, a condition of emergence rather than an emergent object or appearance in itself. In this, his work bears discordant affinities with a variety of otherwise incommensurable projects in French philosophy, from Michel Henry's phenomenology of autoaffective life to Louis Althusser's efforts toward a scientific discourse immune to the pathos of experience. Laruelle's work is gaining an intrepid readership. Less well known in the Anglophone context is the work of his contemporary Clément Rosset, a thinker no less concerned with the absolute identity of the Real who also happens to be Laruelle's stylistic and rhetorical antithesis as an author. Essayistic in Montaigne's sense, Rosset's writings promote an equally blinding vision of identity against philosophies of difference and invocations of the wholly Other. The substantive differences between the two thinkers are subtle but significant; they turn on the uneasy relationship between constraint and emancipation that attends to all philosophical efforts to think the "Real" as absolute singularity and identity.

Monte Pemberton.
Smell and The Production of Space, or, Philosophy in the Ol' Factory.

In his 'The Production of Space' (1974/1991), as part of a broader discussion of the role of the body in space's production, Henri Lefebvre makes numerous several and provocative claims and observations about smells and the sense of smell as productive of space. In essence they push two points. One: smells are not interpreted ("they do not *signify*; they are" p. 198). Two: that the world is being deodorised, concomitant with a greater process of the reduction of the world to the word, the image, and the spectacle. Though barely three pages long, the olfactory realm receives more attention here than in many phenomenological texts combined. Taken together, the purported power of smell, its gradual elimination from the world, and the paucity of commentary on smell invite the question, 'what *is* there to say about smell?' It may well be for good reason that there

is little to say about smell. In this case we might ask, 'what can we do with smell?' This talk prepares the ground for tackling these questions by critically reviewing Lefebvre's thought on smell as an object of phenomenology and as a factor in the production of time, space, and social relations.

Francis Plagne
Hans Blumenberg and the Frankfurt School: Myth and the History of Instrumental Reason

In his 1979 *Work on Myth*, Hans Blumenberg formulates a philosophical anthropology through a theory of the basic structure of myth (what he calls the 'work of myth') and the history of its reception ('work on myth'). The aim of this paper is to show how, in addition to his explicit engagement with the German tradition of Philosophical Anthropology (Gehlen, Scheler), Blumenberg's thought on these issues is formed through an encounter with Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic of Enlightenment.* In a number of key aspects, the basic anthropological account outlined in Blumenberg's work can be seen as a dialectical counter-image of the findings of Horkheimer and Adorno's *Dialectic*. Both works refuse to see human history as a simple progression from myth to logos, finding more complex and continuing interactions between the pre-history on which they focus their anthropogenetic speculations and historical forms of rationalisation. Through an analysis of a number of themes shared by both works (the development of language, the nature of magic, the survival of myth), the concept of instrumental rationality emerges as the major link between Blumenberg and the first generation of the Frankfurt School; but in Blumenberg's work this notion undergoes a fundamental re-evaluation.

Tiffany Plotzza (LaTrobe)
Phenomenology and its Limits: Emmanuel Levinas and the Attempt to Describe the Indescribable.

Beginning his philosophical career in the shadow of Husserl and Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas's phenomenological heritage places him firmly within that tradition; yet the degree to which he can be considered a phenomenologist is a question that persists within the current literature. In *Totality and Infinity,* Levinas acknowledges the extent of his debt to the phenomenological method in the development of that work; however, his appropriation of the phenomenological method appears to sit in direct

contradiction with the primary aim of the text: to describe how the subject can have a relation with that which essentially transcends its experience of it. Levinas's attempt to describe what is essentially indescribable has led many to accuse him of resorting to an indefensible mysticism. In this paper, I examine the extent to which Levinas can be characterized as a phenomenologist by exploring the tensions that exist between specific concepts within Levinas's ethical framework and the limits of phenomenological description, determining if in the process of pushing the phenomenological method to its very limits his thesis falls into incoherence or an indefensible mysticism. I argue that although Levinas's project has its ostensible contradictions, ultimately it can withstand these particular critiques.

Elizabeth Presa (UMelb)
Practices for Art?: Deleuze, Agamben and St Francis of Assisi

Using Deleuze's Spinozian concept of Beatitude, together with Georgio Agamben's analysis of the rule of St Francis, this paper asks how can life resolve into art (as a transformative practice) and art into life (as a form of beatitude?) How can an artist, in his or her practice, activate a series of symmetrically inverted gestures, whereby art transforms life and life transforms art. The concept of 'a life' for Deleuze denotes life as 'impersonal and yet singular" it denotes a "synthesis of the sensible" that does not fit into prior categories and can only be sensed. It requires the sort of synthesis found in art, where sensations are ordered according to a peculiar logic, yet a logic which touches upon something singular in ourselves, so that we become experimental, rather than fixed in our responses to things. In exploring monasticism as a form of life, Georgio Agamben argues that "cenoby *kinos bios* appears as a field of forces run through by two opposing tendencies-at once to resolve life into a liturgy and, pulling in the other direction, to transform liturgy into life." Agamben is fascinated by this form of life which he says "allows us to glimpse another, uncertain dimension of acting and being." In effect his analysis of Franciscan rule reveals life attuned not to rules but to experimentation, that is to say experimentation with what is essential to a life, prior to the law, prior to ownership and possessions and traditional religious and secular roles. He sees it as 'a new level of consistency of human experience". As an artist I'm interested in what "a new level of consistency of human experience" could mean for an art practice. How

then can an art practice allow one to transcend not only mundane, depleted and restricted forms of living, but the often encountered, pitiless hardness of the world? And conversely, how taking the concept of 'a life', can an artist activate a practice, accommodating of idiosyncrasy, yet operating at a level far beyond the shallow considerations of the art

Alexei Procyshyn (Monash)
What Immanent Critique is Not

Immanent critics maintain that the intelligibility or legitimacy of a social practice depends on implicit normative or conceptual commitments that can be extrapolated from historically specific performances and then reflexively applied to evaluate them. Beyond this abstract characterization, however, there is little common ground concerning *how* immanent critique operates, or *what* philosophical commitments it entails.
My goal is to spell out the *how* and *what* of immanent critique by contrasting it with more recognizable argumentative strategies, like *reductio ad absurdum* arguments (e.g. mathematical/analytic contradiction, arguments from consequence, slippery slopes) and causal analyses (e.g. genealogy, positivist critique). This yields four conditions for 'immanent critique': (*i*) an 'inherence condition,' which specifies the manner in which normative content is said to be internal to or implicit in a given practice, (*ii*) a 'relation condition,' which identifies a necessary, non-analytic, and context independent relation between a base practice and its extrapolated commitments, (*iii*) a 'contradiction condition,' which specifies the fit between practice and commitment that has motivational import, and (*iv*) an 'access condition,' which articulates an observational perspective that does not alter or shift the relationship between base practice and implicit commitments. I conclude that 'immanent critique' is not, strictly speaking, a method, since these conditions are multiply

Jack Reynolds (Deakin)
Philosophy and/or Politics? Two Trajectories of Philosophy Post the Great War and their Contamination

In this chapter, I revisit the question of the philosophical significance of the Great War upon the trajectory of philosophy in the twentieth century. While accounts of this are very rare in philosophy, and this is itself symptomatic, those that are given are also strangely implausible, usually either asserting there is little or no philosophical significance (because

most of the major developments had already begun prior to the war), or maintaining that nothing was ever the same in philosophy after the war (as elsewhere), with the creation of the so-called analytic-continental 'divide' being but one notable consequence. I attempt to steer a middle-way between these positions, both having a grain of truth but over-playing their respective hands. Notwithstanding that analytic philosophy and phenomenology both precede WW1 (and its prospect), and that the critique of idealism was already very strong in Anglophone countries, I argue that there was an entrenchment of the 'divide' between analytic and continental philosophy post WW1. And while this is partly (if not predominantly) grounded in rhetoric, caricature, and stereotype, stemming from the war especially as concerns German Idealism, it also involves some significant methodological and meta-philosophical transformations in the incipient analytic and continental trajectories that seem to bear a close relationship to experiences of the war by some of the key philosophers (albeit also to internal philosophical pressures). To put it bluntly, my argument is that WW1 is closely connected with a "parting of the ways" in such self-understandings, between "philosophy and history/politics" on the one hand, and "philosophy or history/politics" on the other, even if both of these normative self-understandings are often betrayed in practice. I look at phenomenology and some trajectories in early analytic philosophy to argue this case.

Chris van Rompaey
Naturans vs Naturata. Or, Why Bother with Spinoza's Latin?

The relation of language to meaning in Spinoza's Ethics has been the subject of wide-ranging debate, from the Enlightenment to the present. Yet at the same time a crucial aspect of this relation, the link between Spinoza's Latin and the way key concepts are to be understood, is at best treated only cursorily by most of the readily available commentaries. My paper looks at the consequences of this philological neglect. Specifically, I argue that closer attention than is customary to certain elements of the Latin text is essential to the investigation of persistent problems within Spinozan studies. Focusing primarily on parts I and II of the Ethics, the discussion will be developed in three stages. First, I offer an overview of Spinoza's Latin, sketching its relation to classical and medieval antecedents and commenting on its intended function vis-à-vis Spinoza's philosophical project. I then consider the extent to which the two standard modern

translations of the Ethics acknowledge—or fail to acknowledge—the continuing relevance of the Latin text. Finally, I use specific examples to show that it is not just etymology but, more importantly, the information conveyed by particular grammatical constructions that is often obscured by the act of translation into an uninflected language.

Laura Roberts (UQ)

Irigaray and Beauvoir: Radicalising Sexual Difference

In the introduction to *The Second Sex* Beauvoir argues that the structure of the oppression of women is different to that of racial or religious oppression. According to Beauvoir's account, the difference between the sexes, while rooted in biological difference and phenomenological analysis, also has a primordial ontological structure that is similar and yet somehow different to her conceptions of how racial or religious oppression is structured. Crucially, on my reading, Beauvoir does not view this ontological relationship between men and women as fixed; there is a hint at the possibility of this relationship being other than it is, and we can see this when Beauvoir describes the primordial *Mitsein* as having the potential to be broken. Beauvoir uses Heidegger's term *Mitsein* to highlight how she views the relationship between male and female as a fundamental and (in Heideggerian terms) an ontological being-with relationship, in order to support her claim that the oppressive relationship between man and woman "is not comparable to any other" (ibid). I believe Beauvoir deliberately uses Heidegger's term in order to highlight as well as to disrupt the ontological assumptions inherent in western culture that define woman as the inessential Other of Man. In this paper I read Beauvoir's claims alongside Luce Irigaray's call for the recognition and creation of a positive feminine subjectivity, and argue that if we understand this difference between the sexes as ontological though not in a traditional sense, I think we can see important links between Beauvoir's and Irigaray's work. I think Irigaray accepts Beauvoir's invitation in *The Second Sex* to break down the ontological assumptions and structures in Western culture that define Woman as Man's inessential other. If we think of Irigaray's project as inspired by Beauvoir's identification of this problematic (traditional) ontological relation between men and woman, perhaps we can better understand Irigaray's call for the recognition of a non-traditional ontological status of sexuate difference and, in turn, better understand the

way in which Irigaray views other differences of race or religion, for example.

Jon Roffe (UMelb)
States of the Market: A Critique and Revision of Deleuze and Guattari's Analysis of Capitalism

In the two volumes of Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Deleuze and Guattari present a striking vision of capitalism as the regime of axioms: functional rules for the imbrication of the social regime and what they call the full body of capital, that is, the market as such. Their concomitant account of the role of nation-States as models of realization of the axioms (following the mathematical concept of model) is no less striking. This paper begins by outlining three critiques of this account, concerning respectively the role of set theoretic mathematics, the question of the agency of axiomatisation, and the emphasis on the national level. In the light of these critical points, a more modest conception of the axiomatic is required, and one that resituates the role of the State in the framework of Deleuze and Guattari's political analysis. The paper concludes by drawing some striking conclusions that nonetheless arise from this combination of their existing argumentation and reconceived concept of the axiom and the State.

Alison Ross (Monash)
The Ambiguity of Ambiguity in Walter Benjamin's 'Critique of Violence'

In his 'Critique of Violence' Walter Benjamin ties law to mythic fate and violence through a series of references to law's 'ambiguity'. He claims that the line that 'neither party may cross' established in the peace treaty is an ambiguous line; he also contends that the functioning of the law is ambiguous insofar as the subject's ignorance of the law is no answer to the law; and that law 'enforces' a false equality, as in Anatole France's remark that the 'poor and the rich are equally able to spend the night under bridges'. Each of these uses of ambiguity to characterise law assist Benjamin's attempt to link 'law' and 'myth'. Hence he claims that Niobe's punishment is 'ambiguous' and she is thereby left 'more guilty than before'. This paper will critically examine these different uses of ambiguity in the 'Critique of Violence' in light of the agenda of the essay. I will examine the question as to whether Benjamin's polemical aim exceeds the

reasons able to support the multiple senses of ambiguity he wishes to attach to law and through it, myth.

David Rowe (LaTrobe)
Drives, Instincts and Wills to Power in Nietzsche

Nietzsche uses the terms 'drive' (*trieb*) and 'instinct' (*instinkt*) as an explanation of human motivation and action. Recent scholars, such as Katsafanas, Janaway and Cox have understood these terms as no more than textual variants of the same idea. Daniel Conway's understanding of these drives is a good contrast; for he claims that from 1888 Nietzsche uses instinct to refer to 'any specific organization of the drives and impulses, as determined by the dominant mores of the particular people or epoch in question.' I will argue that Conway's distinction between drives and instincts is correct; but I will make two further claims. First, that Nietzsche was already thinking along these lines as early as *Daybreak*, in 1881; second, that Nietzsche later came to think of instincts as particular wills to power. I will argue for this claim by paying close attention to one of Nietzsche's last publications: *The Anti-Christ*. If this is right then it goes some way to explaining how, if the will to power is so central to Nietzsche's thought (as many have claimed), it barely gets a mention in one of his last publications. My claim is that he uses 'instinct' as a textual variant.

Kay Rozynski
Diving into the Monster: Excursions into Evil with Jennifer Maiden's Hierophanic Theory of Poetry

Let us say that a poem is an object. And utilitarian; so let us imagine what this poem-object does. This will be easier if we remember the literal page upon which poetry arrives to us; that it is tactile and presents the poem with certain limits. To what end? Artistic practice has considered again and again the problem of translating the heinous event into the aesthetic instance, and the role of art in mediating the apprehension of evil. But what if the spectre of evil could be divulged through a poem in a pattern of alternating intensity – might the threat of engulfment in evil be balanced by the placement of reminders of the mundane, such that the reader could withdraw from the scene of evil at will? Might this not allow a reader constructive access to it? Jennifer Maiden has said so, and has given the tactic a name: 'trochaic theory,' which allegorises the stressed

beat/unstressed beat of what is known in English prosody as the trochee. But where Maiden claims this tactic permits the apprehension of the evil 'out there,' beyond the reader, beyond the poem, I suggest rather that the poem's material limits deliver a space where the immediacy of evil is corralled by its abstraction, but in a way that provides a vantage point from which to observe evil as already inextricably at work in the everyday. Like a hierophany, as Mircea Eliades describes it, where the sacred object is planted in the profane space to underscore the co-existence and co-dependence of these elements, it could be that the problem is less about how to dive into the monster than it is about what to do with the monster once it's already upon us.

Matheson Russell (UAuck)
Second-personalism

This paper identifies a philosophical paradigm or syndrome that I dub "second-personalism". Second-personalism valorizes the dialogical relationship between I and You (first and second person) and opposes this to the objectifying relationship between I and It (first and third person). The second-person standpoint is regarded as the core of moral experience, whereas the third-person standpoint is seen as excluded from this moral experience and thus cut off from the resources required to engage in moral reason and action. Second-personalism is embraced in varying degrees by Gadamer, Strawson, Habermas, Darwall and others, but it has its origins in Humboldt and arguably finds its purist expression in Buber. In this paper, as well as tracing the contours and origins of the second-personalist paradigm, I argue that second-personalism, although insightful and highly compelling in many respects, is hamstrung by its characteristic conflation of (i) the distinction between participant and observer standpoints within the speech situation (second- and third-person standpoints) and (ii) the distinction between and the communicative and strategic attitudes taken towards persons and things respectively.

Ricky Sebold (LaTrobe)
Transcendental Phenomenology and the Scientific Image

The scientific perspective often provides dramatically revisionary pictures of the world when contrasted with the average, common sense viewpoint. Many of these discoveries are incorporated into everyday experience and

change how we describe those phenomena. In other words, parts of our worldview are transformed in light of scientific advancement. But just how far can this process go? Is it possible for the scientific image of the world to fully replace the familiar everyday lifeworld that characterizes pre-scientific experience? Phenomenologists uniformly answer in the negative. According to them, this is because the scientific perspective remains grounded in and derives its very sense from the very lifeworld it is supposed to replace. Thus, the total triumph of the scientific image would be its simultaneous undoing; its intelligibility would be lost due to its totalizing ambitions. The aim of this paper is twofold. First, I intend to detail the nature of this common phenomenological refrain toward the scientific image. To do this, I will discuss variations of the charge found in the writings of the most prevalent phenomenologists. This will then lead into the second aim of the paper: to provide an assessment of the success of the argument. Ultimately, I argue that the worries expressed by the phenomenologists are mistaken. There is no in principle reason why the scientific image cannot be wholly revisionary of experience, including of the background from which it emerges. In the end, I briefly sketch what this means for phenomenology as a distinct method from science that needs preservation.

Dr Undine Sellbach & Prof. Stephen Loo (UTas)

Minute Perceptions: Leibniz, Freud, Uexkull and Ethics at the Edges of Sentience.

In philosophy, sentience is often regarded as a discrete state (such the capacity to feel pain, or be self aware) that calls for pre-established moral or political responses. So that the idea that sentience is the basis of an expanded ethical community often rests on an implicit distinction between morally pertinent feelings and states, on the one hand, and the instinctual and biological edges of sentience on the other. Yet many of the environmental and social problems we currently face entail sensations that are too distant, proximate, dispersed, tiny or overwhelming to be shared in common, or that are located fully *inside* a subject. We are ecologically entangled in ways we dimly perceive, and are impacting the climate in ways we ignore. Our paper sets out to rethink ethics in relation to the ethological and psychoanalytic forces at the edges of the sentience. To do so, turn to Leibniz, a thinker who helped set the stage Freud's notion of the *unconscious* and Uexkull's concept of *umwelt*. In particular we will on

Leibniz's account of *minute perceptions*, those tiny sensations through which all living things sense the world in its totality, but only dimly.

Matthew Sharpe (Deakin)
Löwith's and Camus' Neostoicism

This paper will look at two important, but lesser examined, 20th century thinkers who each argued two things: i. that the ideological bases of the fascist and Stalinist states reflected the secularisation of eschatological motifs from the Hebraic and Christian legacy, based on a salvific, linear conception of history as either progressive or regressive; ii. that, accordingly, we should be open to reexploring the classical heritage, and particularly Stoicism, in the (so-far wildly unsuccessful) attempt to make sure that "never again" would Europe, or anywhere else, be dotted with detention and concentration camps. This paper will examine these "neoStoicisms", with back reference to the neoStoicism of the early modern period, advocated in response to Europe's first 100 years' war. I will do so in light of two important, potentially frankly devastating critiques. First. There is Jürgen Habermas' typically incisive critique of Löwith, as guilty of a retreat from historical consciousness; one which remarkably echoes Jeanson's and Sartre's famous criticisms of Camus after *L'Homme Révolté*. Second, there is the criticism (like Blumenberg's of Goethe's naturalism in the *Metaphorology* book) that the modern relation to nature, as non-teleological and non-providential, mitigates any attempt to recover ethical classicism in any form. In response to the first criticism, I will argue, as per Camus, that opposing historicism is not the same thing as withdrawing from the historical process; and in response to the second criticism, I will try to argue that Stoicism as an ethical universalism, starting from the ground up (in human sociability) can be severed from the ancient Stoics' providential conception of the cosmos as made for human beings. Whether these arguments are persuasive will of course be a matter for the audience's deliberations.

Steve Sinn (Monash)
An Ethics of Vulnerability in Otherwise than Being

A focus of this talk is to highlight the importance of vulnerability in Levinas' ethics. In *Otherwise than Being* vulnerability shapes Levinas' ethics; or vulnerability is within the ethical 'approach' that is able to retain the trace of 'the saying'. To highlight the importance of vulnerability in

Otherwise than Being helps to define a shift in emphasis from an ethics that is in the face to face encounter, to an ethics that is always already there as the saying of subjectivity. To define the importance of vulnerability to Levinas' ethics this talk will focus on chapter two of *Otherwise than Being*. This focus allows for a description of how Levinas' 'apophansis' shifts to become the reduction as the 'approach'. Having defined this movement from the 'apophansis' to the 'approach' this talk will then define, in a concrete sense, Levinas' 'phenomenological reduction' as the 'approach' made through the giving of vulnerability. A focus on Levinas' definition of both the 'apophansis' and the 'reduction' allows for a further consideration on how Levinas defines art in *Otherwise than Being*. From here this talk will then be critical of Levinas' framework for discussing art and suggests that through a definition of 'reduction' as the 'approach' art can, despite Levinas 'suspicions' of art and representation, be an important site for ethics.

Robert Sinnerbrink (Macquarie)

Empathic Ethics: Phenomenology, Cognitivism, and Moving Images

Some of the most innovative engagement with cinema and ethics in recent years has come from phenomenological and cognitivist perspectives in film theory. This trend reflects a welcome re-engagement with cinema as a medium with the potential for ethical transformation, that is, the idea of cinema as a medium of ethical experience. This challenges the sceptical view that cinema's power of affective and emotional engagement reproduces ideological biases through viewer manipulation. My paper explores the phenomenological turn in film-philosophy, emphasising the ethical implications of phenomenological approaches to affect and empathy, emotion and evaluation, care and responsibility, and our experience of 'the Other'. The oft-criticised 'subjectivism' of phenomenological theories, I argue, can be supplemented by recent cognitivist approaches that highlight the complex forms of affective response, emotional engagement, and moral allegiance at work in our experience of moving images. At the same time, the temptation towards reductionist accounts of aesthetic experience can be avoided by way of phenomenological description and hermeneutic interpretation. I will explore this exciting crossover between phenomenological and cognitivist approaches in regard to recent films, such as Farhadi's *A Separation* (2011)

and the Dardenne Brothers' *Two Days, One Night* (2014), which offer striking case studies in 'cinematic ethics'.

Max Sipowicz (Monash)
The Animal in Need of A Master: The Moral Ground of Politics in Kant's Philosophy

In *Idea for a Universal History* Kant writes that "if he lives among others of his own species, man is an animal who needs a master." By this he means that human sociability requires that we enter into a social contract and become governed by a sovereign. This, Kant's argument goes, ensures historical progress towards Enlightenment. Kant argued that such progress is our moral duty, and that it can only be achieved in a society. In this essay I aim to re-trace Kant's argument for the necessity of a state, and in so doing argue that for Kant the political is grounded in morality in two ways. Firstly as the moral law necessitates that we enter into a social contract in order to pursue our collective moral end, and secondly as the political enables us to pursue our individual morality.

Liam Sprod (London Graduate School, Kingston University)
Space of Catastrophe: Kant, Heidegger and the Refutation of Idealism

This paper will examine the meaning and consequences of what Quentin Meillassoux describes at the "Kantian catastrophe" in terms of the relationship between his critique of correlationism and the phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. It will do so through the elaboration of two sections of *Being and Time.* Firstly, §43 where Heidegger reverses Kant's claim from the first *Critique* — that it is a scandal of philosophy that objects outside of us must be taken on faith — to instead assert that the real scandal is that proof of objects outside us is expected in the first place. This will return to an analysis of Kant's Refutation of Idealism and his diagnosis that idealism results from confusion between apperception and inner sense (i.e., the form of time). Ironically, Kant himself falls prey to this confusion in the A-edition of the Transcendental Deduction. This confrontation between the Deduction and the Refutation leads Paul Guyer to reject the Deduction and instead find the key to the Transcendental Analytic in the Schematism and the Refutation. In doing so Guyer constructs an explicitly realist Kant who can then be opposed to the correlationist version pointed to by Meillassoux. The argument of the Refutation, in countering the confusion between inner sense and

apperception, focuses on the possibility of outer sense, that is, the form of space. This reversal between inner and outer sense, or the realist preference for space over time, then provides a framework with which to examine Heidegger's idealist tendencies. For it is precisely his preference for time over space, as articulated in §70 of *Being and Time* (a claim Heidegger later reversed), that is symptomatic of the idealist, or correlationst, tendency in the post-Kantian phenomenological tradition. The paper will conclude by highlighting some of the consequences, both neat and problematic, of re-elaborating the catastrophe of the Kantian tradition in terms of spatiality and realism.

Marilyn Stendera (UMelb)

Being-in-the-World, Temporality and Autopoiesis: A Heideggerian Approach to the Temporality of Enaction

To understand the radical potential of Heidegger's model of practice, we need to acknowledge the role that temporality plays within it. Commentaries on Heidegger's account of practical engagement, however, often leave the connection between purposiveness and temporality unexplored, a tendency that persists in the contemporary discourse generated by the interaction between the phenomenological tradition and certain approaches within cognitive science. Taking up a temporality-oriented reading that redresses this can, I want to argue here, reveal new illuminating sites for the intersection between phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, particularly between Heideggerian perspectives and what have become known as enactive approaches to the study of cognition. According to the latter, cognition is an inherently relational process through which the interaction of a living being and its environment generates meaning and, ultimately, a world of significance defined by the cogniser's self-concern. I will suggest that this emphasis upon the inextricable intertwining of agent and world renders enactive models of cognition particularly congenial to a mutually enriching dialogue with Heidegger's account of purposiveness, particularly if we read the latter in terms of the temporal framework that *Being and Time* offers us.

Terrilyn Sweep (UQ)
Homelessness

In this paper I summarily present Heidegger's description of 'homelessness' (*unheimlich*), or the 'uncanny', as a condition of the human's being, together with some of the analyses of writers who have written on this topic, for example, Neal Curtis and William McNeill. These commentaries make reference to the ancient conception of the 'tragic' that concerns itself with the unattainability of a human 'destiny'; humankind is never destined to arrive at a 'home'. I agree with the consensus of this literature that human destiny is to journey rather than to arrive, however, I also argue that if the idea of the inevitability of homelessness for the race can be owned at the individual level, there may be more impetus to take on responsibility for the sense that is made in the relationships to others, which can then become represented in the wider group. It is uncanny to think that there is no human destiny let alone a group destiny, but this fear must serve as a motivator for responsibility to care for the sense we give our lives in the moment it is being lived.

Grace Tarpey
The Other of Subjectivity: For an Ethics-of-Love

In this paper I argue that love is ethical and show how an ethics-of-love requires appreciation of a realm of the "other" to human subjectivity which is bound up with both the other of the unconscious and the Other as Infinity. In order to forge and shape this argument, I draw mainly from the work of Jacques Lacan and Emmanuel Levinas. I think that studying their work together provides a way of thinking that addresses a crisis of the relationship between singular subjectivity and disorders of love in the contemporary period. Mindful of the theological turn in phenomenology and psychoanalysis, I am interested in how Lacan and Levinas hold a deep, abiding concern with the relationship between ethical subjectivity and the Other. While Levinas enhances the meaning of ethical sense as infinite in relation to the Other, Lacan ventures to illuminate the meaning which the Other holds for an understanding of soullove. Both demonstrate that the subject who loves is being responsible. The role of desire in language as constitutive of human subjectivity is also central for Lacan and Levinas in thinking about love. Although I stress the importance of distinguishing between desire and love, both Eros and Agape are dealt with here as essential for an understanding of an ethics of love. Finally, I

demonstrate how an ethics of love is realised in clinical psychoanalysis as sublime love through the gift of transference. And that, with and beyond insight, or knowledge as truthful, the analytical subject's identification with the Other augments the practice of forgiveness.

Italo Testa (Università di Parma)
Recognitive Attractors
In this paper I would like to analyze recognition as a kind of power. I will analyze the notion of power in the general sense as some sort of causal capacity, and I will introduce the distinction between the active power of doing something and the passive power of undergoing something. I will then argue that such a distinction is needed in order to capture some central features of the phenomenon of recognition, and in particular the way that "being recognized" and "recognizing" are intertwined both in intentional and non-intentional, and in deliberate and non deliberate processes of recognition. I will then argue in favor of both the conceptual and genetic priority of the passive power of being recognized over the active power of recognizing. Furthermore, I will introduce the notion of "attractor" of recognition as a way to analyze some relevant features of the phenomenon of "being-recognized". The power to attract recognition will be then analyzed as a specific form of social power, based on what I will call "recognitional authority", and which basically consists in letting others recognize or be recognized, whether they want it or not.

Tim Themi (Deakin)
Bataille and the Erotics of the Real

In this paper I consider how the erotics of the real, of Bataille, might contribute to the ethics of the real, of Lacan, and also to the genealogy of morals disclosed by Nietzsche. Bataille was a key intellectual figure in twentieth-century Paris, closely associated with the initial inspiration of French Nietzscheanism and personally connected with Lacan, the French Freud. Combining Bataille's anthropological understanding of the taboo-transgression correlation with Lacan's analytic episteme of the real, symbolic, and imaginary, I trace a recessive loss of the erotic function of religion and the sacred through the Platonic, Christian, and Modern Science epochs that Nietzsche's revaluations of the Good tend to centre on. I suggest that an ethics of the real, as one of desire, can be better served by restoring a living openness to the originary erotics observable in the

culture of pre-Platonic Greeks. This erotics manifests most famously perhaps in their polymorphous libidinal structures, the stories of the gods, the *polis* system of delimited war, and the festivals of Dionysos to host the tragic works of Aeschylus, Sophocles, and to an extent Euripides. What emerges from this extended genealogical analysis is the possibility that like Bataille, figuratively speaking, the brothels of Paris should become our true churches again.

Alex Trudzik (UMelb)
Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty on Truth and Perspectivism

Nietzsche's famous declaration, in *Twilight of the Idols*, that the myth of the "real world" had been abolished, and along with it, the apparent character of the "apparent world", can be read as a phenomenological move "back to the things themselves." Appearances are the only *things* we can get back to – there is no more reality behind them that we are falling short of. Yet when we consider Nietzsche's doctrine of interpretation and prespectivism, it seems as though complications with this reading arise. Either Nietzsche would hold that perspectives derive from (and are deformed versions of) the things themselves, being appearances – which is no improvement on the original real-apparent distinction that he rejected – or he would have to claim that it is the individual perspectives themselves which are the only things themselves. This latter position has worrying implications for the possibility of objective knowledge, and prompts the eternal question: are all perspectives to be given equal truth value? I argue that Merleau-Ponty's accounts of perspectives and "objective knowledge" can be used to supplement Nietzsche's thoughts here, providing grounds for preferring particular perspectives over others, without relying on an objective real world that lies beyond them. With the aid of Merleau-Ponty, I will show that Nietzsche's destruction of the real-apparent world dichotomy, alongside his perspectivism, gestures towards a phenomenological return to the things themselves.

Leighton Upson (Independent Researcher)
Deleuze and Heidegger, Art and Thinking: Forest for the Future?

Affective influences from unmade ecological worlds within Western society are kept hidden and separate, continuing the problem of people's bio-malnourishment. I speak from first person artistic encounters within a local forest as a creative vitalist movement towards the future. In

attempting to reveal possible social-environment connections the work of art has trouble with revealing embodied influences. In a bid to untie thought from romantic constructs I call for the need of both Heidegger's grounded depth and Deleuze and Guattari's lateral thought in the forming of new eco-based vernaculars. Applying Deleuze and Guattari's approach of multiplicity I will engage in a critique of a phenomenology of art and a phenomenology of forest. I will relate my argument to Deleuze and Guattari's closeness to, and divergence from, phenomenology. Attention will then be switched to applying Heidegger's later thought from his book 'What is called Thinking?' to proclamations on art by Deleuze and Guattari, in 'What is Philosophy?' such as, "The work of art is a being of sensation and nothing else: it exists in itself." I continue to enquire further into the concept in art and question as to where thinking resides in our construction of creative artworks and future ecological person-place worlds.

Nicole Wallace (UAuck)
Taylor, Recognition, and the Development of Moral Meanings

Charles Taylor is well known in the philosophy of recognition for claiming that recognition is 'a vital human need.' His work gives little detail on the nature of recognition however. Many theorists have focused on Taylor's substantial theory of dialogical, moral identity to flesh out a Taylorian account of recognition, but have tended to overlook his work on methodology in the social sciences. This oversight has led to the adoption of only a partial account of Taylorian recognition in relevant literature. In his work on social science methodology, Taylor adopts Gadamer's concepts of 'understanding the other' through a 'fusion of horizons.' Combining this work with Taylor's notion of identity leads to an account of recognition as a process of moral development. A fusion of horizons means reasoning together about the good, a process that requires us to broaden our awareness of possible conceptions of the good, and challenges the coherency of our own moral meanings. Recognising the other thus comes to change our identity, having as much of an impact on the recogniser as it has the recognised. Recognition as successful fusion of horizons becomes a generative, open-ended process.

Nicholas B. de Weydenthal (UMelb)
Intensive Surface: Ruyer, Oresme and Deleuze

What is an intensive surface and how can the concept be put to use? To address this question I will draw on two relatively forgotten influences on Gilles Deleuze, namely Raymond Ruyer and Nicole Oresme. First, Ruyer's influence on Deleuze can be characterized as considerable rather than cursory. Various scholars have cast this relationship into relief by outlining an interconnected set of concepts developed by Ruyer, and their various re-deployments within, for instance, Deleuze's philosophy of biology or concept of the concept. The notion of form, absolute surface or survey (*survol absolu*), in particular, is the one that I would like to extend in this paper. It is an effective mode of reality that is ontologically different to one in which surfaces are conceived of spatiotemporally, that is extensively. This brings me to the notion of intensity that Deleuze poses in contradistinction to extensity, and that he claims has been confused and obscured. It is here that the significance of Nicole Oresme, a cleric, theologian and economist, in the 14th century, who treated the tension between intensity/intensive quantity and extensity/extensive quality in his work on the latitude and longitude of forms becomes pronounced. The paper consists of three parts. In the first part, I will elaborate the concept of the Ruyerian form as a non-extensive surface. In the second, I will flesh out the distinction between extensity and intensity that Deleuze wants to highlight and keep in tension. Finally, I will articulate the concept of an intensive surface.

James Williams (Dundee)
Signs and events in Wittgenstein and Process Philosophy

In this paper it is argued that a process philosophy of signs provides a more plausible alternative to the definition of signs set out in Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* and *Blue and Brown Books*. It is claimed that Wittgenstein gives a dualist account of the sign based around the idea of the life of signs in use. This is contrasted with a process definition of the sign, inspired by Deleuze and Whitehead among others, where signs are defined as multiple and unbounded in their relations. The distinctions around life and use are therefore illegitimate from the point of view of the process philosophy. To illustrate these points, they are applied to the example of a simple event, taken from Wittgenstein, in order to show the repercussion in terms of interpretation and explanation of

different models for the sign. The paper concludes with suggestions for a formal model for the sign as process and a critical reflection on the difficulties of providing such a model without returning to a restricted definition of the sign.

Ozgur Yalcin (ACU)
Conflict in Rawls's Political Justice and Mouffe's Agonistic Democracy

Mouffe's agonist democracy is one of the radical democratic theories of the political, which argues for the constitutiveness of pluralism and conflict reflected in power struggles in democratic politics. She presents her view of agonistic democracy in a critical dialogue with what she calls rationalist and moralist conceptions of democracy expressed in Rawls's political liberalism and Habermas's deliberative democracy. In this paper, I aim to focus on Mouffe's critique of Rawls, and I will advocate Rawlsian conception of justice against Mouffe's agonistic democracy. Mouffe's main argument is that Rawls gives us a moralizing conception of liberal democracy, and this leads to the elimination of politics through the repression and elimination of antagonism and power in a just society as conceived by Rawls. Mouffe claims that Rawls's idea of overlapping consensus closes "the gap between justice and law that is a constitutive space of democracy". However, Rawls's political liberalism accepts the gap between justice and law, and through the elaboration of Rawls's ideas of stability and legitimacy, I will argue that Rawls's political liberalism has a space for agonistic politics, even though it may be more restrictive than Mouffe's.

Oscar Zentner (UMelb)
Psychoanalysis, Sense and Religion

> Temple turned back to Stephen and asked:
> Do you believe in the law of heredity? ….
> The most profound sentence ever written,
> Temple said with enthusiasm,
> is the sentence at the end of the zoology.
> Reproduction is the beginning of death.
> He touched Stephen timidly at the elbow and said eagerly:
> Do you feel how profound that is because you are a poet?
> Cranly pointed his long forefinger.

Look at him! He said with scorn to the others.
Look at Ireland's hope!

- James Joyce (*A Portrait of an Artist as a Young Man*, Penguin Modern Classics, 1975, p 230-31.)

… Be who, farther potential? And so wider but we grisly old Sykos who have done our unsmiling bit on 'alices, when they were yung and easily freudened, in the penumbra of the procuring room and what oracular comepression we have had apply to them! …

- James Joyce (*Finnegans Wake*, Faber & Faber, 1982, p 115)

I embarked on these themes based on interrogating the texts of Freud and Lacan. In 1945, as Europe was still reeling from the ashes, trying to come to terms with an hecatomb for which all reason was incapable of giving explanation, Lacan invented and wrote his *Sophism: Logical Time and the Assertion of Anticipated Certainty (Les temps logique et l'assertion de certitude anticipée). - Les Cahiers d'Art,1940-45, re-published inEcrits, Paris, Seuil, 1966.* Although it would be tempting to conclude that psychoanalysis holds the key to unlock the interrogation about religion, or indeed about sense, as anything concerning human existence, as we turn the key and we dash for the entrance, the multiplication of labyrinths make us soon realize the complexity of the most humble questions.

Magdalena Zolkos (ACU)
***Desire and Interiority in Roberto Garzelli's* The Sentiment of the Flesh**

In Roberto Garzelli's 2011 film *Le sentiment de la chair* (*The Sentiment of the Flesh*), Helena, a female student of anatomical design, meets Benoît, a radiologist in a local clinic and a professor of anatomy, and the two engage in a secret relationship. Helena radically redefines their space of sexual intimacy by drawing Benoît deeper into her body, not only through penetration of her bodily orifices, but also through the use of MRI technologies to subject her organs, muscles and bones to his desiring gaze. "You are so used to x-rays, you've forgotten what they mean," she says to Benoît, "It is a privilege to see inside of someone, isn't it?" The obsession with cutaneous openings and permeability to access a secret that in Helena's body contain/is, frames corporeality as a site of sentiment, where

the distinction between the subject's interiority and her various ecologies breaks down, and reveals a relation of mutuality and inter-penetrability. It seems, at first, that the space of love and intimacy in *The Sentiment of the Flesh* is arranged within a typical heterosexual matrix of gendered roles: the occulocentric desire and the medical-technical expertise of Benoît define Helena's body as a site for male penetration and opening. However, I want to argue that on a closer viewing Garzelli's film subverts the heterosexual matrix through a feminine-centred refiguring of desire and interiority—drawing on the feminist psychoanalysis critique, and in particular on the work of Teresa Brennan on affect and subjectivity, I propose an interpretation of *The Sentiment of the Flesh* as a voice in the debate on the bounded/porous subject. The fact that Benoît's desire to "see everything" is always prefaced by an "almost" and "not quite," coincides with the film's unmasking of (what Teresa Brennan calls) "the foundational fantasy"—the formation of the modern subject through the fantasy of self-containment.

THEMATIC PANELS

AGAMBEN ON POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC THEOLOGY

Chair: Simone Bignall (UNSW)

- Bryan Cooke (UniMelb)
- Nicholas Heron (UniMelb)
- Daniel McLoughlin (UNSW)

Giorgio Agamben is best known for his work on sovereignty and state violence. Recently, however, his work has turned to issues of economy and government. Tracing a genealogy of these terms, The Kingdom and the Glory argues that Christian theology and liturgical practice have had a profound influence on the development of the ideas through which modern state and economy have been conceptualised. Drawing upon this historical analysis, he argues that power in 'the West' involves a twofold system in which sovereignty and economic government are articulated together, and that the legitimacy of this system is constituted through practices of glorification. This panel explores the implications of this genealogical work for how we understand the nature and development of modern forms of economic and political power. It does so by bringing Agamben's recent work into dialogue with that of Karl Marx and Hannah Arendt.

Bryan Cooke (UniMelb): ***Glorious Bastards: Fragments towards a Materialist Angelology of the Internet***

If it did nothing else, Agamben's The Kingdom and the Glory would be worth reading simply for the fact that it brings together two questions that are rarely posed (let alone inter-related) in contemporary political theory: first, what does it really mean to be governed by an "economy" Second: why does power need glory? In this paper, I concentrate on Agamben's answer to the second (more surprising) question. In particular, I will try follow Agamben's intriguing but almost entirely un-developed remark that the space of 'glory' and of acclamation (central not only to the Church but to the republican institutions of a number of different polities; Imperial ceremonies and to the grotesque liturgies of 20th century fascist regimes) today largely exists in the forms and figures of the mass-media. Explaining this thesis in the context of Agamben's overall position, this paper will attempt to 1) describe how Agamben's discussion of the underlying

connection between administrative-ministerial and acclamatory functions in Angelology allows us to see the otherwise obscure connection between the *spectacular* elements of modern capitalism (e.g. Hollywood) and the seemingly inglorious rule of grey-suited technocrats and 2) to understand the realm of social media in relation to the expropriation of the all important political function of acclamation. Finally, time permitting, I shall argue how Agamben's later work should be read not as merely as another tedious 'secularisation hypothesis' (Blumenberg) whereby the contemporary world would be again described as the product of a disavowed theological heritage, but in fact proceeds from a position which renders the possibility of such an argument impossible. For this reason, among others I will suggest, admittedly, against the grain of his work that Agamben should be read as a kind of errant Althusserian whose great virtue as a thinker is to draw our attention to the material existence of ideology.

Nicholas Heron (UniMelb): ***The "Divinisation of Authority": Economic Theology and Bureaucracy (Marx, Arendt, Agamben)***

To the four traditional forms of government known to political philosophy since Greek antiquity – monarchy (the rule of the one), oligarchy (the rule of the few), aristocracy (the rule of the best) and democracy (the rule of the many) – Hannah Arendt famously adds a fifth: bureaucracy, which she defines as the rule of nobody. But this fifth – the newest and, according to Arendt, potentially the most tyrannical of all – constitutes less a further addition than a sign of the ultimate eclipse of the political, coinciding as it does with the progressive triumph of civil society and the consequent transformation of politics into a mass housekeeping exercise. This paper will seek to consider Arendt's diagnosis in the light of Giorgio Agamben's recent genealogy of "economic theology"; a genealogy which, it will argue, both consolidates and problematises her account. A key intertext for this discussion will be Marx's distinctly "ecclesiastical" and even "angelological" reflections on bureaucracy in his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right.

Daniel McLoughlin (UNSW): ***State and Economy in Agamben and the Early Marx.***

This paper examines the relationship between Agamben and Marx's engagements with the problem of economy. It highlights some of the similarities between Agamben's account of *oikonomia* and Marx's critique of

Hegel: both analyse the articulation between the political and the economy; critique the metaphysical inversion of the universal and particular; and highlight the alienation that this produces. However, these insights are articulated in the context of very different theoretical projects: in Marx it ultimately leads to his analysis of the capitalist mode of production which both harnesses and masks the social power of labour; Agamben's account of economy foregrounds glorification as a praxis that conceals the essential inoperativity of the human. This difference grounds Agamben's critique of the role of labour in Marx's thought, but also means that the problem of the mode of production is strangely absent from his economic thought. The paper concludes by arguing that with the development of the society of the spectacle, and the shift towards immaterial labour that has occurred in the age of neo-liberalism, there is an increasing tendency for these two forms of praxis to converge.

BLACK SWAN: A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL PHILOSOPHY IN AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND (Plenary Panel)

In recent years there has been much philosophical debate over meaning, validity, and relevance of the so-called analytic/Continental divide. Indeed, a number of Anglophone philosophers (Critchley, Glendinning, Chase and Reynolds, McCumber, Pippin, and others) have published important studies—and critiques—exploring the meaning, history, and prospects of Continental philosophy. In the new century, however, the philosophical consensus has tended to converge on overcoming the divide in the name of 'post-analytic' and post-Continental (or 'meta-Continental') philosophy. Yet virtually all historical work and philosophical debate thus far has focused on Continental philosophy in the United Kingdom and the United States. Very little attention has been given to the history and future of Continental philosophy in other parts of the world, especially in the Antipodes. Robert Sinnerbrink and Matheson Russell's recently published history of Continental Philosophy ('Black Swan') provides a revised narrative and critical reappraisal of earlier accounts of the history and development of philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Using this text as a springboard, our panel will explore the history and future of Continental philosophy in Australasia, with authors and respondents discussing how we got to where we are today, and asking where we might be headed in the future.

Chair: Prof. Jack Reynolds (Deakin)

- Chapter co-authors: Matheson Russell (UAuck) and Robert Sinnerbrink (Macquarie)
- Respondents: Genevieve Lloyd (Emeritus, UNSW) and Marguerite LaCaze (UQ)

CONCEPTS IN JEAN-LUC MARION'S PHENOMENOLOGY

Chair: Jack Reynolds (Deakin)

- Dr Pierre-Jean Renaudie (Univ of Porto, Portugal)
- Chris Hackett (ACU)
- Jodie McNeilly (ACU)

The aim of this panel is to engage with a few of the well-known aporias in Jean-Luc Marion's phenomenology, including givenness, visibility, and the icon. It is the panel's contention that these aporias are indeed potent concepts that not only allow critical reflection on Marion's philosophy, but mobilise other thinkers' concepts (i.e. Husserl, Breton and Gadamer) in meaningfully distinct ways, and as possible alternatives to his phenomenological thought.

Pierre-Jean Renaudie (Porto): ***Given or Not Given: The Reach of Intuition in Question***

Marion's philosophical works attempt to extend the concept of givenness in order to providenew grounds to phenomenological description. On the basis of a historical analysis of the breakthrough of phenomenology in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, Marion claims that phenomenology relies on an absolute notion of givenness and does not deal with the given but only with the very fact that the given is given, with its givenness understood "as a mode of phenomenality". Consequently, Marion's third phenomenological reduction aims at bracketing everything but the pure "giving itself" of the phenomena, in order to reconduct the given (*le donné*) to givenness (*la donation*) and so to "unfold" the givenness of the given. Pointing out the limits of Marion's reading of Husserl, this paper tries to demonstrate the bounds of givenness and to elaborate a phenomenological analysis of phenomena that does not need to presuppose the universality and the univocality of givenness. Far from legitimating such a generalization of the concept of givenness, Husserl's broadening of intuition must be understood as a way to make phenomenological description possible *even* when things are not strictly given. The

phenomenological breakthrough is thus compatible with a concept of the given deeply rooted in sensibility.

Chris Hackett (ACU): ***God and Being between Jean-Luc Marion and Stanislas Breton***
The question of "God and Being" is a central debate that has motored the Western tradition. This debate reached another defining point of expression in the twentieth century Neo- Platonic revival within French philosophy. This paper examines two positions within this debate, Jean-Luc Marion and Stanislas Breton, both figures within the Neo-Platonic revival, both theologically attuned, both developing their position with critical reference to phenomenology, yet standing on opposing sides of the classic debate. The guiding question to guide our examination will be: What motivates their difference?

Jodie McNeilly (ACU): ***The Moving Icon: Critically Seeking the Aesthetic in Marion and Finding a Phenomenological Alternative with Husserl***
Marion argues that icons are opposed to idols because they "alone deserve and demand the veneration of the faithful" (ID, 68). Here he foregrounds an aesthetic-based constitution of icons as they are experienced by a community of believers. In this sense, the demand for a phenomenology to describe precisely this difference between venerating activities of the faithful, and the false adoration of idolatry is founded. However in *The Crossing of the Visible,* Marion refuses to first provide an aesthetic theory—despite strong evidences necessitating him to do so—and second (in refutation of this) fails to provide an adequate phenomenological account to show the difference (2004, ix). Investigating several reasons why Marion does not (or cannot) engage with an aesthetic theory, I attempt a recasting of his analysis using Gadamer's more refined phenomenological aesthetic model (TM, 1960). As a result, the icon indeed resists such a model, but at the expense of undermining the icon itself, which can only be established through his pictorial analyses of paintings corresponding to such a model. Without these analyses, Marion's entire project of developing the visible and invisible for the movement of the icon is brought into question. From this, I offer an alternative phenomenological account of the icon and idol with a Husserlian analysis of the pictorial, drawing directly upon his theory of neutralization and the modification of "neutral picture-object-consciousness" (Ideas I). I also suggest a more adequate

means of addressing the structures of veneration, both in terms of imagistic and aesthetic constitutions of belief as a movement of faith.

CONCEPTUAL FICTIONS

Chair: Justin Clemens (UMelb)

- Charles Barbour (UWS)
- Dimitris Vardoulakis (UWS)

In *Shame and Necessity*, Bernard Williams offers a succinct reason why philosophy needs to turn to literature. Williams says that colleagues often ask why he analyses literary texts – why can't he use examples from 'real life'? He responds that 'it is a perfectly good question, and it has a short answer: what philosophers will lay before themselves and their readers as an alternative to literature will not be life, but bad literature'. This anecdote contains a significant argument. It suggests that no theory can solely be based on reason. Any rational account needs an – acknowledged or repressed – fictional support. Following Williams' suggestion, we will interrogate the way in which the fictional is imbued in the conceptual. In particular, it will investigate how the fictional element figures in out understanding of the political.

Charles Barbour (UWS): ***The Mirror of Society: On Marx 'On Suicide'***
Towards the end of 1845 – in the midst of what many scholars think of as his 'epistemological break', or the moment when he rejects the Hegelian philosophy of his youth to take up his mature and scientific study of political economy – Marx translated – in a decidedly infelicitous manner – and briefly commented on portions of a work by the French police archivist Jacques Peuchet called *Mémoires tires des archives de la police*. To date, this curious text – *Peuchet: Von Selbstmort* or 'On Suicide' – has been either ignored, or inserted into a larger narrative about the development of scientific sociology. But the stories that Peuchet recounts, and that Marx choses to translate, are anything but scientific. They are lurid, salacious, and melodramatic – essentially the nineteenth century equivalent of true crime drama (to give a sense of their content, Dumas used one of Peuchet's stories as the basis for *The Count of Monte Cristo*). In this paper I use Marx's 'Peuchet: On Suicide' as a way into the larger question of 'conceptual fictions', or the relationship between the concepts and narrative.

Dimitris Vardoulakis (UWS): ***Foucault and Kafka on Sovereignty and Biopolitics***
This paper compares the opening of Foucault's *Discipline and Punish*, which cites the account of Damiens' execution, to Kafka's presentation of the execution machine in "In a Penal Colony." The aim is two-fold: First, to test Foucault's distinction of classical and disciplinary power against the theory of power implicit in Kafka's text. And, second, to suggest that the conceptual content of Kafka's literature can contribute toward the philosophical discussions of power.

"THE REAL IS THE IMPASSE OF FORMALISATION": LACAN, BADIOU AND MATHEMATICAL FORMALISATION

Chair: Jon Roffe (UMelb)

- Justin Clemens (UMelb)
- John Cleary (UMelb)

First proposed by Lacan in his seminar XX in the early seventies, 'the real is the impasse of formalisation' stands as one of his crucial theses, establishing the place of the subject at the limits of mathematical formalisation. Of those influenced by Lacan, Alain Badiou has perhaps taken this thesis up most forcefully, developing it in a number of novel ways across his three major works to date: *Theory of the Subject*, *Being and Event* and *Logics of Worlds*. The aim of the panel is to explore this thesis in both authors, using it to establish the relationship between them. More specifically, the panel will try to draw out the way in which this thesis constitutes a materialist theory of the subject, as well as the idea that it grounds an orientation or a method in each thinker's respective discourses.

Justin Clemens (UMelb): ***Lacan, Heidegger and formalisation***
In a lecture dating from 3 February 1982, part of his course on *The Hermeneutics of the Subject*, Michel Foucault (perhaps hyperbolically) asserts that only two people in the twentieth century effectively posed 'the question of truth': Martin Heidegger and Jacques Lacan. If Foucault admits that his own work was magnetized by Heidegger's - not least in the sequence of studies that ultimately led the former to rethink power-relations as radical variations on the theme of the 'care for the self' - he acknowledges that Lacan had taken a different route. For Lacan, although psychoanalysis - as broached by Sigmund Freud - constituted an

unprecedented, anti-philosophical assault upon the very possibility of ontology and ethics, it nonetheless did not give up on thinking the relation between knowledge, power and truth. Yet, in sustaining this inquiry, Lacan came to construct a set of very odd doctrines regarding the articulation between science and sexuality. This presentation will present and elucidate how these doctrines function in a late sequence of Lacanian texts, especially from Seminar XVII to Seminar XX inclusive. In my elaboration of these doctrines, I draw on contemporaneous developments in logic and mathematics, in order to show just how and why Lacan's decision for posing the question of truth differs fundamentally from Heidegger's. At the same time, I gesture forwards to the work of Alain Badiou, to show how Badiou's own position on truth and being renegotiates the gulf between Heidegger and Lacan.

John Cleary (UMelb): ***The Impasse and Formalisation, or Alain Badiou's Orientation to Mathematics***

It would hardly be overstating things to say that mathematics is important to the Philosophy of Alain Badiou. However, what orients this approach to mathematics? As Badiou himself hints at in the introduction to *Being and Event*, the answer is the Lacanian thesis 'the real is the impasse of formalisation'. Proposed by Lacan in Seminar XX, the thesis locates the subject at the point of impossibility of mathematical formalisation. This paper will show how Badiou develops this thesis in *Being and Event* by theorizing the point of emergence of subjects or truth procedures at the impasse of Set theory – the continuum hypothesis – and in a slightly different way in *Logics of Worlds* as the gap *between* set theory and possible modes of appearance. In doing so, I will try to show how this constitutes a materialist theory of the subject for Badiou. I then want to touch on the way Badiou's understanding of this thesis diverges from Lacan's around the relation between the impasse, structure and the subject: for Badiou the subject can only emerge in the wake of a rupture with a structure – an event – and not as an effect of the structure.

THE ROLE OF THE HUMAN IN NON-PHILOSOPHY

Chair: Justin Clemens (UMelb)

- Thomas Sutherland (UMelb)
- Elliot Patsoura (UMelb)

Although he has been publishing since the early 1970s, François Laruelle's project of nonphilosophy has only recently received any sustained attention in English-language scholarly work, spurred in large part by the writings of Ray Brassier, along with Alexander Galloway, John Mullarkey, and Anthony Paul Smith. Yet Brassier's nihilistic anti-humanism has tended to colour this reception in a way that would seem almost inimical to Laruelle's stated intentions. The purpose of this panel then, is to focus upon one of the most important, but perhaps also one of the least discussed aspects of Laruelle's fascinating (if abstruse) nonphilosophy, that being his theory of man, and his claim to have recovered a truly ordinary mode of thought - that of lived experience. Revolving around the figure of the One – which he identifies as synonymous with the human ego - as a radical, unified (rather than unitary) immanence 'in flesh and blood' that gives without givenness, and as such, as a necessary but not sufficient condition for philosophy, Laruelle does not claim to be able to think the One in itself, but rather, claims to offer the tools to think according to the One. Accordingly, both of our papers will attempt to interrogate both the value and limits of this humanism, firstly in relation to the parallel traditions of twentieth century humanism and antihumanism, and secondly with reference to Michel Foucault's critique of post-Kantian transcendental philosophy.

Thomas Sutherland (UMelb): ***Human-in-the-last-instance: François Laruelle's Non-philosophical Humanism***

There is an odd tension in François Laruelle's work: on the one hand, his dense, jargonladen, often seemingly impenetrable writing proves daunting to even those familiar with the turgid prose of much continental thought; yet on the other, the express purpose of his nonphilosophical project is to recover a decidedly ordinary mode of thought - that of the individual *ego* - which is ungraspable through the abstractions of philosophy. Opposed to the abstractions that inevitably constitute philosophy's universalized image of humanity, Laruelle instead argues 'the individual is the undivided without remainder or excess, that which is nothing-but-undivided and which precedes *a priori* all forms of universality', such that the problematic of the individual is 'founded on a thinking of the One rather than of Being'. The task of non-philosophy, therefore, is not to think *about* the One (which would be to reduce the human individual to Being), but to think *according to the One* - through what he refers to as the *force-(of)-thought* - whereby the auto-positioned sufficiency of philosophy is

suspended, and philosophy is understood as occasional material that is determined-in-thelast- instance by the radical immanence of the One, which is not a subject in the philosophical sense, but a living, flesh-and-blood human. The purpose of this paper, then, is to ask to what extent Laruelle's non-philosophy is able to escape (or at the very least, rethink) the clash between human and anti-humanism (and now also post-humanism) as it manifests in the continental tradition.

Elliot Patsoura (UMelb): ***Necessary… but Sufficient? Non-philosophical Humanism between Foucault and Laruelle.***

Between the work of the early Foucault and that of François Laruelle, comparable claims are made to the identification of 'a space in which it is once more possible to think' (Foucault). For the former, this entails an end to a characteristically post-Kantian 'confusion of the empirical and the transcendental'; to the illegitimate treatment of empirical knowledge concerning the human 'as a possible philosophical field in which the foundation of knowledge, the definition of its limits, and, in the end, the truth of all truth must be discoverable'. For Laruelle, the possibility of thinking non-philosophically exercises a no less demanding suspension of the auto-positional and auto-donational sufficiency of philosophy, affording in turn a subsequent treatment of philosophy as its material, but also a thinking according to an individual ego (foreclosed, nevertheless, both to thought and to Being). This paper will thus entertain two possibilities: first, that Laruelle's nonphilosophical humanism is but the most sophisticated contemporary instance of the surreptitious post-Kantian disposition diagnosed by Foucault; and second, that Laruelle's project instead constitutes, somewhat ironically, the realisation of early Foucauldian invocations to 'think afresh'.

BOOK PANELS

Mathew Abbott. ***The Figure of this World: Agamben and the Question of Political Ontology.*** **Edinburgh University Press, 2014.**

What if we've been wrong when reading Agamben? Mathew Abbott argues that Agamben's thought is misunderstood when read in terms of critical theory or traditional political philosophy. He shows instead that it engages in political ontology: studying the political stakes of the question of being. Abbott demonstrates the crucial influence of Martin Heidegger on Agamben's work, locating it in the post-Heideggerian tradition of the critique of metaphysics. He also positions it in relation to the thought of Benjamin, Nietzsche, Levinas, Nancy, and Wittgenstein. As he clarifies it, Abbott links Agamben's philosophy with Wittgenstein's picture theory and Heidegger's concept of the world-picture, showing the importance of this for understanding – and potentially overcoming – the forms of alienation characteristic of the society of the spectacle.

Chair: Simone Bignall (UNSW)
Respondents:

- Robert Sinnerbrink (Macquarie),
- Daniel McLoughlin (UNSW),
- Justin Clemens (UMelb).

Miriam Bankovsky. ***Perfecting Justice in Rawls, Habermas and Honneth: A Deconstructive Perspective*****. Continuum 2012 (Bloomsbury paperback, 2013).**

Miriam Bankovsky shows how the pursuit of justice requires two orientations. The first is a practical commitment to the possibility of justice, which is the clear starting point for the broadly constructive theories of Rawls, Habermas and Honneth. Indeed, if justice were not possible, it would be difficult to see why it is worthwhile for human beings to live on this earth. However, a second orientation qualifies the first. It can be expressed as a deconstructive attentiveness to the impossibility of determining justice's content. This impossibility results from the tension between the appeal for individual consideration and the appeal for impartiality, demands that Derrida believes our historical concept of justice includes. Framed by these two orientations, this ambitious book explores

the promise and shortcomings of the constructive theories. Attentive to concrete experiences of injustice that these thinkers tend to overlook, Bankovsky provocatively challenges Rawls' account of civil disobedience, Habermas' defence of rational consensus, and Honneth's ideal of mutual recognition, providing new insights into deconstruction's relevance for contemporary theories of justice.

Chair: Alison Ross (Monash)
Commentators:

- Dr Geoff Boucher (Deakin)
- Dr Carolyn D'Cruz (LaTrobe)
- Dr Alexei Procyshyn (Monash)

AJ Bartlett, Justin Clemens, Jon Roffe. *Lacan Deleuze Badiou*. Edinburgh University Press, 2014.

The theoretical writings of Jacques Lacan, Gilles Deleuze and Alain Badiou stand at the heart of contemporary European thought. While the combined corpus of these three figures contains a significant number of references to each other's work, such references are often simply critical, obscure – or both. Lacan Deleuze Badiou guides us through these crucial, under-remarked interrelations, identifying the conceptual passages, connections and disjunctions that underlie the often superficial statements of critique, indifference or agreement. Working through the rubrics of the contemporary, time, the event and truth, Bartlett, Clemens and Roffe present a new, lucid account of where these three thinkers stand in relation to one another and why their nexus remains unsurpassed as a point of reference for contemporary thought itself.

Chair: Jack Reynolds (Deakin)

- Russell Grigg (Deakin)
- Knox Peden (ANU)
- John Cleary

Paolo Diego Bubbio. *Sacrifice in the Post-Kantian Tradition. Perspectivism, Intersubjectivity, and Recognition.* SUNY Press, 2014.

In this book, Paolo Diego Bubbio offers an alternative to standard philosophical accounts of the notion of sacrifice, which generally begin

with the hermeneutic and postmodern traditions of the twentieth century, starting instead with the post-Kantian tradition of the nineteenth century. He restructures the historical development of the concept of sacrifice through a study of Kant, Solger, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and shows how each is indebted to Kant and has more in common with him than is generally acknowledged. Bubbio argues that although Kant sought to free philosophical thought from religious foundations, he did not thereby render the role of religious claims philosophically useless. This makes it possible to consider sacrifice as a regulative and symbolic notion, and leads to an unorthodox idea of sacrifice: not the destruction of something for the sake of something else, but rather a kenotic emptying, conceived as a withdrawal or a "making room" for others.

Chair: Dimitris Vardoulakis (UWS).
Respondents:

- Paul Redding (USyd)
- Patrick Stokes (Deakin)

Marguerite La Caze. ***Wonder and Generosity: Their Role in Ethics and Politics*****, SUNY Press, 2013.**

Wonder and Generosity provides a fresh account of how the passions of wonder—based on accepting others' differences—and generosity—based on self-respect and mutual respect—can supplement each other to establish an ethics and politics of respect for sexual and cultural differences. Drawing on the work of both historical and contemporary thinkers, such as Descartes, Kant, Beauvoir, Arendt, Irigaray, and Derrida, Marguerite La Caze applies her theoretical framework to a range of contemporary political challenges, including asylum-seeker policies, justice for indigenous and other oppressed groups, debates over official apologies, gender equality, and responses to radical evil. La Caze's book contributes to understanding the relationship between equality and difference in public life, the extent to which we must regard others as similar in the name of equality, and the extent to which we must acknowledge significant differences.

Chair: Jack Reynolds (Deakin)
Respondents:

- Matthew Sharpe (Deakin)
- Jo Faulkner (UNSW)

John R. Morss. ***International Law as the Law of Collectives: Toward a Law of People*****. Ashgate, 2013.**

International law as we know it lacks the vocabulary to deal with the collective dimension and therefore perpetuates an individualistic vocabulary. It talks of states as individual entities and of 'peoples' as individual entities; and its understanding of rights is overwhelmingly of the rights of individual persons rather than the rights of communities or populations. This book advocates a collective approach for public international law. In doing so, it reframes longstanding problems such as the conflict between self-determination and the integrity of states and the effects and the limits of state sovereignty in an increasingly globalized world. Presenting fresh perspectives on a range of contemporary issues in international law, the book draws on the work of major contributors to legal and political theory.

Chair: Sean Bowden (Deakin)
Respondents:

- Patrick Emerton (Monash)
- Helmut Philipp Aust (Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin)

Knox Peden. ***Spinoza Contra Phenomenology: French Rationalism from Cavaillès to Deleuze*****. Stanford UP, 2014.**

Spinoza Contra Phenomenology fundamentally recasts the history of postwar French thought, typically presumed to have been driven by a critique of reason indebted to Nietzsche and Heidegger. Although the reception of phenomenology gave rise to many innovative developments in French philosophy, from existentialism to deconstruction, not everyone in France was pleased with this German import. This book recounts how a series of French philosophers used Spinoza to erect a bulwark against the nominally irrationalist tendencies of phenomenology. From its beginnings in the interwar years, this rationalism would prove foundational for Althusser's rethinking of Marxism and Deleuze's ambitious metaphysics. There has been a renewed enthusiasm for Spinozism of late by those who see his work as a kind of neo-vitalism or philosophy of life and affect. Peden counters this trend by tracking a decisive and neglected aspect of Spinoza's philosophy—his rationalism—in a body of thought too often presumed to have rejected reason. In the process, he demonstrates that the virtues of Spinoza's rationalism have yet to be exhausted.

Chair: Dimitris Vardoulakis (UWS)
Respondents:

- Moira Gatens (USyd)
- Jon Roffe (UMelb)
- Alison Ross (Monash)

PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT & DISCUSSION PANELS

ARC FUNDING ASSESSMENT

The session will involve discussion and pooling of wisdom concerning ARC DECRAs, Discovery Grants and Future Fellowships.

- A special panel has been brought together of current and recent ARC grant recipients

POSTGRADUATE & EARLY CAREER MATTERS

This session is intended for postgraduates and early career researchers with an interest in strategic thinking around careers in philosophy.

Co-Chairs: Wojciech Kaftanski (ACU postgrad) and Sean Bowden (Deakin):

- Geoff Boucher: Becoming a Strategic Researcher
- Lee Braver: The US job market
- Patrick Stokes: Postdoc opportunities in Europe and the UK

WOMEN IN THE PHILOSOPHY PROFESSION

Continuing the tradition of 'WiP' (Women in Philosophy) gatherings at Australian philosophy conferences, this session will touch on issues of particular relevance for women: both those with a position, and those aspiring to one.

Chair: Jo Faulkner (UNSW)

- Catherine Mills (Monash)
- Jodie McNeilly (ACU)

PRACTICAL MATTERS

Name-badges:
In the interest of security please kindly wear your name-badge at all times during conference events.

Financials:
Those delegates who have yet to finalise either their *conference registration* or their *conference dinner booking* are asked to come to the registration desk immediately. Thank you for your co-operation.

Food and Refreshments:
Morning and afternoon tea is provided for all delegates at the designated times on your schedule outside the Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre.

Please note that lunch is *not* catered, though the cafeteria in the Main Campus Building will have a range of food options available for you to purchase. Other food options can be found on Brunswick street and further afield, though please be aware of the limited time period allocated for lunch (one hour).

Internet WIFI:
Delegates are welcome to access ACU WIFI:

- *Network Name:* acuconf,
- *Username:* confguest,
- *Password:* Welcome.1

IT Helpdesk:
IT support is available at the IT service desk located in the University Library.

Maps and Orientation: ACU Melbourne Campus:

1 The Mary Glowrey Building (115 Victoria Parade)
2 The Daniel Mannix Building (The Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre is on the ground floor)
12 St Mary of the Cross Square
13 Multi-level Carpark
14 Modular Buildings (81-89 Victoria Parade)

The campus is located at the junction of Victoria Parade and Brunswick Street on the fringe of the Melbourne central business district, but also close to the food and retail strips of Brunswick and Smith Streets. Cafes, shops and art galleries are a short walk away, as are some of Melbourne's finest parks and gardens.

The conference will take place in and around the Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre, which is on the ground floor of the Daniel Mannix Building (Building 2 on the map). The building can be entered from either Brunswick Street or Young Street.

All **plenary sessions** will be held in the Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre, with refreshments being provided in the foyer outside.

The **parallel sessions** will be held in the well-appointed new modular buildings (Building 14 on the map) that are accessed off St Mary of the Cross Square (12) up the short set of stairs.

Amenities in the Main Campus Building:

- Guests may make use of the computers in the library to check their emails.
- Public phones & water-coolers are located in a room opposite the library, near the Reception desk.
- The Roof-top Garden on level 6 of Daniel Mannix building (which has a great view of the city) is available for delegates to spend some time. Take the lift outside the Philippa Brazil Lecture Theatre.

Parking:

Short term metre parking is available around the campus. 4 hour metre parking is available in the wider local area.

A multi-level level car park is located directly behind 115 Victoria Pde (building 13 on the map). It is accessed via Young St, from Victoria Pde end only. Major credit cards accepted.

Car park fees:

- 3-4 hours = $9;
- 4+ hours = $10;
- $10 max for longer.

Public Transportation:
Fares for Melbourne's trains, trams and buses are paid via 'myki' card.

- A full fare myki Visitor Pack costs $14 and includes $8 myki money for travel. A concession, child or seniors myki Visitor Pack costs $7 and includes $4 myki money for travel.
- A full fare or concession myki Visitor Pack can be purchased from the Melbourne Visitor Centre at Federation Square or from the PTV Hub at Southern Cross Station near the corner of Spencer and Collins streets or ask your hotel.
- The myki Visitor Pack includes a durable myki smartcard pre-loaded with enough value for one day's travel in Zone 1, which includes the entire tram network. (It also includes discounts and offers at 15 of Melbourne's leading attractions, saving visitors more than $130.)
- Always remember to touch on and off your myki as you enter the paid area of a train station or board a tram or bus.
- If travelling for more than one day, your myki can be topped up at:
    - myki machines at all metropolitan train stations and some accessible tram stops and bus interchanges
    - customer service centres at staffed train stations
    - close to 800 retail outlets, including all 7-Eleven stores, where you see the myki sign
    - the PTV Hub at Southern Cross Station.

Hours of operation for Melbourne's trains, trams and buses are as follows:

- Monday to Thursday: between 5am and midnight,
- Friday and Saturday nights: extended hours to around 1am.
- Sunday: Trains and trams run from 7am to 11pm.
- Many of Melbourne's bus routes run from 6am – 9pm Mon – Fri, 8am – 9pm Saturday and 9am – 9pm Sunday.

For further information, see Melbourne's Public Transport pages. For detailed timetable and route information, see http://ptv.vic.gov.au/.

Tram:
From Collins St Terminus (near corner of Swanston St), catch the 109 or 112 tram to right outside 115 Victoria Pde. Other selected tram numbers will take you as far as St Vincent's Plaza, (which is a very short walk to ACU).

Train:
Parliament is the nearest station. From there, you can walk or catch a tram:

- *Walking:* From Parliament station, exit via Macarthur St and head towards St Patrick's Cathedral. Then turn right at Victoria Pde. ACU is a few blocks down, on the left hand side, past St Vincent's Hospital, (heading away from the city).
- *Tram:* Exit via Macarthur St. Catch the 109 or 112 tram from Macarthur St to right outside ACU.

Taxi cabs:

- 13CABS Black Cabs - 13 2227
- Silver Top Taxi - 131 008

Tourist information:

The Melbourne City Tourist Shuttle bus stops at 13 key city locations. It runs every 30 minutes, seven days a week between 9.30am and 4.30pm (except Christmas Day). The full trip takes approximately 90 minutes and includes on-board commentary. Tickets cost $5 (children aged 10 are free). More information: www.thatsmelbourne.com.au/shuttle.

The *free* City Circle Tram (which includes automated audio commentary on points of interest) runs each day, travelling the perimeter of the CBD, taking in many of Melbourne's landmarks. Catch the tram at any of the specially marked tram stops. Services run approximately every 12 minutes from 10am - 9pm Thursday to Saturday, and 10am - 6pm Sunday to Wednesday.

About Fitzroy:
Fitzroy is two km north-east of Melbourne's Central Business District. Planned as Melbourne's first suburb, it was later also one of the city's first areas to gain municipal status. It occupies Melbourne's smallest and most densely populated suburban area. It has a long associations with the working class and is currently inhabited by a wide variety of ethnicities and socio-economic groups and is known for a culture of bohemianism, being the main home of Melbourne's Fringe Festival. Its commercial heart is Brunswick Street, which is one of Melbourne's major retail, eating, and entertainment strips.

It has undergone waves of both urban renewal and gentrification since the 1950s. In response to past planning practices, much of the suburb is now a historic preservation precinct, with many individual buildings and streetscapes covered by Heritage Overlays. Its built environment is diverse and features some of the finest examples of Victorian era architecture in Melbourne. Various kinds of street art adorn many buildings throughout Fitzroy. There are many small commercial art galleries, artist-run spaces and artist studios located within the suburb. Fitzroy has a thriving street art community and is also the home of Gertrude Contemporary Art Spaces and the Centre for Contemporary Photography.

Fitzroy is a hub for live music in Melbourne, and plays host to several prominent venues; The Old Bar, Bar Open, the Evelyn Hotel, Gertrude's Brown Couch, and Cape Live.