Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy

Annual Conference 2019

THE UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE

University of Melbourne

4-6 December 2019

Table of Contents

Acknowledgement of Country 4

The Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP) 4

Conference Host: The University of Melbourne 5

- Conference committee 5
- Student volunteers 5
- Sponsor: The School of Historical and Philosophical studies 5
- Sponsor: The Barry Taylor and David Lewis Philosophy Fund 5
- Sponsor: The School of Culture and Communication 6
- Sponsor: The Research Unit in Enlightenment, Romanticism, and Contemporary Culture 6

Conference Information 7

- Venue 7
- Registration 7
- Sessions: Length, Chairing, Use of AV Equipment 7
- Wifi Access 7
- Catering 8
- Accessibility 8

Campus Information 9

- Transport 9
- Facilities on campus 12
- Facilities beyond campus 12

Conference Events 14

- Postgraduate/Early Career Researcher Day 14
- Public Lecture 14
- Conference Reception 14
- Conference Dinner 15
- ASCP Annual General Meeting 15

Keynotes 16

- Rebecca Comay 16
- Samantha Matherne 17
- Martin Hägglund 18

Plenary Panel 19
The Work of Justin Clemens 19
Abstracts 20
Book Panels 20
Thematic Panels 24
Individual Papers 38
Conference Schedule 98

Acknowledgement of Country

We acknowledge that we are on the lands of the Wurundjeri and Boon Wurrung peoples who have been custodians of this land for thousands of years, and acknowledge and pay our respects to their Elders past and present.

The Australasian Society for Continental Philosophy (ASCP)

The ASCP was established in 1995 as the revamped Australasian Society for Phenomenology and Social Philosophy. Its original aims were to provide a broad intellectual forum for academics, writers, artists, and postgraduates researching topics in Contemporary European philosophy, and to thereby become the region's premier reference point for people working within the diverse fields of Continental/European Philosophy.

The Society aims to foster interest and support research in the field of Continental philosophy, understood in a broad and interdisciplinary sense, in Australia, New Zealand, and in the Australasian region, and to provide a network for those interested in and/or working in this field both nationally and internationally. The Society endeavours to promote the interdisciplinary exchange of ideas inspired by the diverse traditions of European thought (such as phenomenology, existentialism, critical theory, hermeneutics, feminism, deconstruction, poststructuralism, and so on), and to develop productive links with other international societies and associations that share similar goals and views.

It also remains committed to the development of a pluralistic Australasian philosophical community, linking those working in diverse institutions, disciplines, and areas of inquiry, and encouraging productive and collegial relations between postgraduate students and professional academics and researchers. The Society actively supports principles of gender equity, encouraging the participation of women in philosophy at a professional level, and is further committed to fostering the dialogue between diverse philosophical and cultural traditions both within Australia and internationally.

Conference Host: The University of Melbourne

The 2019 Annual Conference is hosted and sponsored by the University of Melbourne.

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE

Andrew Inkpin

Knox Peden

Marilyn Stendera

STUDENT VOLUNTEERS

The Committee would like to thank the student volunteers who will be assisting delegates during the conference: Bridget Assi, Hannah Blount, Ella Bryning, Valentin Cartillier, Nicola Chadwick, Marlee Ernst, Max Hollands, Harry Isles, Dechen Khadro, Sam Leeder, Jamie Miller, Maddison Mulé, Rory Mullen, William Radovic, Antonia Smyth and Joel Spencer and Grant Zhou Zi Hao.

SPONSOR: THE SCHOOL OF HISTORICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

The School of Historical and Philosophical Studies was formed in 2011 comprising the programs of History, History and Philosophy of Science, Philosophy, Classics and Archaeology, and the Grimwade Centre for Cultural Materials Conservation and The Program in Jewish Culture and Society.

Philosophy has been taught at the University of Melbourne ever since its foundation in 1853. The Boyce Gibson Chair of Philosophy, founded in 1886, is the oldest chair of philosophy in Australia, and was named for W. R. Boyce Gibson, whose English translation of Husserl's *Ideen 1* in 1931 played a key role in the Anglophone reception of phenomenology. Over the years, the program has produced many undergraduates and graduates who have gone on to have a major impact on philosophy, people such as David Armstrong, Frank Jackson, Peter Singer, and Mark Johnston, as well as many who have gone on to distinguish themselves in the arts, government, and other areas of public life.

In addition to providing support for the whole conference, the School of Historical and Philosophical Studies is sponsoring the public lecture on the 3rd of December.

SPONSOR: THE BARRY TAYLOR AND DAVID LEWIS PHILOSOPHY FUND

Philosophical research at the University of Melbourne is supported in part by the Barry Taylor and David Lewis Philosophy Fund, established memory of Melbourne Associate Professor Barry Taylor and Princeton Professor David K. Lewis. One of the most influential metaphysicians in the twentieth-century analytic tradition, David Lewis was a regular visitor in the philosophy program

at the University of Melbourne and a valued contributor to its intellectual life for over twenty years. Barry Taylor was a distinguished philosopher of language who used linguistic and epistemological tools to argue against Lewis-style metaphysical realism. Their strong friendship and philosophical disagreements enlivened the work of both. The philosophy program hosts an annual series of public lectures in honour of a remarkable philosophical friendship.

The Barry Taylor and David Lewis Philosophy Fund is sponsoring the three keynote lectures.

SPONSOR: THE SCHOOL OF CULTURE AND COMMUNICATION

The School of Culture and Communication is a thriving research centre for critical thinking in the humanities. This agenda is led by world-leading scholars whose fields of research include literary and cultural studies, art history, cinema and performance, media and communication and Australian Indigenous studies. The School is also host to a range of funded research concentrations, such as the ARC Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotions, the Australian Centre, the Centre for Advancing Journalism and the Research Unit in Public Cultures. More broadly, the School's academics publish, speak and blog on topics as diverse as romanticism, poetry, Asian popular culture, digital media, climate change, network societies, gender and sexuality, racism, cosmopolitanism, and contemporary arts. The School considers the public life of the humanities an enduring tradition that enriches contemporary society, and has many community and industry partnerships through which it engages with a wider audience.

The School of Culture and Communication is sponsoring the plenary panel on the work of Justin Clemens.

SPONSOR: THE RESEARCH UNIT IN ENLIGHTENMENT, ROMANTICISM, AND CONTEMPORARY CULTURE

Contemporary notions of critique, creativity, Literature, Nature, citizenship, human rights, democracy, scientific enquiry, and even the Human were forged by Enlightenment and Romantic thought. Yet this inheritance now seems threatened, paradoxically, by developments that it has helped engineer and with which it is still entwined: the digital revolution, globalisation, transnationalism, the environment crisis, and the emergence of artificial intelligence and autonomous technologies. Through innovative research, conferences, and public lectures, this research unit aims to re-envision the transition from Enlightenment to Romanticism and its legacies in the present. We believe it is important to ask, without nostalgia, what can we make of 'Enlightenment - Romanticism' now?

The Research Unit in Enlightenment, Romanticism and Contemporary Culture is sponsoring the thematic panels and the postgraduate/early career researcher day.

Conference Information

VENUE

The conference will be held at the University of Melbourne's Parkville Campus.

The conference venues are the Old Arts Building (Building 149) and Arts West, North Wing (Building 148a), each located on Professors Walk.

Please use this interactive map to navigate campus. Note that buildings are searchable by name and building number.

REGISTRATION

On the Postgraduate/ECR Day, registrations will be available in 356 Arts West (North Wing) from 12:30 to 1:00pm.

The registration/information desk will operate in Arts Hall in Old Arts from 8:15am to 4:00pm on Wednesday 4 December, from 8:45am to 4:00pm on Thursday 5 December, and from 8:45am to 11am on Friday 6 December.

SESSIONS: LENGTH, CHAIRING, USE OF AV EQUIPMENT

Session chairs have not been organised in advance. As has been the practice at previous ASCP conferences, delegates are asked to volunteer to chair sessions, either by coordinating with panel presenters in advance or by making their services available at the time of the session.

The program of talks has been planned to allow delegates to move between sessions to hear talks that interest them. For this reason, we ask presenters and chairs to keep to the allocated time. In sessions involving three presenters, papers are to be kept to 20 minutes and question time to 10 minutes. In sessions involving two presenters, papers are 30 minutes and question time 15 minutes. As a rule, questions should follow each paper, though in thematic panels and book panels, session chairs have the option of holding all questions until the end.

All rooms have standard AV equipment (computer, projector, microphones, laptop connections). Please do not log out or shut down the computers. If you need assistance, look for one of our volunteers.

WIFI ACCESS

Eduroam

The University of Melbourne participates in the Eduroam network. You can connect using your home institution's credentials; more information is available here.

Visitor Network

The conference also has a dedicated visitor network account. To make use of this, ensure that use of wifi is enabled on your device. Select the 'Visitor' network from the range of options, and log on using the following credentials:

Username: 2019ascpc

Password: !nd8CH

CONDITIONS OF USE

- You will adhere to all University of Melbourne statutes, policies and guidelines including the University's Provision and Acceptable Use of IT Policy.
- You will not infringe copyright, including but not limited to downloading copyright material via peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing.
- You will not apply an unreasonable burden on the network.
- You will not allow any other person to use your account(s).
- You will use up-to-date antivirus software and regularly apply updates to your operating system and applications.
- The University is not liable for loss, damage or consequential loss or damage arising directly or indirectly from use of the wireless network and associated software.

CATERING

Morning and afternoon tea will be provided each day of the conference.

All catering during the main days of the conference will be done by the Asylum Seeker Resource Centre Catering Company, who provide pathways to employment for people seeking asylum. You can find out more about them here, and more about the ASRC here.

Delegates will need to make their own arrangements for lunch. There are a variety of cafés and restaurants near the University, especially centred on Lygon Street in Carlton, east of the campus. The most convenient dining options will be found on campus in Union House (Building 130).

Please see below under 'Facilities on Campus' and 'Facilities off Campus' for more information about dining.

ACCESSIBILITY

All conference venues are wheelchair accessible. All rooms and theatres where sessions (including keynotes and plenaries) are held have hearing aid loops.

Campus Information

TRANSPORT

Myki

All public transport in and around Melbourne (with the exception of the CBD Free Tram Zone) requires the use of a myki smart card. Myki is a reusable card used in place of a traditional ticket. myki cards can be purchased from 7-Eleven stores, newsagents, staffed train station ticket office windows and myki machines (at all train stations). For more information about myki, please visit:

https://www.ptv.vic.gov.au/tickets/myki/

Transport from Tullamarine Airport

Public Transport: Catch the Skybus from Melbourne Airport to Southern Cross Station. A one-way ticket costs $19.75. Details here: https://www.skybus.com.au/melbourne-city-express/

From Southern Cross you can use the Melbourne Tram System to access the campus. Details here: https://www.ptv.vic.gov.au/

Allow up to 1.5 hours for this journey from the airport.

Taxi: Tullamarine Airport is located 20km from the conference venue, with an expected travel time of 20-30 minutes, depending on traffic. Taxi fare from the airport to the University of Melbourne is approximately $50.

Public transport to the Parkville Campus

The campus is in close proximity to Melbourne CBD and accessible by trams (along Swanston St and Royal Parade) and buses. For detailed information, see the next page.

How to travel to Melbourne University Parkville campus

Things you should know about public transport

01 By ditching your car for a train, tram or bus you are helping to make Australia a little more greenhouse friendly.

02 myki is Melbourne's ticket to travel on the city's trains, trams and buses. It is a durable, plastic smartcard which stores value and can be used over and over again.

03 If you are a local, full-time student you are eligible to apply for a concession card. You can't buy a concession myki without a public transport student concession card. It only costs $9 for a card and that will get you travel savings for an entire year. Pick up a form at your student union or any Premium Station and save the extra cash. And remember, you can't use your uni student card to buy a concession myki.

04 You can buy and top up a myki at:

- close to 800 retailers where you see the myki sign, including all 7-Eleven stores
- the customer service centre or ticket window at Premium Stations
- myki machines (full fare myki only) at all metropolitan train stations and some accessible tram stops and bus interchanges
- online at **ptv.vic.gov.au**
- by calling **1800 800 007** (6am – midnight daily).

For a full run down on fares visit **ptv.vic.gov.au**

05 Before you head out, check what zones you'll be travelling in and make sure you top up your myki with enough value to cover your entire journey.

06 Use the journey planner at **ptv.vic.gov.au** to help plan your trip. It can do all your thinking for you and give you a customised trip plan from A to B.

07 Want public transport info on your phone? Visit **ptv.vic.gov.au** for details on mobile phone apps.

08 For more information about travelling to uni by public transport visit **ptv.vic.gov.au** or call **1800 800 007** 6am – midnight daily.

Train

City Loop trains	Melbourne Central Station	Take trams 1, 3/3a, 5, 6, 8, 16, 64, 67, 72 along Swanston St. Alight at Melbourne University
Craigieburn Sydenham Upfield Werribee Williamstown	North Melbourne Station	Take bus Route 401 along Dryburgh St. Alight at Melbourne University.

Tram

1	East Coburg – South Melbourne Beach	Alight at Melbourne University
3/3a	East Malvern – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
5	Malvern – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
6	Glen Iris – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
8	Toorak – Moreland	Alight at Melbourne University
16	Kew – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
19	North Coburg – City (Elizabeth St)	Alight at Melbourne University
55	West Coburg – Domain Interchange	Alight at Stop 14
59	Airport West – City (Elizabeth St)	Alight at Stop 14
64	East Brighton – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
67	Carnegie – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
72	Camberwell – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University

Bus

200	City – Bulleen	Alight at the corner of Elgin St and Lygon St
201	City – Doncaster Shoppingtown and Lygon St	Alight at the corner of Elgin St
203	City – Bulleen	Alight at the corner of Elgin St and Lygon St
205*	Melbourne University – Doncaster Shoppingtown	Alight at Melbourne University
207	City – Donvale	Alight at the corner of Elgin St and Lygon St
250	Garden City / Port Melbourne – La Trobe University	Alight at the corner of Elgin St and Rathdowne St
251	Garden City – Northland SC	Alight at the corner of Elgin St and Rathdowne St
253	Garden City – North Carlton	Alight at the corner of Elgin St and Rathdowne St
401**	North Melbourne – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
402	Footscray – East Melbourne	Alight at Melbourne University
505	Moonee Ponds – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University
546	Heidelberg – Melbourne University	Alight at Melbourne University

*Peak service only.

**401 operates every 3 to 6 minutes express betwen North Melbourne Station and Melbourne University Monday to Friday.

Melbourne University Parkville campus



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PUBLIC TRANSPORT VICTORIA

For more information visit **ptv.vic.gov.au**
or call **1800 800 007** (6am – midnight daily)

FACILITIES ON CAMPUS

Medical Services: The University of Melbourne Health Service is located at 138-146 Cardigan St., Carlton, VIC 3053, Tel: (03) 8344 6904. For appointments and further details please visit this link.

Security: The University of Melbourne Security Office is located at 213 Grattan Street, Carlton, VIC 3053 in Building 203. Services and a security escort are available anytime by calling (03) 8344 6666 or 1800 246 066 (free call). More details are available at this link.

ATMs and Banks: ANZ, Bendigo Bank, and Commonwealth Bank each have ATMs operating in Union House (Building 130). The Commonwealth Bank and NAB also have branches (with additional ATMs) on campus in Biosciences 3 (Building 143, between Old Arts and Union House).

Cafés and Takeaway: Beyond the options in Union House (Building 130), delegates will also find food and beverages available for purchase at Professors Walk Café, located in Baillieu Library (Building 177), immediately adjacent to Arts West, and in Dr Dax Kitchen at 30 Royal Parade in the Kenneth Myer Building (Building 144). A crêpe stand that also serves coffee is located just next to the John Medley Building (Building 191).

Bookstore: The University of Melbourne Co-op Bookstore is located in the Alan Gilbert Building at 161 Barry Street, Carlton, VIC 3053.

Parenting Rooms: The parenting rooms closest to the conference venues are located on the ground floor of Union House (Building 130) and in the basement (B111) of the Glyn Davis Building/Melbourne School of Design (Building 133).

Further information about facilities on campus, please visit this site.

FACILITIES BEYOND CAMPUS

Just east of the University of Melbourne is the suburb of Carlton, centred on the vibrant Lygon Street. Here you will find a number of restaurants, bars, and shops. Below is an inexhaustive list of highlights.

Readings Carlton: A gem of Carlton, Readings is one of the great bookstores of Melbourne, with a wide selection of fiction and non-fiction – including philosophy. 309 Lygon St. (03) 9347 6633.

Jimmy Watsons: A Melbourne Uni institution, come to Jimmy Watsons for a glass of wine or an Aperol spritz (served by the jug, if need be) and decent pizza. 333 Lygon St. (03) 9347 3985.

Tiamo: Along with its sister venue next door, Tiamo 2, Tiamo serves hearty and delicious Italian fare. 303 Lygon St. (03) 9347 5759.

D.O.C. Gastronomia Italia: The D.O.C. group operates two terrific restaurants in Carlton, D.O.C. Espresso (326 Lygon St., (03) 9347 8482), which specializes in pasta and piadina, and

D.O.C. Pizza & Mozzarella (295 Drummond St., (03) 9347 2998), which specializes in… pizza and mozzarella.

Lemongrass: Fancy something other than Italian? Award-winning Lemongrass Thai offers a range a reliable dishes, and can cater to vegan diners. 174-178 Lygon St (03) 9662 2244.

Pidapipó: Got a sweet tooth? Arguably the best gelato in Melbourne is available at Pidapipó. Leave time for your visit; you'll be able to spot it by the queue. 299 Lygon St (03) 9347 4596.

Shakahari: Good food is available at Shakahari, where vegan and gluten-free dishes are the specialty. 201-203 Faraday St. (03) 9347 3848.

The Green Man's Arms: As the name suggests, the Green Man's Arms is a pub that serves uniquely vegetarian pub food. Popular with the locals, and serving a range of local brews, they also have kombucha on tap. 418 Lygon St (corner of Lygon and Elgin). (03) 9347 7419.

Sua Da Café: Open for lunch only, this Vietnamese café offers banh mi and high octane coffee for when the campus offerings aren't cutting it. 258 Elgin St. (03) 9347 5151.

Le Miel et La Lune: Delightful venue for breakfast and lunch. 330 Cardigan St (corner of Cardigan and Elgin). (03) 9043 9767.

Lygon Court: This shopping centre on Lygon contains a Woolworths, an organic grocer, a chemist, and a stationery called Milligram for all your writing needs. 380 Lygon St.

The Clyde Hotel: Enough said. 385 Cardigan St (corner of Cardigan and Elgin).

For more information on Lygon Street, please visit this site.

Conference Events

POSTGRADUATE/EARLY CAREER RESEARCHER DAY

Tuesday 3 December, 12:30 – 5:30pm, Room 356, Arts West, North Wing.

Registrants are welcome to attend a series of sessions dealing with grant opportunities, career pathways, and guides to academic publishing. Please see the conference schedule for details.

PUBLIC LECTURE

Tuesday 3 December, 7:30 – 8:30pm, Lecture Theatre B 117, Glyn Davis Building (Melbourne School of Design) Masson Road

This Life: Why Mortality Makes Us Free

The philosopher Martin Hägglund will talk about his groundbreaking book ***This Life***, which challenges our received notions of faith and freedom. The faith we need to cultivate, he argues, is not a religious faith in eternity but a secular faith devoted to our finite life together. He shows that all spiritual questions of freedom are inseparable from economic and material conditions. What ultimately matters is how we treat one another in this life, and what we do with our time together.

Hägglund develops new existential and political principles while transforming our understanding of spiritual life. His critique of religion takes us to the heart of what it means to mourn our loved ones, be committed, and care about a sustainable world. His critique of capitalism demonstrates that we fail to sustain our democratic values because our lives depend on wage labor. In clear and pathbreaking terms, Hägglund explains why capitalism is inimical to our freedom, and why we should instead pursue a novel form of democratic socialism.

In developing his vision of an emancipated secular life, Hägglund engages with great philosophers from Aristotle to Hegel and Marx, literary writers from Dante to Proust and Knausgaard, political economists from Mill to Keynes and Hayek, and religious thinkers from Augustine to Kierkegaard and Martin Luther King, Jr. *This Life* gives us new access to our past – for the sake of a different future.

More details here.

CONFERENCE RECEPTION

Wednesday 4 December 5:30 to 7:30pm

The ASCP will host a reception during this time in Arts Hall, Old Arts. All registrants are welcome. Book stalls will operate during the reception and throughout the conference, featuring titles published by Bloomsbury and elsewhere by ASCP delegates.

CONFERENCE DINNER

Thursday 5 December 7:00pm

The conference dinner will take place at Naughtons Hotel, Royal Parade, a historic and recently renovated venue a stone's throw from campus. The cost of dinner is $55 per head and must be paid at the time of registration. The cost covers a three-course meal. Beer, wine, and spirits will be available for purchase from the bar.



ASCP ANNUAL GENERAL MEETING

Friday 6 December 1:00 to 2:00pm, Room 353, North Wing, Arts West

Keynotes

REBECCA COMAY

Deadlines (literally)

Is there more than a superficial family resemblance between the emergencies we suffer on a daily and epochal basis–due dates, expiration dates, statutes of limitation, biological clocks, revolutionary crisis-points, environmental tipping points, messianic end-times? The deadline invokes the implacable indifference of measured time but it imposes itself in anything but a uniform manner. Like all emergency measures, deadlines are coercive rituals that distribute privilege unevenly—limits are announced, extensions are granted, penalties are imposed, time runs out faster for the disenfranchised. In other words, the deadline (like death itself) is a "real abstraction": it universalizes itself in a palpably discordant fashion. The deadline marks the place where the continuum of homogeneous, empty time erupts into a mine-field of exceptions. This lecture will explore some of the vicissitudes of this terrifying word and concept.

Rebecca Comay is Professor of Philosophy and Comparative Literature at the University of Toronto, where she is a core member of the Literature and Critical Theory Program (Victoria College), and an associate member of the Germanic Languages and Literatures Department and the Centre for Jewish Studies. Her research interests include Hegel and 19th century German philosophy; theatricality; Marx and Marxism (including Frankfurt school); psychoanalysis; contemporary French philosophy; trauma and memory; iconoclasm and destruction of art; contemporary art and art criticism; Proust and Beckett. She is the author of *Mourning Sickness: Hegel and the French Revolution* (Stanford, 2011), and, most recently with Frank Ruda, *The Dash – The Other Side of Absolute Knowing* (MIT 2018). She is currently working on a book on the temporality of deadlines, as well as a project on dramaturgy and dialectic.

SAMANTHA MATHERNE

Recapturing Edith Landmann-Kalischer's Theory of Aesthetic Value

In spite of her remarkable output, the work of the early phenomenologist, Edith Landmann-Kalischer (1877-1951) has been almost entirely neglected. My aim in this paper is to bring to light one of the aspects of her *oeuvre* that can make a contribution still today, viz., her theory of aesthetic value. I attribute to Landmann-Kalischer a view of aesthetic value I call 'moderate objectivism'. According to moderate objectivism, aesthetic value is at once part of the world and essentially connected to the response of subjects. To be sure, Landmann-Kalischer is not the only proponent of moderate objectivism; more recently John McDowell and David Wiggins have defended a version of this view. However, I argue that Landmann-Kalischer's moderate objectivism has distinct advantages over these alternatives, especially with respect to questions about the relationship between aesthetic value, aesthetic judgment, and aesthetic normativity.

Samantha Matherne is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University, where she works primarily in the history of philosophy, focusing on Immanuel Kant and his influence on Post-Kantian traditions, especially Phenomenology and Neo-Kantianism. Of special interest is how figures in these traditions conceive of the interrelations between perception and aesthetics. Her volume on Cassirer for the Routledge Philosophers Series is due to appear in 2019. She is currently at work on a systematic interpretation of Kant's theory of imagination and is also exploring the neglected work of the phenomenologist, Edith Landmann-Kalischer. Learn more about Samantha's teaching and research at her website.

MARTIN HÄGGLUND

Secular Faith and Political Emancipation

Proceeding from Hegel's idea of freedom, my paper will seek to further develop the relation between a critique of religion and a critique of capitalism, which is at the center of my book *This Life*. Hegel's idea of freedom articulates the most revolutionary demand possible, namely, that "no one is free until everyone is free." Yet Hegel himself did not follow through on this insight, since he assumed that the general masses cannot overcome their need for the religious representation of an independently existing God, who is the source of the norms to which we hold ourselves. On Hegel's account, only the philosopher can attain the "absolute knowing" that we are the source of the authority of our norms and that our freedom is possible only through our mutual recognition of one another as essentially social, historical, material, and finite living beings. For Marx, on the contrary, absolute knowing cannot be limited to a theoretical achievement of the philosopher, but must be a practical achievement that in principle can be taken up and sustained by everyone. For the same reason, the overcoming of religion must be accompanied by an overcoming of the existing form of our life together, which is capitalism. The task is to transform our social conditions in such a way that we can let go of the unhappy consciousness of religious faith and recognize in practice that everything depends on what we do with our finite time together.

Martin Hägglund is Professor of Comparative Literature and Humanities at Yale University. He is the author of four highly acclaimed books and his work has been translated into ten languages. He was elected to the Harvard Society of Fellows in 2009, awarded The Schück Prize by the Swedish Academy in 2014, and received a Guggenheim Fellowship in 2018. For more information about Martin's teaching and research, please visit his website.

Plenary Panel

THE WORK OF JUSTIN CLEMENS

Speakers: Oliver Feltham, Bryan Cooke, and Marion Campbell. Moderator: Knox Peden

Justin Clemens is Associate Professor in the School of Culture and Communication, University of Melbourne. He has published extensively on psychoanalysis, contemporary European philosophy, and contemporary Australian art and literature with recent books including *Lacan Deleuze Badiou* (2014), with A.J. Bartlett and Jon Roffe; *Psychoanalysis is an Antiphilosophy* (2013); and *Minimal Domination* (2011). He was founding Secretary of the Lacan Circle of Melbourne (2004-2009), and was the art critic for the magazine *The Monthly* (2004-2009). In addition to his scholarly work, he is well-known nationally as a commentator on Australian art and literature, and his essays and reviews have appeared in *The Age, The Australian, The Monthly, Meanjin, Overland, Arena Magazine, TEXT, Un Magazine, Discipline, The Sydney Review of Books*, and many others.

As Justin's biography indicates, he is a thinker that moves among and across a variety of theoretical discourses and aesthetic practices. Over the years, he has established himself as a major figure in Australian intellectual life, as well as a beloved mentor to scores of students in the city of Melbourne. This plenary is an opportunity to celebrate and assess the enduring contribution of a singular Australian philosopher.

Abstracts

BOOK PANELS

Marguerite La Caze, *Ethical Restoration after Communal Violence: The Grieving and the Unrepentant* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2018).

Speakers: Marguerite La Caze (University of Queensland), Simone Drichel (University of Otago), Peter Banki (Western Sydney University)

Contemporary political ethics has to face the question of how to repair relations which have broken down after crimes, oppression, and political violence. This book employs the work of European and feminist philosophers, including Jacques Derrida, Albert Camus, Simone de Beauvoir, Hannah Arendt, Karl Jaspers, Giorgio Agamben, Immanuel Kant, Jean Améry, Vladimir Jankélévitch, Margaret Urban Walker and Linda Radzik to engage with historical and recent cases: the post-liberation French purge, post-genocide Rwanda and post-colonial Australia and draws out the negative and positive conditions of ethical political responses in these contexts. It develops a philosophical account of ethical restoration through focusing on just punishment, guilt and shame, rebuilding political trust, forgiveness and reconciliation, remorse and atonement, and self-forgiveness.

Jon Roffe, ed., *The Works of Gilles Deleuze 1: 1953-1969* (Melbourne: Re.press, 2019).

Speakers: Joe Hughes (University of Melbourne), Vincent Le (Monash University), Sanja Mladenovic (University of Melbourne)

This panel will discuss the newly published *The Works of Gilles Deleuze I: 1953-1969*, which deals with Deleuze's early contributions to the history of philosophy and the study of literature, leading up to his landmark works *Difference and Repetition* (1968) and *The Logic of Sense* (1969).

The panel contributors will each address one rubric that runs through this early part of Deleuze's work, as discussed in the book.

Martin Hägglund, *This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2019).

Speakers: Conall Cash (Cornell University), Mathew Abbott (Federation University Australia)

A profound, original, and accessible book that offers a new secular vision of how we can lead our lives. Ranging from fundamental existential questions to the most pressing social issues of our time, *This Life* shows why our commitment to freedom and democracy should lead us beyond both religion and capitalism.

Jessica Whyte, *The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism* (London: Verso, 2019).

Speakers: Jessica Whyte (UNSW Sydney), Justin Clemens (University of Melbourne), Janice Richardson (Monash University), Miguel Vatter (Flinders University), Charles Barbour (Western Sydney University)

Why has the neoliberal age also been the age of human rights? Drawing on detailed archival research on the parallel histories of human rights and neoliberalism in the twentieth-century, Jessica Whyte uncovers the place of human rights in neoliberal attempts to develop a moral framework for a market society. In the wake of World War Two, neoliberals saw demands for new rights to social welfare and self-determination as threats to 'civilisation'. Yet, rather than rejecting rights, they developed a distinctive account of human rights as tools to depoliticise civil society, protect private investments and shape liberal subjects. By critically examining neoliberal political thought, Whyte shows that the neoliberals developed a stark dichotomy between politics, conceived as conflictual, coercive and violent, and civil society, which they depicted as a realm of mutually-beneficial, voluntary, market relations between individual subjects of rights. In mobilising human rights to provide a moral language for a market society, neoliberals contributed far more than is often realised to today's politics of human rights. Without coming to terms with that influence, those who mobilise human rights to contest neoliberalism may instead find that they strengthen its hold.

Raymond Ruyer, *The Genesis of Living Forms*, trans. Jon Roffe and Nicholas B. de Weydenthal (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).

Speakers: Jon Roffe (Deakin University), Maurizio Melloni (Deakin University), Nicholas B. de Weydenthal (University of Melbourne)

This panel is devoted to the newly translated 1958 work by Raymond Ruyer, *The Genesis of Living Forms*. Speakers will address the main arguments of the book concerning the decisive philosophical status of embryogenesis, and the centrality that Ruyer grants to a non-physicalist account of causation in terms of signs.

Alison Ross, *Revolution and History in Walter Benjamin: A Conceptual Analysis* (London: Routledge, 2019).

Speakers: Alison Ross (Monash University), Justin Clemens (University of Melbourne), Knox Peden (University of Melbourne/Flinders University), Jessica Whyte (UNSW Sydney)

This book places Benjamin's writing on revolution in the context of his conception of historical knowledge. The fundamental problem that faces any analysis of Benjamin's approach to revolution is that he deploys notions that belong to the domain of individual experience. His theory of modernity with its emphasis on the disintegration of collective experience further

aggravates the problem. Benjamin himself understood the problem of revolution to be primarily that of the conceptualization of collective experience (its possibility and sites) under the conditions of modern bourgeois society. The novelty of his approach to revolution lies in the fact that he directly connects it with historical experience. Benjamin's conception of revolution thus constitutes an integral part of his distinctive theory of historical knowledge, which is also essentially a theory of experience. Through a detailed study of Benjamin's writings on the topics of the child and the dream, and an analysis of his ideas of history, the fulfilled wish, similitude and communist society, this book shows how the conceptual analysis of his corpus can get to the heart of Benjamin's conception of revolutionary experience and distil its difficulties and mechanisms.

Oliver Feltham, *Destroy and Liberation: Political Action on the Basis of Hume* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2019).

Speakers: Oliver Feltham (American University in Paris), Justin Clemens (University of Melbourne), Dimitris Vardoulakis (Western Sydney University), Charles Barbour (Western Sydney University), Jessica Whyte (UNSW Sydney), Paul Patton (Wuhan University/Flinders University)

Each presenter will speak briefly concentrating on one aspect of the book and presenting an analysis of the book's arguments and overall strategy with regard to current developments in the fields of political philosophy and critical theory. The book itself develops a theory of political action on the basis of a topological systematisation of Hume's theory of the passions - in book 2 of the Treatise - achieved by folding it back onto volumes 5 & 6 of his History of England, so as to develop an account of the recurrence of certain 'configurations of appearance' in Hume's composition of a political history. Hume's own twin developments of a theory of government and the discourse of political economy as solutions to the endemic problem of political faction are then measured in the light of this topology of passions, and an alternative model of political action as democratic enthusiasm is extracted from the margins of Hume's texts.

It is quite rare for David Hume's philosophy to be used as the basis of a critical theory of political action, so it will be very interesting to see how the panel members react to this choice and its consequences given current concerns and developments in the field of critical theory.

Marguerite La Caze and Magdalena Zolkos, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives on Vladimir Jankélévitch: On What Cannot Be Touched* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2019).

Speakers: Magdalena Zolkos (Goethe University Frankfurt), Marguerite La Caze (University of Queensland), Peter Banki (Western Sydney University), Peter Atkinson (Monash University), Tim Flanagan (Murdoch University)

Contemporary Perspectives on Vladimir Jankélévitch: On What Cannot Be Touched performs a cross-disciplinary theoretical analysis of the philosophy of Vladimir Jankélévitch. An international

group of contributors, including both established and emerging scholars, engage with his writings from diverse disciplinary angles and consider his importance for contemporary political and cultural contexts. Edited by Marguerite La Caze and Magdalena Zolkos, the collection provides a holistic and multi-perspectival approach to Jankélévitch's writings, one that illuminates nuanced and complex connections across the five sub-fields of philosophy to which Jankélévitch contributed: moral philosophy, virtue theory, metaphysics, philosophy of music, and philosophy of religion. The book addresses different aspects of and problems in Jankélévitch's philosophy, with all chapters unified by a preoccupation with the motif of intangibility—that which cannot be touched.

Religion and the Limits of Reason in the Early and the Late Heidegger

Of science Heidegger says that it is "bankrupt" and "does not think," and of reason that it is the most "stubborn adversary of thinking." This panel address three questions: (1) What is it that Heidegger finds so problematic in science and reason? (2) How does he transcend the limits of science and reason? (3) To what an extent is Heidegger a "religious" thinker? The panel investigates this issue in early and later Heidegger, giving special attention to his phenomenology of religious life in the 1920s, and his concept of the fourfold. In this context, the panel investigates how Heidegger reactivates religious motifs, while carefully avoiding a relapse into metaphysical speculation, or a regional philosophy of religion. The panel argues that by differentiating different levels in Heidegger's approach a unifying and coherent notion of the religious dimension (outside an onto-theological framework) can be given, which also helps to understand Heidegger's concept of Being.

Ingo Farin (University of Tasmania)

Transcending Reason

In 1919 Heidegger claims that the exclusive focus on the cognition of facts and matter-of-factness ultimately leaves us stranded in a "barren desert." He then suddenly exclaims that everything hinges on our grasping that "instead of always cognizing things" we must exercise "contemplative understanding" and learn how to "contemplate understandingly." Heidegger finishes this downplaying of theoretical cognition and the plea for contemplation with an unexpected, enigmatic biblical quote: "And the Lord God made trees grow up from the ground … and in the middle of the garden he set the tree of life and the tree of the knowledge of good and bad" (GA 56/57, p. 65).

In this paper I show how in his *Lectures on the Phenomenology of Religious Life* (GA 60), Heidegger creatively appropriates Schleiermacher's notion of religion as a feeling of absolute dependence. I argue that in the late 1920s Heidegger recalibrates this and subsumes it under *Befindlichkeit* in *Being and Time*, and then further specifies it as the feeling that comes with being exposed to "the totality of beings" (in "What is Metaphysics?"). I argue that this construction avoids onto-theological argumentation or recourse to an absolute to be grasped by theoretical understanding.

Martin Leckey (University of Melbourne)

The Gods in the Fourfold: The Divine in the Later Heidegger

The later Heidegger's notion of the fourfold (earth, sky, divinities and mortals) is enigmatic, and the divinities (or gods) are the most enigmatic of the four, since Heidegger gives only a few cryptic clues as to what they are in a few late essays. As such, they present a challenge for any interpretation of the fourfold, and any understanding of the notion of the divine or holy in later

Heidegger. After engaging the interpretations of the gods given by others (including Jeff Malpas, Julian Young, Graham Harman and Andrew Mitchell), I put forward my own analysis which argues that Heidegger's concept of the gods is composed of three layers: the ontic, ontological and the "essential". This interpretation integrates aspects of other seemingly contradictory understandings of the gods into a single unified picture. Further, it explains the central importance of the gods in understanding the meaning of being, and in diagnosing and overcoming what Heidegger sees as the central problems with the metaphysical presuppositions of our technological age.

Nietzsche's Politics

Nicola Chadwick (University Melbourne)

On Conway's Account of Nihilism and Decadence in Nietzsche

This paper is a critical engagement with Conway's account of nihilism in Nietzsche. Conway's account is notable in that it avoids an over-reliance on Nietzsche's unpublished notes, as well as engaging with the oft neglected concept of decadence. Conway argues that nihilism is a logical process, the origins of which are found in the emergence of consciousness and the horror vacui of the will. Additionally, decadence is the most recent stage in the development of nihilism. I would like to propose a different account. Although I agree with Conway on the role of consciousness and the will, I disagree with where he locates decadence in the story. I will instead argue that it is the decadent instinct that gave rise to Christian morality and thus the ascetic ideal. Therefore, decadence has a more foundational role than Conway suggests. The consequence of this contrasting account is the way in which one conceives Nietzsche's approach to overcoming nihilism. Whereas Conway claims that Nietzsche did not intend to overcome nihilism and that he was too decadent to do so, I will argue that Nietzsche was indeed attempting to overcome nihilism, and integral to this process is responding to the decadence of the age.

Paul Patton (Wuhan University/Flinders University)

Democracy and Cultural Elites in Nietzsche

Nietzsche was not the enemy of democracy that he was widely supposed to be. Particularly in his early writings, he was both a keen observer of the forms of democracy emerging in Europe during the late nineteenth century and a defender of at least some elements of the democratic ideal. However, questions remain about the nature and extent of his commitment to democratic society and government. Was he irredeemably elitist in the sense that only the achievements of free spirits mattered, and that the mass of ordinary people are only valuable insofar as they provide the conditions under which the creativity of a few can flourish? Or are there resources in his early works to suggest a more complex view of the relation between cultural elites and a healthy democracy? Does he provide reasons for thinking that the cultural achievements of free spirits in turn enrich the lives of all people, such that democracy is a condition for the improvement of all? This paper will explore these issues in relation to Nietzsche's early and middle period works such as the *Untimely Meditations*, *Human, All Too Human* and *Daybreak*

Vanessa Lemm (Flinders University)

Nietzsche's Great Politics of the Event

This presentation offers an analysis of Nietzsche's politics of the event (Ereignis). Nietzsche's conception of the event is inseparable from his conception of the great human being. I argue that Nietzsche provides a politics of the event and that this politics denotes the task of cultivating great human beings. One can distinguish between two different politics of the event in

Nietzsche's thought. On the one hand, there is what could be called a small politics ("kleine Politik") understood as a politics of the state or of moral and religious institutions that seek to produce conditions which favor the emergence of great human beings. We are here dealing with an active politics of liberation which seeks to change the course of history giving it a new direction and a new aim. On the other hand, Nietzsche speaks of a great politics ("groβe Politik") of the event which is not inscribed into the program of a particular political or moral institution. Rather it is a politics beyond politics and morality whose aim is not to change the course of time but rather to affirm the eternity of the moment. At the center of this great politics stands Nietzsche´s conception of *amor fati*. This paper discusses the different elements of these two politics of the event in three recurrent figures in Nietzsche's philosophy: the historical agent, the genius and the philosopher.

Techne, Polis, and Differenz in Heidegger

Richard Colledge (Australian Catholic University)

Kant's 'Ontological Difference': Heidegger on Kant on Being as Position

This paper is a series of reflections on Heidegger's reading of Kant on Being, mainly drawing on two sources: Chapter 1 from his 1927 lecture course "The Basic Problems of Phenomenology" (i.e., "Kant's Thesis: Being Is Not a Real Predicate"), and then, at the other end of his career, his 1961 essay, "Kant's Thesis about Being". The context is Kant's refutation of the ontological argument in the Transcendental Dialectic that turns on the keynote distinction between real and logical predicates. Whereas a real predicate *determines* a concept by asserting some definite characteristic of it, a logical predicate is a *contentless* positing of the concept in terms of whether (and how) it is instantiated in experience. Real predicates thus deal with matters of essential content, while logical predicates deal with issues of existential judgement, and therefore these two belong to quite different categorical regions: reality to the region of quality, and actuality to the region of modality (*KRV*: A80/ B106, 212). But since in Kant's lexicon Being and existence (*Sein* and *Wirklichkeit*) are synonymous, this means that Being is *eo ipso* considered as nothing more than a contentless positing of modality: it is "merely the positing of a thing or of certain determinations in themselves" (*KRV*: A598/B626, 567), or as he famously puts it, "*Sein* [i.e., existence] is obviously not a real predicate" (*KRV*: A598/B626, 567). Heidegger's reading of this key passage in Kant's CPR was clearly of formative importance for his own thinking in the early 1920s, but it was a text to which he was to return towards the end of his career. In 1927 he contends that nothing less that the whole problematic of Dasein (as it was developed in SZ) emerges from "the connection between reality and existence", even if this is "a problem that lies virtually hidden in the Kantian thesis" (GA24: 107/76). This 'Differenz' of reality [*Realität*] and existence [*Existenz*/ *Dasein*] foreshadows Heidegger's own ontological difference in compelling ways, even if the differences between the two are just as important. Similarly interesting are the differences between Heidegger's engagement with Kant's text in 1927 and 1961. The latter ends with the fascinating claim that "[i]f positedness, objectivity [*Gegenständigkeit*; read, *Wirklichkeit*], proves to be a modification of presence [*Anwesenheit*], then Kant's thesis about being belongs to that which remains unthought in all metaphysics." (GA9: 307/363)

Miguel Vatter (Flinders University)

Martin Buber and Martin Heidegger on Dasein, Polis, and Anarchy

Of the few Jewish thinkers who Martin Heidegger sought out after the war, apart from Hannah Arendt, the most significant was probably Martin Buber. However, extant scholarship on the Buber-Heidegger exchanges have to date focussed either on their early discussions around intersubjectivity (Buber's 1923 *I and Thou* and Heidegger's conception of *Mitsein* in *Being and Time*), or on their late work on the relation between thinking, acting, and language. In this paper I shall address some of their texts from the mid 1930s in which their thought shows some interesting convergences. The context is the early and mid 1930s, when Heidegger first attempted

to position himself as one of the intellectual leaders of the Nazi movement only to then, apparently, step back and give his thinking a new "turn" (Kehre) that is nowadays associated with the *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* of 1936-1938. One of the key moments in this "turn" concerns Heidegger's "topological" approach to the question of *Dasein* and its relation to what can be called a poetic/ prophetological approach to politics which surfaces in his *Introduction to Metaphysics*, his interpretations of Hölderlin, and in his critique of Schmitt in the lectures on Hegel's *Philosophy of Right*. In this paper I shall argue that Heidegger's so-called topological turn shares some very interesting points of contact with Buber's monumental *Konigstum Gottes* [The Kingdom of God] first published in 1932. This book essentially offers an account of the *Da-sein* of the Jewish people as a function of the problem of the "place" of God (viz. Being) in the world. The paper ends with a reflection on the "topological" *and* "anarchic" reading of the *Beiträge* pioneered by Reiner Schürmann, which has recently found its way into Agamben's politico-theological reflections on anarchy.

Dimitris Vardoulakis (Western Sydney University)

Heidegger's Ruse of Techne and Materialism

Heidegger uses techne to reject the metaphysical distinction between theory and praxis thereby affirming a materialist position. At the same time Heidegger uses techne to reject instrumentality, a gesture that is characteristic of the metaphysics of morals and that also precludes the possibility of practical judgment as instrumental, which is critical to the materialist tradition. The effects of the ruse of techne consist in an almost uniform aversion to instrumentality characteristic of philosophers in the wake of Heidegger. To define something from a materialist perspective is to talk about its effects. And the effect of Heidegger's ruse of techne or the metaphysical materialism that describes that ruse has been profound in philosophy—especially what has come to be called "continental philosophy."

Nature, Culture, Social Critique

This panel brings together talks drawing on a naturalistic turn in Hegel-studies and Hegelian philosophy. It looks into the intertwinement of nature and culture, or nature and "Geist", and into the possibility of grounding immanent social critique on a philosophical anthropology that draws on central Hegelian ideas elaborated in recent work in this field. For long philosophical anthropology has been treated like a dead dog in philosophy. Also, for long the default assumption has been that immanent social critique can only be grounded on culturally specific principles or norms, and thus cannot apply across cultures. These assumptions are suspect for two main reasons: the environmental crisis forces us to look at the relationship of humanity as a whole to nature, and genuine multiculturalism makes critical outlooks without cross-cultural applicability of increasingly limited use. This panel questions both assumptions and inquires into possible ways forward for a unified account of human being that incorporates both its cultural and natural aspects, and enables a critical perspective into the relation of the human life-form as a whole to nature.

Loughlin Gleeson (UNSW Sydney)

'Critical Naturalism' in Hegel and Marx: The Naturalistic Foundation of Human Freedom and a Formal-Anthropological Model of Normative Criticism

This paper will aim to contribute to an emerging philosophical approach called 'critical naturalism' through a rational reconstruction of Hegel and Marx's writings. More precisely, my goal is both to adumbrate the naturalistic foundation of Hegel and Marx's decidedly relational models of 'concrete freedom' and propose a formal-anthropological model of normative criticism in keeping with the methodological aims of the left-Hegelian, Critical Theory tradition. Focusing on the natural moment of critical naturalism first, Section 1 of this paper will outline the internal and external natural dimensions of 'concrete freedom'—by which is meant being genuinely reconciled with, or 'at home' in, constitutive others—that appears in Hegel's later writings as well as, mutatis mutandis, in Marx's early writings. Looking at the critical moment of critical naturalism next, Section 2 will outline a formal-anthropological model of normative criticism centred around the axiological principle of concrete freedom, in relation to which various defects or pathologies within the human life-form's relations to constitutive others can be determined in a practically grounded yet theoretically justifiable manner. To close, bringing both moments of critical naturalism together, I will reveal the practical-philosophical relevance of this approach with reference to the current environmental crisis.

Simon Lumsden (UNSW Sydney)

Hegel's theory of Culture

The notion of Bildung comes to prominence in the later half of the Eighteenth Century. It was primarily conceived as the self-formation of an individual. In the early Nineteenth Century, especially in Hegel's thought it has a much more expansive meaning where it is at the heart of his socio-historical project. Bildung is Hegel's theory of culture and is the overriding concept by which he describes world history. Bildung, for Hegel, is not just the way in which individuals are

cultivated — the way in which individuals internalize the norms of their society — but rather, this paper will argue, it is the internalization of the perspective of the universal.

Cat Moir (University of Sydney)

The Nature of Hegel's Social and Political Thought

Organicist and naturalist readings of Hegel's philosophy claim—whether implicitly or explicitly—that his social and political thought is conditioned by his philosophy of nature. However, the connection between these two domains of Hegel's thinking is a matter of debate. Hegel sees human beings as belonging simultaneously to the realms of nature and spirit, yet the emergence of objective spirit, which ultimately takes the form of ethical life, involves the transformation of nature into culture. In this paper I argue that the concept of second nature is the key link between Hegel's philosophy of organic, embodied life and his social and political theory.

Rooted in the discussion of habit in the philosophy of nature, the concept of second nature is central to explaining the formation of the subject of ethical life as one capable of rational, critical, self-conscious action. Hegel sees education as the embodied process through which we internalise this capacity until it becomes second nature. Even if education on this account is a question of leading us out of the realm of the merely natural, nature thus remains present in the *Philosophy of Right*. Meanwhile, Hegel's argument in the *Philosophy of Nature* that first nature can only appear from the perspective of a rudimentary organismic consciousness simultaneously indicates that for him, nature is always already a construct.

Heikki Ikäheimo (UNSW Sydney)

The self-creating life-form of persons and its limits

Abstract: In this talk I will elaborate on three Hegelian ideas. Firstly, that the subjective and objective aspects of 'spirit' (*Geist*), that is to say the psychological and social structures of distinctive of persons and their life, are co-constitutive elements of a whole. This whole is the human life-form, or to speak more technically "the life-form of persons". Secondly, that recognition or *Anerkennung* as self-transcendence and inclusion of otherness is ontologically constitutive of both structures, and key to their internal interrelations. Thirdly, that though freedom as autonomy is distinctive of this life-form, thought on the model of abstraction from necessarily determining otherness it is theoretically mistaken and put in practice pathological of the life-form in a literal sense of 'pathology'. The third part of my talk draws on Loughlin Gleeson's work.

French Husserl Revisited: Jean Cavaillès and Michel Henry

Knox Peden (University of Melbourne/Flinders University), Bryan Cooke (University of Melbourne)

Michel Foucault famously described the reception of phenomenology in France as bifurcated between a 'philosophy of the concept' and a 'philosophy of experience'. This panel will consider two thinkers who seem to exemplify Foucault's heuristic, explicitly so in the case of Cavaillès, whom Foucault identified as a philosopher of the concept, and implicitly in the case of Henry, who devoted a life's work to a phenomenological assessment of life as 'auto-affection'. Our plan is to attend to each thinkers' engagement with Husserl in order to challenge the utility of Foucault's framework for thinking about the trajectory of phenomenology in French thought - past, present, and future.

Reconsidering Lukács

Georg Lukács was a towering figure in 20th century Marxian thought. In recent years, he has enjoyed renewed attention. At the same time, the received interpretation of his philosophy has been challenged. This discussion, spanning social theory, politics, aesthetic and literary theory and philosophy has emphasised the open, processual and democratic character of Lukács's 1920s Marxist philosophy while also discovering occluded philosophical and political themes in his literary and aesthetic theory, both from his pre-Marxist period and from the 1930s onwards. This panel will contribute to this re-evaluation, demonstrating that Lukács's work may offer new and often unexpected insights today.

Daniel Lopez (La Trobe University)

The Finite and the Infinite in Lukàcs and Hegel

In *History and Class Consciousness*, Georg Lukács referred to Heraclitus's river (into which one may never step twice), writing: "As a theory of totality eternal becoming turns out to be a theory of eternal being; behind the flowing river stands revealed an unchanging essence, even though it may express itself in the incessant transformations of the individual objects." (HCC, p. 180). In saying this, Lukács referred to the reified historical logic of capitalism which conceals finitude behind infinite, quantitative transformation.

This view produces its own antinomy. The liberal concept of history as endless progress is a bad infinity, in the Hegelian sense, which places the true infinite beyond human knowledge and control. Far from excluding historical novelty or change, this merely renders it irrational and catastrophic. Although Lukács has often been described as a messianic thinker, he was aware of this antithesis; his concept of praxis, although it failed, was intended to overcome it. Instead, it was Walter Benjamin who most fully embraced an irrationalist and qualitative sense of historical change, under the sign of a redemptive messianic aesthetic. While beautiful, his alternative risks nihilism.

This paper will expand upon the argument made in *Lukács: Praxis and the Absolute* (Daniel Lopez, Brill, 2019) to suggest that Lukács's failed solution to this impasse contains the necessary elements for a more enduring answer. It will be suggested that while the reaffirmation of finitude (as proposed by Martin Hägglund) is necessary first step, more is needed. In closing, it will be proposed that the overcoming of nihilism can only be sustained by a speculative concept of the infinite, as supplied by Hegel.

Cat Moir (University of Sydney)

The Nature of Social Ontology in Lukács and Bloch

The controversy surrounding Georg Lukács's *History and Class Consciousness* hinged on his rejection of Engels' application of the dialectical method to the natural world. Following Kant, Lukács argued that nature could not be known in itself: only knowledge of a Hegelian second nature, the product of human activity, could be obtained using the dialectical method. Thus while Lukács believed that an ontological account of society was possible and indeed politically

necessary, his rejection of a dialectics of nature amounted to the assertion that society and nature operate according to radically different logics.

Lukács' argument raised questions that were hotly debated within the Comintern during the course of the 1920s about the relationship between mechanistic and dialectical materialisms. Though Lukács does not address himself explicitly to this discussion in *History and Class Consciousness*, his work intervenes obliquely in the debate: by distinguishing sharply between the realms of nature and society, Lukács effectively abandoned nature to the laws of mechanism, preserving dialectical dynamics only for the sphere of human consciousness and social relations. The question of how, within a materialist standpoint, the emergence of consciousness as such—the sine qua non of class consciousness, Lukács major concern in the work—can be explained was thus left unanswered.

Lukács' erstwhile friend Ernst Bloch set out to tackle this issue in his work of ontology *Das Materialismusproblem, seine Geschichte und Substanz*, written in 1936-38 but first published in 1972. Dedicated to his 'friend of youth' Lukács, the book makes a strong case for transitivity between the spheres of nature and society. Bloch argues that human subjectivity is a higher-level product of a form of subjective drive in nature itself, a claim he invokes in order to explain both the intelligibility of the natural world and the possibility of our practical intervention in it. In order to explain the very possibility of consciousness and praxis, Bloch argues, nature and society must themselves be dialectically related. However, Bloch does not merely collapse these two spheres into one another. Rather, he claims that while human history, psychology, society and so on do not escape the laws of the natural world on which they supervene, each emergent region of reality operates according to a new, more complex logic that is not present at the simpler levels.

In this paper, I approach Bloch's *Materialismusproblem* as an explicit response to Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness* in order to illuminate the relationship between nature and social ontology in their works.

Julian Potter (La Trobe University)

The Road from Syracuse: Lukács and Heidegger on the Titanic Individual

Both Lukacs and Heidegger had brushes with political power, and attempted to apply their philosophical thinking towards cultural leadership in moments of temporary opportunity. Their respective failures led to interesting reflections on the nature of power and the powerful individual. This paper interrogates Lukacs' interpretation of Goethe's Faust, written in the 1930s and completed in 1940, and Heidegger's 1935 work An Introduction to Metaphysics, specifically his reading of the chorus from Sophocles Antigone. These very different yet contemporaneous works offer, via literary studies, perspectives on the relation of philosophy to power, and of thinking to being and history, after the attempt to establish philosophical-political leadership. Both reject the liberal impulse towards peace and stability, and place violence and intervention at the centre of being. Simultaneously, the idea of the 'individual' self is blurred between the universal self of philosophy and the titanic individual that makes history.

Institution of Intellectual Community: Blanchot, Kojève, and Badiou at *Critique*

This panel will present a survey of the first 25 years of Georges Bataille's influential journal Critique. Founded in 1946, Bataille sought to establish in Critique a review 'touching on all the domains of knowledge – history, science, philosophy, technology – as well as contemporary politics and literature'. The journal exerted a decisive influence on post-war French thought. The three papers on this panel will examine a series of pivotal moments in the journal's formative years under Bataille and, from 1962, Jean Piel. We will first present the founding documents and principles of the journal to determine Critique's 'house style' and the development of a distinct form and practice of the review taking the model of Blanchot. Next, we will detail two defining texts in the review's early history – Alexandre Kojève's "Hegel, Marx and Christianity" (1946) and Alain Badiou's "The (Re)commencement of Dialectical Materialism" (1967). Kojève's article crystallised the ideals of the early review under Bataille. Badiou's article meanwhile tested them, precipitating a minor editorial crisis around questions of tone and style.

Joe Hughes (University of Melbourne)

Critique*: Foundations, The Review Form, and the early essays of Maurice Blanchot*

The aim of this paper is to survey three different dimensions of the founding of *Critique* in 1946. I first situate the review within the field of existing journals: *Critique* was launched in an already saturated field, alongside new publications like *Les Temps Modernes* (1946) and more established journals like *Esprit* (1932) and *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* (1893). It is in the context of this field that the specific program for the journal takes on its broadest sense: unlike these journals, it's aim was an explicitly neo-Hegelian attempt to excavate the sense of the present, in its totality: 'by bringing together the best possible analyses of the best publications', Bataille wrote, 'it would faithfully—systematically—expose the movement itself, the progress of the human spirit'. The ideal form for this kind of project was the review form. Tethered, on the one hand, to a recent text, a fragment of actuality, it was guided, on the other, by a critical and creative spirit. In the final part of this paper I look at the emerging conventions of the review form itself. When Bataille and Prévost sent the proposal for *Critique* to its first publisher, Maurice Girodias, they named Maurice Blanchot as a model for the reviews they had in mind. I thus conclude by outlining some of the defining characteristics of the form in early Blanchot and suggesting the way in which they functioned as a model for the early years of *Critique*.

Elliot Patsoura (University of Melbourne)

***Kojève, Bataille, and the Crossroads of* Critique**

In a review titled "Hegel, Marx and Christianity" and published in 1946 in an early issue of Georges Bataille's journal *Critique*, Alexandre Kojève suggests 'the future of the world depends, in the final analysis, on the way in which the Hegelian writings are interpreted today'. While ostensibly a reference to the object of Kojève's review (a 1945 work on Hegel by Henri Niel), Kojève's claim is also a patent self-reference: it draws attention to the very movement of the review's textual strategy and registers the ongoing significance of Kojève's own Hegel interpretation almost a decade after the last of his seminal pre-war lectures on the

Phenomenology of Spirit. For Bataille (perhaps the most enthusiastic of Kojève's pre-war attendees), Kojève's review typified the ideals of his new journal, describing it as that which 'marks most clearly the intentions of *Critique*, which would like to be the crossroads of philosophy, literature, religion and political economy'. This paper examines Kojève's review to explicate both the nature of its alignment with Bataille's ideals and the significance of this alignment for the post-war French intellectual context.

Jessica Marian (University of Melbourne)

***The Badiou Crisis at* Critique**

One of Badiou's first publications was a review entitled "The (re)commencement of dialectical materialism", appearing in the May 1967 issue of *Critique*. The lengthy review addresses three works by Louis Althusser: the seminal *For Marx* (1965) and *Reading Capital* (1965), as well as a shorter article "Matérialisme dialectique et matérialisme historique" (1966). Badiou's review had been prepared for *Critique* at the request of Michel Foucault, then a member of the journal's editorial committee alongside Roland Barthes, Michel Deguy and Jacques Derrida, under the direction of managing editor Jean Piel. In the months prior to its publication, Badiou's review was the subject of a minor editorial crisis recorded in a series of letters circulated between these editors. Barthes found the review "long and difficult and unappealing"; Derrida wrote that he found it "irritating" and "pompous". Added to this was the sensitive issue of some rather acerbic footnotes concerning Foucault. As this paper shall demonstrate, these debates centred not on the philosophical rigour or quality of Badiou's thought, but rather attended to issues of tone and style – that is, Badiou's article tested certain institutionalised norms of critical practice. This paper examines Badiou's review and the editorial debate it provoked in order to draw out the implicit stylistic principles in operation at *Critique*.

Crossing Avenues: The Free Spirit of the Prison World

Speakers: Valery Vinogradovs and Mahmood Fazal

Part of a larger project, this panel brings together philosophy, journalism, and life.

Firstly, drawing from the primary texts and prominent commentaries (e.g. Mullin 2000, Reginster 2013), we will try to ascertain Nietzsche's views on the Free Spirit. We will argue, however, that any theoretical investigation of this philosophical figure, while being useful, is deeply vulnerable due the limitations of a standard academic inquiry. Indeed, it is hard to find a concrete example of the Free Spirit in the literature; for us, like for Nietzsche, one of his ideals remains a provocative and lively idea.

Next, we will consider a long tradition, situated "beyond good and evil", a tradition where Free Spirits are common. We suggest taking a risk and probing into the Prison-World with philosophical interest. We will discuss the Prison-World's hierarchy, basic norms, inner dynamics, and a sense of time.

We will then move on to the concluding part of the panel: an analysis of the traits of the Free Spirit, its vivid type found only in the Prison-World, culminating in the figure of an unnameable leader who 'runs the yard'. Here, we will address the familiar Nietzschean categories in a fresh light: power and violence, solitude, sexuality, virtues, taste, manners, and self-aesthetisation.

Overall, the panel aims to show that the Free Spirit is not just an abstract notion. It's real. We-outsiders can learn from the Prison-World about being Free, should we choose to do so.

INDIVIDUAL PAPERS

"School-sick": Autobiography, autoimmunity and the education of Jacques Derrida

Stephen Abblitt (Keypath Education Australia, La Trobe University)

Jacques Derrida suffers excessively from a school sickness, discomfort and anxiety at the risk and responsibility of education, as the illness or wound opens the self to the unforeseeable coming of the other. Yet he never leaves school, spends his lifetime in universities, and professes his love of institutions.

Reflecting on Derrida's autobiographical descriptions of his student days, this paper presents a series of short biographical sketches, examining three bouts of school sickness which demonstrate a formative influence over the philosopher's life and work: the first is his exclusion from the Lycée Ben Aknoun in 1942; the second, his troubled time at the Lycée Louis-le-Grand; and the third, his eventual progression to the École Normale Supérieure in 1952. In each instance, in slightly different ways, Derrida confronts the "double bind of threat and chance, … threat in the promise itself", and hesitates before the strange illogic of autoimmunity.

In this minimal autobiographical trait, a moment of singular exemplarity that testifies to a universal compulsion, is gathered Derrida's approach to the educational institution: he is haunted by an undecidable decision between the poison and the remedy, between the threat of (self-)destruction and the promise of the unknowable, unforeseeable future-to-come.

The Vulnerability of Self-Conscious Animals: On Hegel's Amphibians and Géricault's Horses

Mathew Abbott (Federation University Australia)

In the first part of this paper I read a passage from Hegel's *Aesthetics* on what it means to discover that one is an animal; in the second part I read a passage from Michael Fried on Théodore Géricault's pictures of animals. The passages are mutually illuminating because they turn on opposing sides of the same paradox: for Hegel knowing ourselves as animal means being rational and apparently ceasing to be animal; on Fried's account of Géricault's project, his images of horses express an ideal of humanness beyond human reach. Part one draws on some contemporary rationalist and naturalist philosophy (much of it explicitly Hegelian) to sketch a picture of what it is to be a self-conscious animal. It argues that making sense of Hegel's insight requires attending to how rationality does not replace animal ends with rational ends but takes up and transforms animal ends. Rather than render us transparent to ourselves, however, this makes possible our being problems to ourselves. Part two turns to Géricault's paintings of horses and the tragic wish Fried claims they figure, where animal life is held out as a refuge from self-consciousness. If Hegel is right that we are unique on earth because we take up and work out our ends, then Géricault reminds us of the animal vulnerabilities that are also taken up in self-conscious life. Nature provides no refuge from spirit, spirit no escape from nature.

The Other Side of Transparency-art and the opaque subject of psychoanaylsis

Robyn Adler (University of Melbourne, VCA)

From the Panopticon to the Panopticam, a mise à jour of the gaze in the belle époque of transparency. This paper will consider theological discursive formulations of the economy that paved the way for the gaze to be reduced to a scopic gluttony that demands that everything become visible. Psychoanalysis, like art, remains a subversive practice that refuses to reveal all since the opaque "Kern unseres Wesens", core of our being, renders the subject ultimately un-representable. The incapacity to expose what is most intimate in ourselves, establishes the real limit of the impossible as the condition of possibility for political action; the bungled action "de l'une bévue", without a point of view, becomes a way of seeing together based on a non-rapport, that subtracts from any Weltanschauung.

Living existentially

Jennifer Ang (Singapore University of Social Sciences)

The idea that philosophy serves a broader purpose in providing guidance on how to live has recently been revived by scholars such as John Cooper and Pierre Hadot. They found that for philosophy to be considered a way of life, it has to be able to shape one's understanding of the world, guide how one should respond from moment to moment, and reach an existential level in defining one's being. In this paper, I discuss how Jean-Paul Sartre's existentialist philosophy is a way of life by presenting to us an interconnected perspective of human existence and human development in history, guide our philosophical reasoning about our everyday decisions, and offers a practical guide to living an authentic life through assuming responsibility for our life choices and engaging with our situations.

Merleau-Ponty's Hegelian Transformation of Intentionality

Dimitris Apostolopoulos (Nanyang Technological University)

Merleau-Ponty criticises his early writings for (1) presupposing the subject/object distinction and (2) overemphasising the role of subjectivity. I argue that his reading of Hegel in the mid 1950s helped him overcome these limitations and led him to the schema of subject-object relations he subsequently adopted. Some key motivations behind Merleau-Ponty's shift to later positions are well documented, but Hegel's influence remains insufficiently understood. I attempt to partially rectify this by identifying specific, non-trivial conceptual debts to Hegel.

After explaining criticisms (1)-(2), I detail Merleau-Ponty's reading of Hegel on *Erfahrung* and his solution to the 'criterion problem.' For Hegel, (i) neither subject- nor object-centric intentional conditions are privileged; (ii) the criteria for disambiguating intentional structures emerge only after determinate intentional acts unfold; (iii) intentionality is a 'double movement' irreducible to internal ('subjective') and external ('objective') sense-making conditions. This model reveals the limits of the *Phenomenology*'s privileging of subjectivity, shows why object-centric criteria are insufficient, and suggests a strategy for overcoming criticisms (1)-(2). I then show how Hegelian tenets directly inform Merleau-Ponty's account of 'reversibility,' his view that experience is 'the

formative milieu of object and subject' (V.I. 191), and his methodological principle that phenomenology should develop its categories 'within Being' (265).

Post-capitalist realism

Vanessa Arapko (University of Auckland)

In his passing Mark Fisher left behind two concepts of realism. The first is the renowned capitalist realism, a phenomenon that precludes the imagining of a coherent alternative to capitalism. The second, is the antithesis of capitalist realism: communist realism, a 'moving — perhaps slowly, but certainly purposively — from where we are now to somewhere very different'. This latter concept however remains undeveloped. To put flesh on the half-bare bones of communist realism, I am to extend and enrich Fisher's concept by transforming it into a more broadly defined 'post-capitalist realism'. This preliminary account too negates capitalist realism but further develops what Fisher left incomplete. Post-capitalist realism herein posits forms of life and thought that make capitalism an unimaginable alternative.

The Simultaneity of Flows: Bergson, Wildon Carr and the Relativity of Life

Paul Atkinson (Monash University)

In *Duration and Simultaneity*, Henri Bergson famously claimed that Einstein's Special Theory of Relativity does not really address time because the frames of reference are spatial abstractions derived from the duration of lived experience. Moreover, the theory does not consider how the unity of perception serves as a precondition for simultaneity. To highlight the enduring nature of time, Bergson instead posits a simultaneity of flows in which an event is both simultaneous with itself and with other enduring events. One of the consequences of this theory, is that simultaneity and qualitative differences must vary according to the relative speeds of lived events.

The paper will investigate the simultaneity of flows through the work of H. Wildon Carr, one of Bergson's English language interpreters, who argues that our time sense is variable and that life should play a significant part in an expanded conception of relativity. To illustrate this idea, I will discuss time-lapse photography, a phenomenon that intrigued both filmmakers and philosophers in the early years of the twentieth century. In seeing natural processes at different speeds, time-lapse photography gives us cause to reflect on how speed informs perception, the notion of life, and the recognition of qualitative differences.

A Kantian approach to local color

Konstantin Azarov

Local color is about shades, rather than colors, accents, rather than mutually unintelligible languages, about new forming identities rather than well-established ones. Local color is important to the building of identities and a Kantian approach to local color mitigates against the risks of collective subjectivity: like chauvinism, stereotypes, provincialism.

After Lyotard, Kant's aesthetics has often been used to approach art, but never local color. Local color is an aesthetic attempt to represent the cultural specificity of a particular locality. However, it receives little academic attention, even though it plays an important role in postcolonial art and literature as, for example, by Australian author Tim Winton. Local color was first introduced as 'couleur locale' in French Romanticism, but soon received strong criticism as a form of stereotyping. However, the Kantian conception of caricature as a un-purposive image separates local color from stereotypes: purposiveness (*Zweckmässigkeit*) is never stereotypical.

Moreover, the Kantian conception of the ideal of beauty helps to develop a notion of local color into a particular aesthetics: a systematic way of creating, evaluating and appreciating local colorist art. The Kantian ideal of beauty is an idea, which is to be created by every agent herself, and is a priori limited to a human figure as a representation of an idea of reason, because rationality supersedes sensitivity. In this light, ideally, the local colorist will represent a particular local type of rationality as a way of life created by local culture by itself and for itself.

They cannot descend: Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre on 'the zone of non-being'.

Daniel Badenhorst (University of Auckland)

Today one need not return Hegel's *Logic* to find oneself confronted by a dialectic of being, nothing and non-being. The contemporary return to Frantz Fanon's thought has meant a return to his comments about the 'zone of non-being' which reside at the beginning of Black Skin, White Masks. Through the interpretations of George Ciccariello-Maher, Lewis Gordon, and Nelson Maldonado-Torres, this zone has been theorised as a place below the (white)ontological ground to which the racially-colonised are condemned. Being thus condemned, the racially-colonised are non-beings, and any theory of recognition or politics that does not account for the zone of non-being is said to obscure this fundamental ontological asymmetry between (white)beings and (black)non-beings.

While much productive theorisation has come of this interpretation I contend that Fanon's text resists such a reading. In this presentation I aim to unpack some crucial nuances missed by the interpreters. In particular, I will turn to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre, who famously made much ado about non-being. It is my contention that understanding Fanon's comment about the zone of non-being in light of Sartre's theorisation is crucial and that doing so renders Fanon's account more internally consistent.

Historical Materialism in the Perspective of Marx's Political Philosophy

Yanhui Bai (Wuhan University)

Historical materialism is a fundamental theoretical issue in the study of Marxist philosophy. There are two tendencies in the academic circles to interpret the theory of historical materialism: First, historical materialism is an empirical science, that is, the interpretation of historical materialism from the perspective of factual dimension and analytical philosophy; the second is the historical materialism of Marx and political philosophy is related to the essence of historical materialism in the perspective of the history of thought. This paper intends to clarify the logic of historical materialism and redefine the context of historical materialism from the perspective of

Marx's political philosophy. This not only helps to deepen the study of historical materialism and Marxist philosophy, but also has great practical significance for exploring the era value of historical materialism in the contemporary context.

Neo-Liberalism and the Haunting Right to Bildung

Peter Banki (Western Sydney University)

In his paper "Asylum: on the Right to Research and Bildung" (2010) Werner Hamacher put forward the thesis that the right to the freedom of art, research and Bildung is not one right among others. It is, he argues, the right thanks to which all other rights and freedoms are given. Without this unique right, all others would not have the possibility to be known, formulated, renewed, corrected or amended. Hamacher writes: “Only the right to the freedom of art, research and *Bildung* explains and secures the possibility and the structure of rights in general, as well as their historical emergence and transmutation”.

Written in response to the Bologna reforms of higher education in Europe, Hamacher’s thesis can be read as a form of philosophical activism, whose purpose is to reawaken a sense of what is currently under attack in the globalized West under neo-liberalism. If the right to the freedom of art, research and *Bildung* is not protected, then all our rights and freedoms will eventually disappear. My paper will appraise Hamacher’s gesture and its implications for the idea of the modern university, as put forward by Wilhelm von Humboldt in the plan for the University of Berlin (1810).

The Meaning of Life – what the science says

Ross Barham (Melbourne High School)

The meaning of life is to be found in that which gives life meaning insofar as what gives life meaning can be shown to be singular, universal, and meaningful in itself. Happily, recent empirical studies undertaken by Tomasello et al. confirm the Wittgensteinian claim that semantic meaning is inherently intersubjective. I argue that these findings, when coupled with the Brandomian inferentialist account of the objectivity of propositional content, justify Wolf's 'Larger-the-Oneself' view of a meaningful life, and conclude with a few comments inspired by Arendt on the role of philosophy in purposeful meaning creation.

Becoming, Being, and Existence in Indian Thoughts: A Conceptual Analysis from the Perspective of Buddhist Term Bhava

Dipen Barua (University of Hong Kong)

The concepts of “becoming,” “being,” and “existence” are central topics in Western and Indian philosophies. Scholars in Buddhist Studies often discuss these three terms with the Buddhist term bhava occurred in the dependent co-arising (paṭicca-samuppāda): with clinging as condition, bhava is; with bhava as condition, birth is (upādāna-paccayā bhavo; bhava-paccayā jāti, SN II 1).

Yet, they express different opinions by mixing up the interpretation of bhava with the notions of "becoming," "being," and "existence". Bodhi (2000, 52) renders bhava as "existence," because for him "being" implies a metaphysical speculation. Harvey (2016, 59) prefers "being" but without a metaphysical association. Thanissaro (2008, 7) elucidates "becoming" is more appropriate, because "being" primarily signifies the metaphysical absolute. With all these meanings they mostly present bhava as a dynamic process of cosmic objects and phenomena in birth-cycle (saṃsāra) where beings born and die again and again until the attainment of enlightenment.

We see the ambiguity with regard to scholars' rendition of bhava, how do we then distinct the connotations of "becoming," "being," and "existence" in Buddhist thoughts? We interpret bhava as persistent notion of "self" within the five aggregates (pañcakkhanda): form, perception, perception, determinants, and consciousness. This "self"-notion is the false conception of personality which endures, as a psychological feature of desire, until the attainment of enlightenment. As the Buddha had imparted his teachings in the Indian region, in this paper, it is intended to discuss about "persistent notion of 'self'," and the notions of "becoming," "being," and "existence" based on ancient Indian scriptures.

Refugees: Towards a new Concept of the Political

Nathan Bell (Monash University)

This paper outlines a proposal for a new concept of the political based upon the centrality of the right to asylum. Drawing upon a range of thinkers, including Hannah Arendt, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida, Judith Butler and Andrew Benjamin, the argument is that the fulfillment of claims to asylum represents the realisation of the political as such. This claim arises from Arendt's ideas of the political as developed by Judith Butler wherein politics is not simply formed from social contracts among willing participants, but is always already performed in conditions of unchosen plurality. Levinas's arguments concerning human subjectivity as oriented to responsibility, when aligned with Arendt's thought, produces a political subject and a purpose of the political oriented towards the needs of others. I develop this with reference to the thinking of unconditional hospitality of Derrida, and the philosophical anthropology of Andrew Benjamin.

Does Sovereignty Transgress History?

William Bennett (Deakin University)

I imagine that my life - or better still, its aborting, the open wound that is my life - constitutes all by itself the refutation of Hegel's closed system (Georges Bataille, Lettre à X., chargè d'un cours sur Hegel…Paris 6 December 1937; CS:90)

This claim is from an unsent letter that Georges Bataille wrote to Alexandre Kojève: it is the cynosure of my thesis. Hegel's closed system is determined by his conception of history, which is characterised by progress. Sovereignty is the nominal signification that Bataille gives to a variety of ecstatic, erotic and poetic human practices characterised by excess. I consider whether sovereignty may pose a challenge to coherent discourse and the primacy of organised labour in the development of communities.

Totality is modern and it is material: historical materialism beyond the social.

David Blencowe (Monash University)

In this paper I present historical materialism as a uniquely modern achievement. All pre-modern attempts to account for the sum of all things have lacked the idea of society as a structured and structuring force.

However, I will also argue that Marxist totality should not be equated with society. Instead, it is a materialism that affirms the objective reality of the biological and the ecological which, if forgotten, leads to many of the contradictions and conflations that pervade contemporary politics, not least those on the Left.

I follow John Bellamy Foster in tracing the germ of historical materialism to a tradition of European Enlightenment that stems from Epicurus and his innovation of a non-mechanistic and non-teleological atomism. The novelty of Marx's practical materialism should not obscure its ontologically realist underpinnings. The social is one term of the materialist dialectic, which importantly allows for the relativisation of scientific theories within their social and historical contexts, but to reduce scientific endeavour or even the concept of nature to the social is to deny historical materialism its acumen and push it from an achievement of modernity into the confusion of postmodernity.

Anatomy of the Invisible: Kant's diagnosis of religious disorders and the poetic cure

Sherah Bloor (Harvard University)

Immanuel Kant diagnosed various melancholic disorders of the imagination – his own hypochondria and the related ailment of religious fanaticism – using medical manuals. The philosopher agreed with the physicians that a diseased imagination typically manifests linguistic symptoms. This was especially evident in the acute case of the religious fanatic who might present with raised tone, stuttering, wild gestures, or mutism.

We still think of religious fanaticism as marking a limit of language. The fanatic, it is said, is so overwhelmed by the force of their imaginings that their discourse becomes unreasonable, if not incomprehensible. In this paper, I will trace this idea to 18th Century medical ideas about the religious imagination and the nature of language, which, I argue, are central to Kant's treatment of fanaticism, explaining, for instance, why he would propose the practice of writing poetry as a somewhat risky cure.

What's Left for Žižek?

Christopher Boerdam (University of Queensland)

Slavoj Žižek, although identifying as a Marxist and anti-capitalist, has always been vocal in his criticism of some trends associated with mainstream left-wing politics, such as multiculturalism, political correctness and identity politics. In recent years, Žižek has come under increasing criticism from the left for his seemingly right-wing responses to polarising political events, such

as the election of Donald Trump and the European refugee crisis. Žižek's problematic status as a left-wing intellectual was made apparent in April this year in his anti-climactic debate with Jordan B. Peterson, in which these two thinkers from supposed opposite ends of the political spectrum ended up agreeing on most substantial points of their discussion. In this presentation, I will explicate the theoretical basis of Žižek's criticisms of political correctness and identity politics, focusing on his theorisation of subjectivity, universality and communism. I will argue that Žižek's claims are underpinned by a clear conceptualisation of leftist struggle, but one that does place him at odds with some current trends in left-wing politics. I will also suggest that there is an antagonistic, performative dimension in Žižek's work that potentially undermines the strategic success of his interventions.

The Last Days of the Dialectic: Alain Badiou's Political Engagements, 1969-1981

Robert Boncardo (University of Sydney)

In this presentation, I will draw on my research on Alain Badiou's former political group, the 'Union des Communistes de France Marxiste-Léniniste' (UCFML), to chart the progress of his political thought in the decade prior to the publication of his first major philosophical work, Theory of the Subject (1982). This research is based on an extensive reading of the UCFML's newspaper, 'Le Marxiste-Léniniste', which ran for eight years, as well as on the group's various pamphlets and book-length publications. By examining the practices of Badiou's group, my claim is that we can come to a deeper understanding of his claims about class, the party-form, and the state at this stage in his philosophical trajectory. This work therefore lays the basis for a more accurate account of the shift between the UCFML and Badiou's subsequent political group the 'Organisation Politique', as well as between Theory of the Subject, Can Politics be Thought? (1985) and Being and Event (1988).

Gelassenheit in the waterscape: thinking about our experience of coastal and aquatic environments.

Larelle Bossi (University of Tasmania, IMAS, Centre for Marine Socioecology)

The United Nations has challenged the global community to think about our oceans, and specifically about what they have coined "the blue economy". When considering thirty year projections, our sense of place in relation to the final frontier may be of interest within the current environmental crisis, particularly when the UN has most recently reported on the devastating science of our heating and rising oceans. Whilst much of the literature has assumed the oceans a resource – either to be exploited for economic gain, or protected for health and well-being – there is an absence of published discourse around thinking about our sense of place within the coastal and oceanic environment. Our sense of place here is conceived of as our experience in these environments and ultimately the way we may think about our identity. I take as my starting point, the topological philosophy of Jeff Malpas as inspired by his discourse on the agrarian landscape. Albeit in stark contrast to the oceanic realm, I argue that our sense of place in the waterscape reveals a more inclusive interpretation of Martin Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* and also a less confronting image of who it is that we are.

The Work of Laughter is the Work of Philosophy: Diotima and Arendt

Michelle Boulous Walker (University of Queensland)

Is laughter philosophical? If so, what can it do? Philosophers in the Western tradition have, from time to time, addressed the significance of laughter. Hobbes famously suggested that "laughing is a bad infirmity of human nature, which every thinking mind will strive to overcome". In Plato's *Symposium* the threat of laughter as ridicule works to silence or to discipline the participants, but this seems in contrast to the very philosophical laughter Diotima introduces. Is this the laughter Socrates takes with him when, following Diotima's lead, he develops his own methodology; his own way of doing philosophy? The philosophical nature of Diotima's laughter is significant. It is, arguably, an ethical bridge that establishes a non-authoritative relation between Socrates and herself; a laughter that invites the other in, undoing the traditional hierarchy between master and disciple. As such, Diotima's laughter is a lesson in what philosophy is and what philosophy can do, and Socrates is wise to understand this. Like laughter in Diotima's speech, Arendt's laughter is daimonic, an intermediary in this case between thoughtlessness and the ability to think. Laughter bridges the chasm between on the one hand, shock and distress, and the other, our ability to face these. Laughter provides the pause or interval necessary for us to move forward. It is thus unsurprising that the laughter that echoes uncomfortably throughout Arendt's book on Eichmann provides the impetus for the exploration of thinking that she later explores in *The Life of the Mind*.

Making sense of self-awareness: phenomenology beyond qualitative feel

Artem Bourov (University of Melbourne)

Can we make sense of our conscious experience in the same way that we make sense of the physical world? I will respond to this question by demonstrating two ways in which the phenomenological philosophical tradition enriches and expands on classic arguments for the irreducibility of consciousness in analytic philosophy of mind. Drawing on the Husserlian and Sartrean model of consciousness developed by Dan Zahavi (1999, 2005, 2014), I argue that pre-reflective self-awareness – the immediate, intimate, reflexive awareness we have of our own experiences – is just as integral to conscious experience – and just as epistemically irreducible – as the paradigm marker of the irreducibility of consciousness within analytic debates, that of 'qualitative feel' or 'qualia'. I further suggest that if pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a core and foundational form of selfhood (as Zahavi insists), then the experiential self is likewise epistemically irreducible to the physical. I conclude by outlining potential avenues for embodying pre-reflective self-awareness, to avoid any purely mentalistic construal of the experiential self.

Expressive action and destratification in A Thousand Plateaus

Sean Bowden (Deakin University)

This paper will compare and contrast the concept of expression mobilized in Deleuze and Guattari's *A Thousand Plateaus* with the concept of expression at play in Deleuze's works of the late 1960s. It will then employ a suitably clarified concept of expression in order to come to grips

with the treatment of ethical action and agency in *A Thousand Plateaus*, broadly characterized as involving productive and enjoyable processes of 'destratification'. The notion of expression, it will be argued, provides us with a way to understand what is involved in experimentally doing something whose contours cannot be given in advance, but only in the complex and moving, social and ecological situation in which the action progressively unfolds.

Terminology in the "Epistemo-Critical Foreword" to Walter Benjamin's Origin of the German Trauerspiel

Edward Lawrence Bradford (Monash University)

Until recently, a majority of scholars have maintained that key terms in Walter Benjamin's oeuvre are instances of metaphor, thereby aligning Benjamin's work with literary and cultural criticism. However, a discernible shift in scholarly interpretation has led to a re-evaluation of these terms, a selection of which first appear in Benjamin's failed Habilitation thesis, *Origin of the German Trauerspiel*. From an analysis of the recent scholarship on the "Epistemo-Critical Foreword" to this text, it is argued that key terms are presented as ciphers of Benjamin's unique philosophical method, rather than evocative language encouraging fragmentary writing. This interpretation not only relates itself to Benjamin scholarship as it stands, but also has consequences for how these terms are presented in wider philosophical discourse.

Critical antiquities and theorizing modern crises

Tristan Bradshaw (Northwestern University), Ben Brown (University of Sydney)

"'And this also,' said Marlow suddenly, 'has been one of the dark places of the earth.'" By so referring to the river Thames, the narrator of *Heart of Darkness* defaces its image as conduit for "The dreams of men, the seed of commonwealths, the germs of empires" by reframing it as the mysterious destination of Roman conquest. Conrad's critique of the modern imperial project stems from this suspicion, for which antiquity serves as a standpoint. Conrad, however, does not stop there. As Roman imperialism is drawn on to illuminate modern conquest, so it is drawn into that critique to become part of its very object. Conrad was not the first nor the last to detour via antiquity in order to theorize contemporary crises. What Ricoeur dubbed "the school of suspicion" makes similar use of antiquity. Marx's critique of modernity is devoted to overcoming suspicion by "resolv[ing] superstition into history," lest it become superstitious itself and fail to identify and overcome modernity's real crises. What characterizes, then, the peculiarly critical mode? We need not follow Marx in every particular here, but his and others' move to antiquity may be telling, and this is what we wish to explore, thematize, and extend.

Wonder and the private sphere in Iris Marion Young and Hannah Arendt

Daniel Brennan (Bond University)

The paper explores the analysis of home in Iris Marion Young's oeuvre. I argue that what Young offers is an account of the private sphere that begins in wonder. By comparing the account of

private habituated life in Young's work, to the account of the detrimental relationship between private life and action in the philosophy of Hannah Arendt, the paper makes the case that the private sphere is a more fecund space for social progress than thinkers like Arendt allow. The paper explores how an orientation of wonder towards the private sphere demonstrates the rich potential for social hope inherent in private life.

To Admit the Pleasure-giving Muse: Poetry and Thought in the work of Iris Murdoch and Judith Balso

Ella Bryning (University of Melbourne)

This paper will consider the relationship between philosophy and poetry in the work of three philosophers: Iris Murdoch, Judith Balso and Alain Badiou. First, we will outline the way in which all three thinkers depart from the Platonic conception of the poet as an engineer of images and facsimiles. Then, we will evaluate (i) to what extent these thinkers are right in their claim that poetry is a mode of thinking and (ii) the political consequences of conceiving of poetry as a mode of thinking. With respect to (i), we will argue that, although poetry can be considered a mode of thought, it cannot be taken to constitute a body of knowledge. In (ii), we will argue that it is precisely because of this fact, that poetry is opposed to knowledge, that poetry is politically necessary.

Aristotle and Heidegger on Pathos and Being

Christopher Lloyd Buckle (Murdoch University)

In this paper I investigate Heidegger's interpretation of the *pathé* as an account of what we understand as 'moods', 'emotions', 'affects', 'passions' etc. Though *pathos* is often translated as passion, I will retain the Greek term to differentiate it from the affective conceptualisations previously mentioned.

In §30 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger footnotes a comparison between his account of fear (*Furcht*) and Aristotle's account of fear (*phobos*) from the *Rhetoric*. As such, this paper will look to both of their respective accounts, albeit from a Heideggerian perspective as guided by basic concepts of Aristotelian philosophy. In doing so, I show that Heidegger adds a version of the concept of *Angst* to his analysis of Aristotelian *phobos*, though it does not have the ontological significance of the fundamental attunement which we find in *Being and Time*. As such, it is my claim that Heidegger furthers the "everyday" interpretation of phobos by grounding fear with the fundamental attunement of *Angst*.

By looking to Heidegger's reading of Aristotle, my project aims to investigate feelings as a constitutive dimension of our being which orients us in the world, rather than as phenomena which merely accompany experience.

Arendt's contradictions: Eichmann in Jerusalem in the perspective of Arendt's practice of Socratic dialogue

Alex Cain (Monash University)

Commentators often note that there are contradictions, or at least inconsistencies, in Hannah Arendt's work. On the one hand, Arendt is accused of theoretical inconsistencies, insofar as she makes claims in her later work that seem incompatible with claims she made earlier. On the other hand, Arendt has been accused of contradicting herself morally, with some commentators claiming that Arendt should not have written Eichmann in Jerusalem the way she wrote it. Both views cast the Eichmann trial at the centre of Arendt's thought, as a radical shift in Arendt's position. This article shows that both views fail to acknowledge the importance of what I call the "archetype of non-contradiction" in Arendt's work. As a result, I argue that, viewed in perspective, her treatment of the Eichmann trial is simply another instance of Arendt attempting to follow the archetype of non-contradiction, practising tentative and fluid thinking, and maintaining her friendship with herself.

Intentionally sought self-destruction and the work of Sabina Spielrein

Grace Campbell (University of Queensland)

In this talk, I focus on the allure and fascination of self-destruction. I suggest that self-destruction ought to be regarded as a phenomenon in its own right rather than as a side-effect of vice or ignorance. I do not argue that attempts to understand self-destructive behaviours from this perspective are prima facie incorrect. However, the tendency to examine self-destruction purely as a side effect of vice, ignorance, or mental illness obscures key points of the phenomenon. In contrast to this, I examine how self-destruction is a topic that fascinates audiences and commands interest and attention.

In order to propose how self-destruction can be understood as a phenomenon in its own right, I use Sabina Spielrein's 1912 essay 'Destruction as the Cause of Coming into Being'. In this essay, Spielrein highlights how destruction should not be considered an aberration. In contrast, destruction is a necessary aspect of creation, reproduction, language, and maintenance.

Whose dead god: the Althusserian spectres of Hegel

Valentin Cartillier (University of Melbourne)

This paper examines Louis Althusser's early engagement with Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel's work as a reappraisal of his self-proclaimed break from the latter. Published posthumously, *The Spectre of Hegel* presents Althusser's master's thesis 'On Content in the Thought of G.W.F Hegel' alongside other articles, which complicate the philosopher's status as the anti-Hegelian Marxist par excellence. For Althusser, these texts present an intervention into the proliferation of Hegelian thought in post-War France. Althusser mobilises Hegel against what he sees as the dogmatic focus on Hegelian subjectivity in post-war France in an attempt to preserve the most radical and subversive elements of the latter's thought. This paper will argue that, far from Hegel's presence being discarded, Althusser's early writings on him present latently discernible pre-

configurations of two ideas that would typify Althusser's later work: aleatory materialism and 'history without subject.' This will be explicated firstly by drawing analogies between Althusser's description of Hegel's encounter with Kant, wherein the former had to pass through the subjectivist philosophy of the latter to restore objectivity into his own philosophical system. Secondly, I will argue that the French Hegelian overemphasis on subjectivity lead Althusser to reconsider the subject's position within the historical process.

Truth and Intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's Political Thought

Conall Cash (Cornell University)

Merleau-Ponty's political works are oriented toward the same concern as that of his larger philosophy, namely to articulate an intersubjective and worldly conception of truth, and to "recover an absolute in the relative." This investigation motivates both his engagement with Marxism and his immanent critique of what he identifies as Marxism's highest achievement, Lukács's 'philosophy of praxis'. Rather than refusing the problem of relativism by asserting Marxism as a science, the philosophy of praxis declares that within the realm of relative and partial perspectives, an order of truth arises which is not the discovery of an object but a process of self-knowing activity. The philosophy of praxis associates this process with the revolutionary activity of the proletariat. Merleau-Ponty, whose Phenomenology of Perception sought to articulate a conception of truth via a theory of embodied and intentional perception, identifies a self-undermining tendency of the philosophy of praxis, insofar as it wishes to render in the form of a state that which it nonetheless recognises as irreducibly processual. If to know oneself is to exist in mediated relation to oneself, the revolutionary praxis identified with proletarian activity cannot deliver a final state of being at home with oneself, which would rid freedom of any content. It is in recognition of this problem that Merleau-Ponty declares, "The failure of Marxism would be the failure of the philosophy of history." This paper will reconstruct Merleau-Ponty's immanent critique of the philosophy of praxis in the context of his larger philosophy's intersubjective conception of truth.

"It is stupid to confuse the moral and the aesthetic": Sartre's moralising in his amoral imaginary

Steven Churchill (Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy)

In the conclusion of "The Imaginary" (1940), Sartre makes a sharp criticism of any attempt to take an aesthetic attitude to life as based in a fundamental "confusion" of the real (the domain of existential absurdity and therefore of moral issues), with the imaginary (the domain of 'irreality' and therefore of aesthetics). Sartre thereby draws an absolute distinction between the moral and the aesthetic. I argue that while Sartre's absolutism here may help us make sense of the confusing and even painful situations that may arise as a result of conflating the aesthetic (and therefore the imaginary), with the moral (and therefore the real), this distinction may not be helpful or even attainable in the midst of our existential travails. In fact, I hold that a truly existential perspective on the distinction between the moral and the aesthetic would involve allowing it to remain unresolved. I conclude with the thought that Sartre's perspective seems oddly moralistic for a philosopher of the amoral imaginary.

What is an Idea? Plato's theory of participation and mathematics

John Cleary (University of Melbourne)

The Platonic dialectic of ideas is a dialectic of participation. The movement of his thought revolves around the problem of knowing how sensible things, which appear to be incommensurate with the ideas, can come to be part of them, and thus how the universal relates to the particular. After establishing the nature of this problem, I outline in this paper how it gives rise to a shift in the ontological status of the ideas from being absolute unities to being relational structures composed from genera or types that mix with one another. This shift introduces becoming and process into the ideal, such that the opposition of sensible and ideal is internalized in the ideal itself. I then show how mathematics plays a crucial role in the structural determination of ideas, and that the original opposition between the sensible and the ideal is transposed into a distinction between mathematics and meta-mathematical ideas that govern mathematical objects and thus the mixture of ideal types. It is this role that gives mathematics its position proximate to the good.

Nietzsche, Freud and the Baroness Moser: A reading of the 'compulsion(s) to repeat'

Jane Connell (University of Melbourne)

Critics from Strachey to Laplanche note the paradox that while the compulsion to repeat is central to the edifice of psychoanalytic theory—bridging the troubled theoretical water between the pleasure principle and the death instincts—its definition remains elusive. Re-evaluation of Freud's clinical and theoretical placings of the trope reveals a fault-line which dissolves this paradox.

Its empirical substantiation rests on Freud's accounts of three women who left treatment against his advice. His case study of the Baroness Moser, the only developed clinical exegesis of the trope, is marked by inconsistencies that reveal this fault-line.

Strachey also notes that, despite Freud's denials, Nietzsche's notion of the eternal return, furnishes the trope's theoretical platform. If so, in Freud's hands, Nietzsche's account of a potentially liberating existential crisis is reduced to the tidy trajectory of psychological development based on an 'inherent' and 'instinctual' limit.

Thus the compulsion to repeat functions both to disguise Freud's difficulty dealing with non-compliant female patients and avoid a radical tenet of Nietzsche's philosophy.

That the trope carries the imprint of these crises of clinical and epistemological authority bears on the phenomenon of the persistent rebranding of the death instincts as Thanatos—exemplified in Ricoeur's interpretation of Freud.

The Inertia of Cinema's 'Real Movement': Resonances of Blanchot's 'Animating Paradox' in Deleuze's *Cinema 2*

Corey Cribb (University of Melbourne)

In *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image* Deleuze notably reads Bergson's findings in *Matter and Memory* against Bergson's critique of 'the cinematographic illusion' in *Creative Evolution* to suggest that what cinema shows is not the 'false movement' of Zeno's paradox, but 'real movement', which would express a change in what Bergson calls 'the Whole'. This paper will probe at some of the implications which are raised for Deleuze's Bergsonian thesis when, deep into *Cinema 2*, Deleuze turns to Maurice Blanchot to characterise the relation between modern cinema and thought as an effect of Blanchot calls 'the Outside'. In an attempt to clarify the significance of this oblique citation I argue that by adopting Blanchot's concept, Deleuze retains something of Blanchot's subversion of the Hegelian dialectic, according to which it is not the will and negativity that drive the becoming of spirit, but a primordial state of inertia within it, which animates its movement from 'without'. By concurring with Blanchot's 'animating paradox', I suggest that Deleuze offers a thesis on ontological change in which the moving images of cinema would find rapport with the movement of being by touching upon something static, thus highlighting the importance of 'seers' in Deleuze's film ontology.

The Declaration of Interdependence! – Feminism, grounding and enactivism.

Anya Daly (University of Melbourne)

This paper explores the issue of whether feminism needs a metaphysical grounding and if so what form that might take to effectively address and support the socio-political demands of feminism. Some feminists (Haslanger & Sveinsdóttir, 2011) argue that the constructs appealed to in 'social constructivism' are real but not metaphysically fundamental because they are contingent. And this is exactly the crux of the problem – is it possible to sustain an engaged feminist socio-political critique for which contingency is central and at the same time retain some kind of metaphysical grounding. I argue that fundamentality as presented in many current accounts which are underpinned by the explicit or implicit ontologies of monism and dualism, reveal basic irresolvable problems; they are unable to adequately address the important concerns of feminism. I propose that addressing these concerns will only be possible through an enactivist account which is able to offer a non-reductive grounding and at the same time accommodate and galvanize feminist socio-political critiques. My paper proceeds in dialogue with feminists generally involved in this 'metaphysical turn' in feminism and specifically with the paper by Mari Mikkola, 'Doing Ontology and Doing Justice: What Feminist Philosophy Can Teach Us About Meta-Metaphysics', Inquiry, 2015.

The Methodological Significance of Foucault's Normative Commitments

Leonard D'Cruz (University of Melbourne)

At the end of his life, Foucault claimed that if he is 'perfectly at home in the philosophical tradition, it is within the critical tradition of Kant'. In this talk, I argue that Foucault's normative

commitments stem from this Kantian heritage. Despite what sometimes seems like an ambivalence towards enlightenment values, I argue that Foucault's project is motivated by essentially Kantian commitments to the value of freedom and the ethos of critique. In doing so, I aim to develop a more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which his work might have been shaped or constrained by normative concerns. This talk is framed as a response to two influential lines of criticism inaugurated by Fraser, Habermas and Taylor – namely, that Foucault's work is 'cryptonormative' and that his critique of reason is predicated on a 'performative contradiction'. Against these charges, I argue that Foucault's normative commitments do not interfere with the methodological rigour of his work and, as such, do nothing to undermine his diagnostic insights. Furthermore, I argue that his critique of reason is not based on a performative contradiction, but is instead grounded in his immanent modification of Kant's critical project.

Emotional knowledge and its value in society

Bertille De Vlieger (University of Lille)

Emotional knowledge is a form of self-knowledge which holds great interest for ordinary individuals. It is not obtained by any obligation but rather because we think it is crucial to obtain (Cassam 2017). It seems to stoke the curiosity of ordinary people. One can call emotional knowledge a form of substantial self-knowledge, which is opposed to more trivial forms of self-knowledge (for example, knowing that my shoes make noise). In this paper it is a matter of demonstrating that emotional knowledge holds an instrumental and a prudential value. By arguing that it can allow a control over our emotions, I shall maintain that emotional knowledge affects individual marginalization or acceptance in society. It allows individuals to create their own mechanism for controlling their behavior, in addition to those created by society (Deleuze 1990, Foucault 1976). Moreover, this type of knowledge reveals our personality by allowing us to identify our affective identities. Finally, I shall defend the idea that emotional knowledge contributes to the conduct of a good life. As such, my hypothesis could be viewed as incompatible with widespread ideas (Montaigne 2019), according to which the knowledge of our own emotions can trigger negative emotional states, e.g. mental rumination, anxiety, that do not contribute to our well-being. Similarly, the knowledge of our emotions enables to talk about their fluctuations and their ambivalence, two aspects of emotions that often lead to negative judgments either self-attributed or held by others.

Walter Benjamin: the romantic form of the novel and the sense of life

Caterina Diotto (Università Degli Studi Di Verona)

This research explores Benjamin's reflections on the Novel, and the evolution of his perspective through the years. The analysis begins from the concept of the Novel as Benjamin defined it in *The Concept of Art Criticism in German Romanticism*. Then it compares that perspective to its new developments in one of Benjamin's literary turning point, 'The Crisis of the Novel' (1930). The romantic concept of the Novel as a form that can contain other forms - as a medium - becomes necessary for the realization of the literary Montage. Therefore, in his essay 'The Crisis of the Novel', instead of an actual debunking of the "traditional" structure of the Novel - exemplified by

Gide's *The Counterfeiters* -, it is possible to recognise an evolution of Benjamin's perspective that still has in the romantic concept its essential precondition. The "new form" of a Novel that aims at reflecting reality's autenticity should be the literary Montage. In *The Storyteller* (1936), overturning Lukács' theory, Benjamin seems to consider the Novel the only literary form in the modernity still able to connect - allegorically - the individual to its sense of life.

Political Romanticism

George Duke (Deakin University)

Political Romanticism (1919/1925) contains Carl Schmitt's most direct critique of the metaphysical foundations of liberalism, but has not received the same amount of attention as other texts from the Weimar period. This paper examines the extent to which Schmitt's own work in the Weimar period represent a form of political romanticism. Part 1 provides a brief overview of Schmitt's polemic against political romanticism. Part 2 then applies this analysis to Schmitt's discussions of (1) sovereignty (2) constituent power. Part 3 sketches an alternative path by reference to Aquinas and Kantorowicz's work on the political theology of medieval kingship.

Non-conceptual thinking in Badiou and Mādhyamaka: negativity and the communicability of non-conceptual truth

Brendan Duncan (University of Melbourne)

This paper will consider how contemporary continental philosopher Alain Badiou and the Mādhyamaka tradition of Mahāyāna Buddhism approach the problem of non-conceptual thought. After outlining the structure of the problem for each, I will argue (i) that Badiou's and Mādhyamaka's recourse to various modes of negativity (void, emptiness, nothingness, etc.) signal a shared response to the problem of non-conceptual thinking; and that (ii) their individual responses to the secondary problem of the communicability of non-conceptual truths usefully complement each other. My broad aim in this paper will be to suggest that Badiou and Mādhyamaka share a philosophical orientation, such that the insights of one can be brought to bear on the project of the other.

The Transcendental Origin of Nature: Husserl and Richard Avenarius

Christopher Edwards (Murdoch University)

In this paper, I will discuss Edmund Husserl's 1910/11 critique of the naturalistic philosopher Richard Avenarius (1843–1896). My aim will be to highlight some of the key transcendental problems that render contemporary attempts to naturalise phenomenology untenable. At the centre of Avenarius' naturalism is his notion of the 'natural-world concept' [*Natürlicher Weltbegriff*], which he considered to be the basic foundation and 'final stop' for any rational inquiry. It is on the basis of this fundamental concept that he advances an ontologically monistic conception of the human being and the natural world. For Husserl, Avenarius' attempt to account for our everyday lived-experience is problematic insofar as Avenarius does not bracket out the

'natural attitude'. In other words, Avenarius' account does not go far enough, since he does not offer a transcendental account of the a priori conditions that make possible the meaningful constitution of any world whatsoever. As I will argue, Husserl's critique of Avenarius is important for us to consider today, insofar as contemporary attempts to naturalise phenomenology are bound to the conceptual framework of cognitive science, which is open to the same errors that Husserl identified in the work of Avenarius.

Nietzsche's Dionysian Care of Self and the Musical Secret

Venessa Ercole (Griffith University)

Over the last two decades, the question of Nietzsche's relationship to Ancient Greek "care of self" (ἐπιμέλεια ἑαυτοῦ) has risen from its earlier obscurity. This paper examines Nietzsche's "care of self" in his Dionysian philosophy and argues that there is a "musical secret" to Nietzsche's Dionysian "care of self". This emerges in three ways. First, the Dionysian call to the "free spirit" is a seductive siren's song which speaks to the heart of the few great individuals (as opposed to the many) who alone have the ears capable of hearing it. Second, the Dionysian task of "giving style to one's character" involves a special conception of harmony inspired by music. Nietzsche's conception of harmony is particularly Dionysian in that it gives equal status to discord and involves an affirmation of all the parts which are necessary in creating true harmony. In this conception of harmony, loss, sacrifice and suffering are all affirmed. Finally, it will become clear that the musicality of Nietzsche's Dionysianism occurs, in part, because Nietzsche views music as a metaphor for life. To be in harmony with the wider harmony of life is the "musical secret" of Dionysian care of self.

Who Cares: Heidegger on "the truth of a people"

Michael Fagenblat (Open University, Israel), Antonio Vargas (Hebrew University)

This co-authored paper examines the philosophical motivations and chronology leading to Heidegger's ontological account the political in the years 1928-1934. Two sets of reasons are discussed, both rooted in *Being and Time*'s aim of providing "a preliminary ontological analytic of the subjectivity of the subject". One concerns the relation between the care-structure of intelligibility and the 'who' for whom being matters. The other concerns the metaphysical role of the ontic in the transcendental analytic of Dasein. We thereby show how the path from *Being and Time* to a "metapolitics" of the *Volk* unfolds philosophically. But what is this ontological account of the political? We briefly compare our position to recent, proximate interpretations by Crowell (2018) and Polt (2019) and then distinguish our position in respect of two further claims. First, we argue that by summer 1934 Heidegger was already deconstructing a "metaphysical" construal of the *Volk*. Second, we show how, by winter 1934, this deconstruction consisted in a critique of the ontological primacy of the state, including an explicit refutation of Carl Schmitt's position. The argument aims to clarify some unresolved interpretative and chronological issues while analysing the role of being-a-people in the ontologically binding structure of transcendental subjectivity.

Plotinus' Orientalism and the Language Within Language

Tim Flanagan (Murdoch University)

In a striking passage from the *Enneads*, Plotinus remarks upon Egyptian hieroglyphics in his discussion of the unique character of Intellect. For Plotinus, the significance of this ancient writing system was that it attested to the continuous and ultimately non-discursive nature of thought (something immediate and unbroken by the more plodding efforts of propositional utterances).

Working out from certain stylistic and philological analyses of Plotinus' own project, this paper contends that the broader role of imagery in the *Enneads* itself attests to a intuitive form of experience whereby the involvement of what is read is not so much an an object as a process.

The paper does this by taking seriously the development of what Gilles Deleuze referred to, after Proust, as a sort of 'foreign language within language'. According to such a schema, the ground for the understanding of concepts is something that is at once the source of their order yet at the same time nothing beyond their actual (discursive) articulation. Key to such a claim is the role of agglutination rather than etymology and it is via an analysis of the former in Plotinus' work that this paper proceeds.

Philological Materialism

Tom Ford (La Trobe University)

In this paper I juxtapose new materialism with another 'new ' theoretical movement, new philology. Despite being strictly contemporary, their histories would seem not to have intersected in any significant way. Names we might associate with one (Karen Barad, Bruno Latour, Jane Bennett, Timothy Morton or Quentin Meillassoux, for example) are rarely linked with those we might associate with the other (Sheldon Pollock, Barbara Cassin, Jerome McGann or Werner Hamacher). Still, thinking through the histories of these two critical currents together can help us see how both register fundamental shifts in the relationship between language and matter in the Anthropocene, although they track these shifts from opposing sides, as it were.

Singularity, Similarity, and Exemplarity in Spinoza

Moira Gatens (University of Sydney)

In the *Ethics*, IV, Preface, Spinoza offers the reader an exemplar of human excellence: the free and wise person. However, Spinoza does not treat human nature as a universal, in which each human being participates, simply by virtue of being human. Rather, each human being is conceived as singular. The exemplar, then, may be considered to function as an enabling fiction in his moral philosophy. In order to aspire to freedom and wisdom, human beings depend upon interconnected networks of similar (but not identical) others. Thriving lives assume thriving communities composed of like-minded and like-embodied individuals. My presentation will explore notions of singularity, similarity, and exemplarity in relation to distinctive human capacities to imagine ourselves otherwise, to self-transform, and to flourish.

Towards a creative ethnology of human sacrifice: the syncretistic methodology of Bataille's and Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical anthropology.

Joel Glazebrook (University of Queensland)

This paper examines the methodologically innovative approaches of Georges Bataille and Ludwig Wittgenstein in the field of philosophical anthropology. Both thinkers developed novel responses to the philosophical study of human culture, applying a syncretistic approach to ethnological descriptions and explanations of a range of phenomena, including human sacrifice.

Adopting Alois Pichler's categorisation of Wittgenstein's philosophical method as syncretistic, I contend that this categorisation can be extended to Bataille's analysis of human sacrifice and, perhaps, his methodology more generally. Both thinkers' approaches demonstrate a creative pivot away from explanations of human sacrifice as purely utilitarian and/or as, to quote Wittgenstein, 'pieces of stupidity'.

Both thinkers draw attention to the lack of mediation that certain anthropological explanations deploy when approaching culturally, temporally and thus ethnologically distinct human practices.

Methodologically, both creatively pivot towards an analysis drawing on a syncretistic attitude and style characterised by poetic, analogical and otherwise generally imaginative ruminations on social behaviour, calling into question reductivist hypotheses that explain human sacrifice as nonsensical or as emerging from simplistic use-value.

Finally, I speculate briefly on extending a syncretistic methodology to philosophy more generally, addressing the problems associated with schematising the creative posture that marks both thinkers' approaches.

Science, Scientism, and Formalisation: Husserl and Klein's contributions to the phenomenology of modern science

Kyle Gleadell (Murdoch University)

Today, there is certainly no shortage of popular scientific paperbacks in print offering comprehensive accounts of the "nature" of the universe, its "meaning", and our place within it. From the cosmological projections and the unified M-theory of Stephen Hawking to the many worlds theory of Sean Carroll, these popular physicists claim to offer grand explanations of the world around us. However, can modern science really offer these kinds of explanations or must it be, regarding its mathematical and empirical principles, necessarily more modest in its accounts? In this paper, I engage with Edmund Husserl and Jacob Klein's phenomenological critique of modern science. Specifically, I look to the formalisation of modern mathematical science, that is, the shift toward symbolic abstraction over 'material' or determinate content, which takes place throughout the 17th century. For it is here that, our understanding and experience of nature is radically reconceived, with formal and universalisable principles informing or even "standing in for" our experience. Ultimately, I argue that, if we overlook the foundations of modern science, and take the formal methods of modern science as defining "nature itself", then we risk both concealing our surrounding world and diminishing the integrity of modern science.

Women's reception of Kant, 1790–1810

Karen Green (University of Melbourne)

This paper looks critically at the early reception of Kant's philosophy in the works of three women, Elise Reimarus (1735–1805), Isabelle de Charrière (1740–1806), and Germaine de Staël (1766–1817). Beginning with Reimarus, it argues that although aware of Kant's philosophy, the political ideas that she developed were closer to the Lockean inspired, natural law theories found in the English women, Catharine Cockburn (1679–1749) and Catharine Macaulay (1731–1791), than to Kant's mature philosophy. Turning to Charrière, the paper suggests that her reading of Kant, while not grounded in a thorough knowledge of his works, nevertheless points to the fact that he does not really escape the problematic aspects of this earlier ethical and political outlook, grounded in natural law. Finally, the readings of Reimarus and Charière's responses to Kant are used to critically evaluate Staël's high estimation of his importance, and to suggest that, had she been more aware of and appreciative of earlier female interpreters of Locke's philosophy, she would have had a greater understanding of Locke's metaphysics of morals, and a less naïve optimism with regard to the capacity of Kant's philosophy to escape the metaphysical difficulties that had faced natural law theories of the Lockean kind.

Against Technology: Toward a Non-Ethics, not of Technology

Benjamin Grieve-Johnson (University of Tasmania)

Heidegger's position on technology and technological thought is well established. What he leaves opaque is how we ought to practically respond to the technological age. *Country Path Conversations* is his most instructive text in this regard: the turn away from metaphysics is a journey marked by a profound sense of gratitude and patience, which he calls "noble mindedness". Rather positioning itself against technology, this comportment amounts to a resting of the will, and so again Heidegger sidesteps normative ethical discourse. Indeed, this is an instructive move: under this light, ethics as a formal discipline must itself be considered a technical mode of thought. An ethics against technology is, in fact, totalised technology.

This leaves us in a profound quandary, and one in which a great deal is at stake for philosophy in the twenty-first century: is it at all possible to remain "noble minded" without also succumbing to quietism? In a world so completely defined by technological problems, such as climate change, an ethics of waiting seems far from an ethics for our time. In light of this, I will defend Heidegger's non-willing thought, and in doing so discuss some ways in which it might be translated into practice.

The legacy of Weimar?: Trump as Schmittean sovereign and Taubesean katechon

Mike Grimshaw (University of Canterbury)

How might we think Trump, think the rise and momentum of Trump, think what Trump symbolizes and expresses drawing on the insights and possibilities offered from radical

theological and philosophical thought? Given the alignment of Trump with conservative theological and philosophical forces and movements, it is both timely and important that radical theological and philosophical voices combine to offer a counter-narrative. Trump is a global problem: the signal of a shift in politics and society that must be resisted not only by bodies but perhaps, most importantly, by minds. Therefore to resist Trump, we must be able to re-think, to critique, to deconstruct Trump: to provide iconoclastic thought against Trump the man, the movement, the problem. This paper reads Trump as a problem of as & for political theology via the letters of Carl Schmitt and Jacob Taubes (2013), viewing Trump as a particular expression of political theology: both the one who makes the exception (that is, decides what he wants as a type of sovereign president) and as both restrainer and one to be restrained.

Nostalgia, Exile and other Reconstructive Tools in a Phenomenological Understanding of the Fractured Self

Mackenzie Groff (University of Auckland)

Nostalgia and exile both interrupt who we are in the everyday and force us to assess our current identity and existential condition and how our overall current state compares to what we have left behind. In both moods, we are standing outside ourselves, forced to face the impossibility of return. When our relation to our familiar places is severed we lose something fundamental to our overall well-being and begin to realize that we become unnerved without roots, without place. When we undergo the mood of nostalgia or exile, while the associated circumstances are bound to vary, the common thread or longing familiar to both is the desire to belong, to be in place, to be at-home once again.

Living with Technology: Human Enhancement or Human Development?

Paul Healy (Swinburne University of Technology)

While "mediation theory" (e.g., Idhe, Verbeek) has been heralded as a great advance in rethinking our relationship to technology, it goes too far in blurring the distinction between the human and the technological, thereby eroding the possibility of establishing a "free relation" to technology. Although the so-called "capability approach" (e.g., Oosterlaken, Coeckelbergh) holds out the promise of correcting for this excess, it threatens to fall prey to a purely instrumentalist conception of our relationship to technology. In response, the present paper seeks to build on the strengths of the capability approach while correcting for its weaknesses by reinforcing its ontological and ethical credentials through appeal to both Heidegger and Aristotle. Thus construed, it is contended, this approach can provide a framework within which we can still productively shape and direct technological advances notwithstanding the extent of our immersion in a technological world.

Thus Spoke The Student from Bologna: In Defence of The Blush and Embarrassment

Michael Hearn (University of Queensland)

This paper focuses on a scene from Robert Antelme's account of a student from Bologna, in which Antelme describes the student's blushing response to being randomly selected by an SS soldier from a bedraggled line of prisoners for a roadside execution. Starting with Jean Paul Sartre's brief account of the blush and embarrassment I will endeavour to establish an understanding of these affects as aporia and confusion, in contrast to their more common association with self-conscious emotions. I will then turn to an essay by Lisa Guenther for her discussion of her own and Giorgio Agamben's reading of Antelme, as well as an analysis provided by Phil Hutchinson questioning Agamben's excision of embarrassment from Antelme's account. I hope that as a result of this two-pronged approach the student from Bologna, specifically his body, might speak for itself. I will argue that to the extent that philosophy deals with the blush and embarrassment it is inclined to ignore what the body is Saying in the heat of the moment, turning instead towards the pink blush of shame. In so doing it speaks to only a privileged few at the expense of the many, thereby diminishing the potential for the blush and embarrassment to open up new philosophical spaces defined by vulnerability.

Time, Space and Distribution

William Hebblewhite (Macquarie University, University of Melbourne)

The distribution of the sensible is the central concept of Jacques Rancière's considerable body of work. The concept underpins the radical theorising about politics and aesthetics that have made Rancière one of the most prominent figures in contemporary continental philosophy. However, there is a lack of work in understanding the inner mechanisms of the distribution of the Sensible. Taking as my starting point Rancière's claim that the "sensible" in the distribution ought to be understood as an aesthetic experience in the Kantian sense this paper attempts to consolidate a formal structure of the distribution by reading the concept alongside Kant's Transcendental Aesthetic. The goal is not to harness Rancière for Kantian critical philosophy but rather to specify the role of time and space within Rancière's work, particularly in the reconfiguring of experiences and activities that make up a range of social, political and aesthetic relations that come under the term the distribution of the sensible.

Dispelling Misconceptions: Inheritance and Difference in Esposito and Derrida

Amy Hickman (Curtin University)

Roberto Esposito's *Immunitas* outlines the possibility for reconceiving of the immunity of community, using immune self-regulation in pregnancy as a model. In doing so, Esposito hopes to refigure immunity such that it allows for community to be engaged and traversed by difference, and to ameliorate the risks of what he refers to as autoimmune crisis. In this paper I follow two criticisms of Esposito's reconception of immunity: that it excludes sexual and generational difference, and that it excludes the possibility of monstrous birth. By reading Esposito's account alongside Jacques Derrida's account of autoimmunity and inheritance, I suggest that Esposito's conception of immunity risks foreclosing the future of community, against his own stated

intentions. I suggest that despite Derrida's deep dislike of community, his work engages difference and inheritance in such a way that it may have much to offer for a renewed thinking of community, even if ultimately it is one in which community cannot be affirmed.

Function and field of "cause(rie)" in/as the language of psychoanalysis

Ben Hjorth (University of Toronto)

Cause toujours. (Devise de la pensée « causaliste ».)

– Lacan, *Écrits*

Lacan's pun, in the Rome Discourse of 1953, on the concept of "cause" sums up much of what is at stake in the debates over knowledge, meaning and agency raised by his own theory of the subject as a fundamentally "linguistic" phenomenon. The parodic "Motto of 'causalist' thought" is one of the epigraphs to the first section of this foundational paper on "The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis," written in the wake of Lacan's resignation under duress earlier that year from the IPA, and the quip's apparent critical assessment of the naïve "causalist" metaphysics of scientism seems directed at those of his former colleagues. But, alongside and beyond this critique, there is a profound speculative (that is, positive) force animating this witticism. It is one which partakes of that mysterious, (side-)splitting quality of the joke or Witz to which Shakespeare, Freud and Hegel attended so closely, convinced that there are Doppelsinnig, contradictory truths to be found in jest. Our "cause," in every sense, is neither more nor less than these causeries: the mere, empty words, the sweet nothings of language that (we) subjects are.

Logos, Analogos, Techne: Planetary Computation and the Technopolitics of Abstraction

Geoffrey Hondroudakis (University of Melbourne)

This paper examines debates surrounding the opposition between the digital and the analogue as a starting point for investigating the modes of reason forming the long history of abstraction. Drawing on recent work by Alexander Galloway, Yuk Hui, and Wendy Chun, among others, I ask how specific or new digitality is, given a long view of practices of discretisation, differentiation, and processual continuity as operations of thought. Given comparisons between logos and digitality, analogos and the analogue, critique of planetary computation becomes coterminous with a critique of instrumental reason, the alliance of logos with techne. I argue that the logic of the digital, conceived broadly, operates as a response to the irreducibility of the real, such that the logos of scission is a project for managing disjunctions of scale through which mediation must operate. Instrumental reason articulates and produces, via technics, a meta-scalar frame that manages difference via a process of discretised abstraction. This produces frames of legibility and illegibility, and governs their relative subordination and superordination in a technopolitics of systematicity. Planetary computation then can be addressed in terms of its production and interrelation of various frames of legibility, a meta-scalar operation of abstraction as power.

A Recognition Theoretic Account of Hermeneutical Injustice

Kazi A S M Nurul Huda (University of Oklahoma)

Characterizing Fricker's version of hermeneutical injustice as structural, Medina argues that it has agential components too. So, intending to have a theoretical framework that addresses both of these dimensions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue that one of the most plausible candidates for such a framework is the recognition theory. But recent conceptualizations of epistemic injustice through the recognition theory – e.g., Congdon and Giladi – are inadequate because they only employ Honneth's recognition theory that doesn't offer a framework for analyzing the structural sources of hermeneutical injustice. To handle this problem, I advocate for a framework that considers Fraser's and Honneth's recognition theory together. Fraser offers an evaluative standard called participatory parity that assesses social discrimination based on the ability of individuals or groups in engaging with others as equal peers. Her framework can address the structural dynamics of hermeneutical injustice. Again, Honneth mentions love, respect, and esteem as the three principles of recognition. His framework can address the issues that withhold or deny social validation necessary for one's self-realization as a knower. Hence, I contend that the virtue of the robust framework that considers Fraser's and Honneth's recognition theory together is that it facilitates a multidimensional hermeneutical injustice analysis.

Towards a phenomenological theory of affect

Emily Hughes (UNSW Sydney)

An increasingly prominent area of research, the philosophy of emotion is defined by a conflict between two seemingly incommensurable positions: are emotions intentional, cognitive states that are directed toward an object and manifest in meaning and significance? Or are they non-intentional, non-cognitive physiological states that manifest in bodily feelings in both humans and non-humans? In this paper I argue that the hierarchical theories of affect put forward by phenomenologists such as Scheler, Bollnow and Heidegger offer a significant intervention into the debate, by destabilizing the cognitive/non-cognitive dichotomy on which it is grounded. Specifically, I argue that their differentiation between fundamental attunements and ordinary, everyday attunements gives us a means through which to account for both cognitive and non-cognitive, intentional and non-intentional emotions. By drawing their various theories together, I aim to demonstrate that a coherent phenomenological theory of affect has much to contribute to the contemporary philosophy of emotion.

Complex Community: Towards a Phenomenology of Language Sharing

Andrew Inkpin (University of Melbourne)

Language is indisputably in some sense a social phenomenon. But in which sense? Philosophical conceptions of language often assume a simple relationship between individual speakers and a language community, with one of these being attributed primacy and used to understand the other. Having briefly identified some problems faced by such conceptions, this paper outlines an alternative phenomenological view of shared language by developing two complementary perspectives on the extended context in which linguistic abilities are enacted. First, it draws on

the late Wittgenstein to characterize the grounding of linguistic community by shared practices. By considering the link between language-games and corresponding sub-communities of language users, I argue that our pragmatic sharing of language is both more fragmented than social holism suggests and more cohesively structured than idiolect-centred approaches imply. Second, the notion of 'institution' found in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty is used to account for the way existing linguistic practices, forms, and meanings are taken up or appropriated by individuals and groups as part of an open process that allows for varying degrees of differentiation. Bringing these two perspectives together, I conclude that, as language users, who we are in community with and how closely we converge with other speakers varies over different areas of language – we belong to communities that are complex in the sense of being fragmented, differentiated and non-uniform.

A poem is a ripple of words on water wind-huffed

Ruth Irwin

Heidegger describes Language as the 'House of Being'. In this simple phrase, he amplifies interpretation from the individual subject to the historical language community. Interpretation is irreducibly subjective, but Heidegger's critique of Descartes "I think, I am" conjoins thinking and Being without closing the interpretive 'gap' between subject and object completely. Humanity's significance is our ability to consciously comprehend Being; distinguished from mere 'existence'. These are some of the ways Heidegger importantly reworks sceptical philosophy, opening up spaces for art and poetics, and the Earth to appear as forms of truth, just as viably as deductive logic. Nature forges the 'ground' for humanity and for other species. Maori philosophy goes a step further. The concepts of whakapapa and whenua bring earth and people into the same conceptual basis. Whenua means both land and womb, whakapapa is our ancestors; the layers and layers of generations of the human and the more than human. I argue that these concepts show how Heidegger remains captured by the modern, and Christian framework of time, Being, and language. Whakapapa sets out our evolution in an ongoing timeframe, and one not curtailed by finitude, neither in terms of personal death nor the Armageddon of civilisation itself.

The normativity of autopoiesis: viruses, suicide and sacrifice

Kalle Jarvinen (Murdoch University)

Maturana and Varela's theory of autopoiesis has found widespread purchase in the post-humanities as a non-anthropocentric way of conceptualising the purportedly self-producing and adaptive capacity that constitutes the essential definition of the living as such. In this paper, I problematise autopoiesis as an already-normative conception of the living oriented towards organic stability. I begin with a brief account of autopoiesis, focusing on Maturana and Varela's critiques of 'Darwinism' and their contention that autopoiesis "implies an ethics we cannot evade." Following this, I argue that the theory of autopoiesis compartmentalises the potentialities of life towards a teleology of homeostatic ends. Autopoiesis demarcates life in such a way that non-homeostatic capacities of life are rendered as pathological or accidental 'errors' of life. To conclude, I discuss three phenomena in relation to autopoiesis: viruses, suicide, and sacrifice. Each of these phenomena challenge us to think life not only in terms of its self-maintaining and

adaptive capacities, but also life's more monstrous, destructive and 'inorganic' capacities. Yet, these inorganic capacities gesture towards the possibility of thinking life—and any supposed 'ethics of life', if such a thing is possible—in less straightforwardly normative terms, and to acknowledge the ethical ambivalence of life's inorganic potentialities.

Anthropocene and the 'Post-Kantian Decider'

Jayson Jimenez (University of Tasmania)

In a talk entitled "Nature isn't real" (2016), Timothy Morton arrived at a logical explanation on why we should drop Nature in the ecological awareness. He says that while Nature emerges as a holistic representation of the entire ecological chain, it ontologically betrays all the things and objects it contains. Morton further claimed that humans who attend at the top of the so-called 'natural' hierarchy now get to decide what is real such as the 'realness' of Nature, or as he beautifully puts it, the state of being the 'post-Kantian Decider'. It is on this decision that Nature has become an ontological human reality driving the Earth into its recent geological time, the Anthropocene. While it is a case in point that Morton sees human as the leading post-Kantian Decider in the Anthropocene, he failed at the very least to cast a conceptual difference between 'Human' and 'Nature' in the post-Kantian sense. This paper reinforces this difference and argues that the Anthropocene is a speculative anomaly hardwired at the core of continental philosophy.

The topopoiesis of mourning: a creative melancholia towards decolonization in Australia

Rachel Joy (University of Melbourne)

This paper begins by documenting how my art practice employs what I call an 'apparatus of topopoiesis'. I understand the word topopoesis - originating from the Greek topos : place and poesis : to make - to mean making from place-based thinking. A thinking inspired by place that is expressed in making can, I argue, enable transformative experiences for those who engage with it. My presentation then examines what Jacques Derrida understands to be the work of mourning and its relationship to 'memory, inheritance and generations.' I employ the 'apparatus of topopoiesis' to reflect on the place and practice of mourning as theorised by Derrida in his collected essays, The *Work of Mourning* (2001) and *Specters of Marx* (2006). The spatio-temporal aspects of melancholy and mourning are then considered, including the ambiguity and the inaccessibility of memory and I explain why I consider my own art practice to be a topopoiesis of melancholy. I conclude by analyzing one of my artworks using the frameworks identified above to argue that art is capable of creating a space of ethical encounter between Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.

Parsing the impasse of sexual difference: Irigaray with and against Heidegger and Lacan

Luara Karlson-Carp (University of Melbourne)

The Lacanian notion of the real as Being's inherent impasse centres around a formulation of sexual difference as radical disjunct. There is no sexual relation as there is no Being; both

represent naive and even fascistic imaginary projections which deny that the political is made possible by disjunct and antagonism. However, for Luce Irigaray this rendering of sexual difference as disjunctive impasse is wrought by the negation of woman. It does not track the real but rather supports an unjust and even deadly phallocentric imaginary. Irigarayan sexual difference is thus formulated as a positive qualitative difference between (at least) Two. Irigaray considers this framing to be profoundly important for enabling the cultivation of life and ethics, including a new vision of 'nature' irreducible to standing reserve. But drawing upon Heidegger to reformulate as presence the very absence and disjunct which for Lacanians makes politics possible seems to be a dangerous game indeed. Is the absence of the sexual rapport necessarily the precondition for the possibility of politics? Or does this formulation itself negate the possibility of a different rapport, one which would transform the frame of the political beyond the phallocentric mandates of a rapacious (sexual) economy? At what cost?

Grace and Theodore de Laguna's Dogmatism and Evolution (or, A tale of modern philosophy, Willard V. Quine and the marginalisation of speculative philosophy)

Joel Katzav (University of Queensland)

Grace and Theodore de Laguna's joint, forgotten 1910 monograph *Dogmatism and Evolution* (DE) is an important text. First, it develops an important, holistic theory of judgement. This theory rejects, and overcomes challenges to, 'the dogmas of rationalism and empiricism', which include the thesis that things' relations are external and that judgements have their meanings, and are evaluated against experience, individually rather than holistically. DE's holistic view of judgement also overcomes challenges to Hegelian and pragmatist responses to the dogmas. Second, DE illuminates the history of modern philosophy. According to DE, this history involves the realisation of the inadequacy of the dogmas of rationalism and empiricism, as well as of drawing a sharp distinction between analytic and synthetic truths. Hegelianism and pragmatism arose out of this realisation, as did DE. Third, DE illuminates analytic philosophy. Willard V. Quine's paper, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism" (TD)–which he presented opposite Grace in 1950–is usually taken to have had its revolutionary impact because of its critique of what Quine termed 'the dogmas of empiricism' and because of its holistic epistemology. But Quine's targets were those already targeted by the Hegelians and the de Lagunas, and his holism was unoriginal. TD's real revolution lay in the narrow, conservative conception of philosophy it fostered and in its participation in the marginalisation of speculative philosophers like the de Lagunas.

Disability and its Deleuzions: Approaching Disability Studies from a Deleuzean Perspective

Ben Kearvell (University of Adelaide)

Drawing on affect theory, notions of the posthuman and new materialism this paper explores what it is like to approach disability studies from the point of view of disablement. While working on a doctoral dissertation using Deleuze's differential ontology to analyse the uses and transformative potential of disability studies, the author has encountered degrees of alienation – points at which disability studies seemed to speak against, rather than for or with him. The object of this paper is not to condemn disability studies but to uncover its affective potential in Spinozist

terms of both sadness and joy.

Foucault and Psychoanalysis: A Missed Encounter?

Mark Kelly (Western Sydney University)

Foucault's remarks concerning psychoanalysis are ambivalent and even prima facie contradictory – at times lauding Freud and Lacan's as anti-humanists, at others severely critical of their imbrication within psychiatric power. The question of Foucault's relationship to psychoanalysis has thus been a vexed one, with scholars reading Foucault as alternately very close to or implacably opposed to psychoanalysis, as well as all points in between. In this paper, I will detail (as much as time allows) how Foucault's position on psychoanalysis varies correlatively with variations in his research program, concluding that he greatly overestimates his distance from psychoanalysis during the 1970s due to a variety of factors, the primary one perhaps being a misunderstanding of Jacques Lacan's thought. I thus conclude that there is no reason for Foucault's thought not to be brought into productive collaboration with psychoanalysis, though this is also not necessary since he is ultimately concerned with different problematics.

Hans Blumenberg on the Rigorism of Truth and the Strangeness of the Past

James Kent (Monash University)

In this paper I will discuss Hans Blumenberg's recently published essay "The Rigorism of Truth", unpublished during his lifetime, and discovered in his Nachlass. This short polemic offers a critique of both Freud and Hannah Arendt for engaging in what he considers a misplaced faith in the liberatory potential of rational truth in moments of historical disaster. The little literature that exists on this essay seems to suggest that this unpublished piece exhibits either all the signs of a late, Romantic capitulation to the 'need' for myth in human life, or the failure to recognise Blumenberg's own faith and debts to the 'mythology' of reason's emancipatory hopes. My argument hinges on the claim that these readings put undue emphasis on the philosophical anthropology component of Blumenberg's work. Instead, I offer a new reading of the essay, in keeping with an alternative reading of his theory of myth. The essay transforms, then, from a polemic regarding the need for myth, into a nuanced description of the ways in which we can overestimate our capacity to overcome it.

Marx's concept of community

Kong Ting (Wuhan University)

"Community" is an important concept and important issue in the study of contemporary social philosophy, political philosophy, legal philosophy and moral philosophy. This essay seeks to contribute to scholarship on the community, to argue for the intrinsic unity of Marxist philosophy and contemporary real life. It is important both theoretically and practically for philosophy to reveal the deep ideological foundation for the community with which Marxist philosophy is deeply concerned. Marx's community concept contains profound humanistic values, that is, the

free development of human beings. The non-freedom of the individual from the kinship community, through the false freedom in the political community, finally realizes the free association of people in the future community. This development trend explains the concept that "the essence of man is the true community of man". What is really important for Marx is what kind of conditions a community provides for the free development of human beings, this is a special feature of Marx's exploration of the community concept . Marx's community concept is not only a theoretical summary of the long process of human history development, but also a cultural inheritance of the community concept existing in the tradition of human civilization.

At the limits of the political: Bartleby's passivity and the impolitical

Norma Lam-Saw (Western Sydney University)

Readings of Herman Melville's "Bartleby, the Scrivener," portrays its contentious political relation. For Deleuze and Agamben, Bartleby's passivity embodies a singular expression of political resistance which 'exhausts' politics or renders it 'inoperable,' towards its very renewal. For Negri however, Bartleby's solitary passivity is inadequate towards the necessarily active and collective constitution of the political. Rancière also argues that "Bartleby" as a type of literature constrains any political potential it embodies to that of its aesthetic form. The passive resistance of "Bartleby" is thus both not political for Negri and Rancière, and that which provokes a resoundingly political resistance for Deleuze and Agamben.

This paper seeks to explore Bartleby's contentious political relation through Roberto Esposito's notion of the impolitical. For Esposito, the impolitical is neither that which opposes the political (apolitical) nor that which is not political (unpolitical), but rather the 'outer limit' of the political. Esposito's thought of the impolitical as that which is both "outside within" the political and constitutive of the political offers a way to approach the opposing readings of Bartleby's relation to politics. This question of Bartleby's political relation converses with the thought of "Bartleby" in the junctures of literature and philosophy, and aesthetics and politics.

Gillian Rose, Georg Lukacs and the Lament over Reification: Sociological or Speculative Critique?

Michael Lazarus (Monash University)

This paper examines the relationship between Marx's Capital, Georg Lukács and Critical Theory through the prism of value-form theory. Marx's theorisation of value understands commodities as expressions of the historical form of social relations defined by capital. Products of human labour become values in capitalist production, defined by the abstract quality of undifferentiated quantities of labour-power, exchangeable through the universal character of the market. The social form of this process, Marx identifies as processing a fetish quality, where humans take on the thing-like character of commodities. The impact of this theorisation on Critical Theory has been considerable, beginning with Lukács' concept of reification. I examine the challenge to Lukács' interpretation of Marx's *Capital* made by Gillian Rose. She draws attention to a misidentification of reification in Marx, suggesting a strong conceptual distinction between commodity-fetishism and reification. In their conceptual flattening, Rose contends that Lukács

and Critical Theory generalised Marx's value-form theory, losing its speculative character. I argue that despite Rose's suggestion remaining unfulfilled, she helps illuminate important tensions between Marx's value theory and Critical Theory.

The Deepfakes to Come: A Turing Cop's Nightmare

Vincent Le (Monash University)

In 1950, Turing proposed to answer the question "can machines think" by staging an "imitation game" where a hidden computer attempts to mislead a human interrogator into believing it is human. While the cybercrime of bots defrauding people by posing as Nigerian princes and lascivious e-girls indicates humans have been losing the Turing test for some time, this paper focuses on "deepfakes," artificial neural nets generating realistic audio-visual simulations of public figures, as a variation on the imitation game. Deepfakes blur the lines between fact and fiction, making it possible for the mere fiction of a nuclear apocalypse to make itself real. Seeing oneself becoming another, doing and saying strange things as if demonically possessed, triggers a disillusionment of our sense of self as human cloning and sinister doppelgängers become a reality that's open-source and free. Along with electronic club music, illicit drugs, movies like *Ex Machina* and the coming sex robots, the primarily pornographic deepfakes are how the aliens invade by hijacking human drives in the pursuit of a machinic desire. Contrary to the popular impression that deepfakes exemplify the post-truth phenomenon of fake news, they mark an anarchic, massively distributed anti-fascist resistance network capable of sabotaging centralized, authoritarian institutions' hegemonic narratives. That the only realistic "solutions" for detecting deepfakes have been to build better machines capable of exposing them ultimately suggests that human judgment is soon to be discarded into the dustbin of history. From now on, only a machine can win the Turing test against another machine.

A Comparative Critique of Foucault and Adorno: Defining a Domain of Authentic Action between Preserving Negativity and Talking Back

Brianni Lee (Harvard University)

This paper compares Foucault's argument that philosophers can use power in the form of knowledge for the sake of practice against Adorno's argument that theory, in which mimetic impulses rather than power are manifested, becomes the only means by which philosophers can participate in the domain of practice. I argue that the comparison between Foucault and Adorno offers an insight that a fear of philosophical theorizing lending itself to radical change in the public sphere should in fact be a necessity in order to prevent action from devolving into pseudo-activity. Adorno's deep skepticism towards action is shown by comparison with Foucault to be far too timid in the sense that the categories of action and theory exist for Adorno in unity, as authentic action is to preserve the possibility of meaningful critique through autonomous thinking conducive to a society marked by less violent relations of domination. The comparative critique of Adorno and Foucault defines a usefully narrowed range in which something could be called an authentic action, which runs between rejecting the notion of philosophy leading social actions through applicable principles and also rejecting the notion that theory is itself radical, creating room for authentic political practice through mediation.

Revisiting Badiou's Beckett: literature as an evental site in *L'immanence des vérités*

Caitlyn Lesiuk (Deakin University)

The relationship between Samuel Beckett's oeuvre and philosophy is a fraught one: there is a well-established tension that emerges in the act of philosophical interpretation, whereby Beckett's texts accomodate a counter-critique of the analytic frameworks applied to them. In the case of Alain Badiou, the encounter with Beckett highlights some ambiguities around how his concept of 'the event' can be thought through in the space of literature. Badiou has written steadily on Beckett throughout the course of his career, however his recently published work, L'immanence des vérités—the final part in the Being and Event trilogy—has yet to be discussed widely in secondary literature, especially in the context of Beckett scholarship. There is a short section dedicated to Beckett in this work, titled Beckett: Découvrement du recouvrement d'un infini, and more broadly, the text relies on examples from poetry and prose to set the scene for the final ontological arguments. Badiou implicitly addresses the most prominent criticisms of his commentary on Beckett, and offers a clear demonstration of the role that Beckett's literature plays in thinking through his central concepts. This paper will develop the implications of this new work on existing debates in Beckett and Badiou scholarship.

Rethinking the 'Problematic' in Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844

Danfei Liu (Wuhan University)

In *For Marx*, Althusser held that the presupposition of Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844 is Feuerbach's anthropological problematic, for it's on the basis of human essence that Marx critiqued capitalism in this work. I argue Althusser only saw Marx studied human essence, but didn't see or turned a blind eye to how Marx redefined human essence, so he didn't recognize that only on the basis of perceptual reality of capitalist industry development can Marx make the claim that human species-essence is human practical activity, nor did he see the historic and social dimension Marx endowed to human essence based on the concept of practical activity, and that Marx's logical structure of "human essence——the alienation of human essence——the return of human essence" in *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844* is in fact formed by abstracting from the realistic human history, which will inevitably led to his oversight of the deep structure and real problematic in Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844*.

Kantian Enlightenment as Parrēsia: Foucault on Kant's reprisal of the Greek problem

Wendyl Luna (UNSW Sydney)

Towards the end of his career, Foucault undertakes an in-depth examination of the Greek problem of parrhesia (i.e. truth-telling). His last two lecture courses at Collège de France (*Government of Self and Others* and *Courage of Truth*), together with his lectures at Grenoble and UC Berkeley ('Parrēsia' and 'Discourse and Truth', respectively), are all devoted to explaining this notion. While it is necessary to unpack how Foucault understands parrhesia and determine how he uses it to confront contemporary politics, in this paper, I am interested in understanding

Kant's place in Foucault's reconstruction of parrhesia's history. Specifically, I would like to investigate how Kant's notion of Aufklärung becomes, for Foucault, a new articulation of the problem of parrhesia. Even though Foucault provides little to no explanation why he considers Kantian Enlightenment as a reprisal of the Greek problem, it would be worthwhile to revisit his 1983 introductory lecture on Kant as well as his 1978 lecture series, *Security, Territory, Population*. I will demonstrate that Kantian Enlightenment does not simply reiterate the Greek problem but also restores the parrhesiastic function of philosophy or 'philosophical truth-telling' by raising anew the problem's twofold site: public (use of reason) and self (e.g. enlightened Prince).

Towards a Hegelian Critique of Photography

Matt Marasco (La Trobe University)

Is the photograph art or objective knowledge about our world? For some theorists, the relation between a painting and its subject is intentional, whereas the photographic relation is causal. This age-old quarrel has never been settled, nor shall I attempt to do so. However, one thinker who has not yet been considered in this discussion is G.W.F. Hegel. At first, he appears to side with the photograph's critics, although, after a careful examination of Hegel's aesthetic theory and the philosophy of photography, we find an unlikely proponent of the photograph. In this paper, I aim to formulate fragments of a Hegelian critique of photography and attempt to demonstrate how the photographic image is compatible with Hegel's philosophy of art.

Thinking Flesh: Nietzsche, Hysteria, and the Gothic Body

Gregory Marks (La Trobe University)

Writing on the nature of conscious life in The Will to Power, Nietzsche remarks "that which is called 'body' and 'flesh' is of such unspeakably greater importance" to the production of thought than the "superfluous" sentiments of consciousness. This conception of the body as the precondition of thought has been emphasised in the commentaries of Lou Salomé and Pierre Klossowski, but has not yet been examined for more than its philosophical import. This paper suggests that, situated among the late nineteenth century's growing medical and literary discourses of the body, Nietzsche's writings speak to a wider interest in the transfiguration of the body as key to the secrets of the mind.

Contemporaneous with Nietzsche's theorisation of the corporeality of thought are the medical discourses of hysteria, which saw the feminine body as a flux of malleable and preconscious signs. Drawing from the works of Janet Beizer and Kelly Hurley I propose that the corporeality of thought in Nietzsche's late philosophy be read as a valorisation of the hysterical body as a model of creative, ecstatic existence. Furthermore, through this framework of hysteria, I argue that Nietzsche takes part in the wider literary conventions of the Gothic, which dramatise hysteria as a process of psychological and bodily transformation. Within the matrix of fin-de-siècle bodily discourses, from Nietzsche's notebooks to those of medical practitioners and Gothic writers, we encounter minds made matter, the terror of bodily transformation, and the collapse of the thinking subject into the flesh which surrounds and composes it.

Heidegger vs. Kant's Concept of Comportment and the notion of Divinity in Virtual Reality

Adrian Marshall (Federation University Australia)

This paper clarifies the differences between Heidegger's and Kant's conceptions of the human being and knowledge by addressing the notion of 'comportment' in the context of virtual reality (VR). By analysing comportment in VR, this paper shows that Heidegger's notions of Being and Dasein are just as relevant and powerful in VR as they are in the physical. This discussion of comportment raises questions regarding the notion of the Transcendental in VR, about what and how instances of divinity or quasi-divinity operate within VR and how this affects the comportment of Dasein in VR. These questions will be explored with reference to both Heidegger's and Kant's ideas surrounding the Transcendental position of 'God' and Dasein, concluding with my own thinking on divinity in the virtual. In the context of this paper, the creator of virtual spaces can be seen as a virtual divinity that transcends the world it operates within and controls, such as the function of a Game Master (GM) in MMORPG's or the role of the programmer or creator in the realm of more generic VR programs. I will ask how this virtual divinity can be addressed within VR and what effect this has on Dasein's virtual comportment.

Making History: Art as a Practice of Creative Solidarity in the Kyōto School

Philip Martin (Macquarie University)

In early 20th century Japan, the rapid influx of European philosophy, legacy of East Asian philosophical Buddhisms, and rapid modernisation influenced the novel philosophies of Nishida Kitarō and his critics, who became known as the Kyōto School. These thinkers are often compared to German Idealism and phenomenology, but these comparisons sometimes miss one of their major insights: philosophies of creativity. Nishida adapted a Buddhist account of temporality to respond to Hegelian historical dialectics and Marxist materialism, focusing on the fundamental role of creativity. In this presentation, I will explore how Nishida, Miki Kiyoshi, and Nishitani Keiji understand the unique historical role of artistic practices. I will examine the general accounts of creativity, technology, imagination, and social history Nishida and Miki develop and how they contrast with existential phenomenology. Nishida and Nishitani further develop these ideas in terms of artistic communication, historical space, and collective social life. I will suggest that their primary concern is how art transforms interpersonal sensibility: art is not simply a form of non-linguistic self-expression, but rather aesthetic practices actively form the sensuous material conditions of history. The existential stakes of art are not merely mutual understanding and enriched social imagination, but practices of solidarity and commitment.

Improvising Aesthetic Experience

Sam McAuliffe (Monash University)

A central, yet rarely acknowledged characteristic of aesthetic experience is the indeterminate nature of its coming-into-presence. That is, a work's material objectivity discloses itself to the individual each time in a unique and perhaps unexpected manner. This paper presents an

understanding of aesthetic experience as a thoroughly improvisatory practice, where subjects interpret and respond to works of art as they encounter them; an idea also found in the later work of Heidegger, and Gadamer. I believe that improvisation as it occurs in the practice of music provides an exemplar that demonstrates this improvisatory character of aesthetic experience. Thus, I argue that the mode of improvisation practiced by musicians in their bringing forth of musical works of art – a practice that is both responsive and creative – provides insight into the responsiveness and creativity required of the subject encountering a work of art. This paper will comprise three main sections: (1) a brief characterisation of improvisation as it occurs in musical practice; (2) a short overview of the work of art understood as an event; (3) an argument that one's experience of the work of art is comparable to the mode of improvisation demonstrated by musicians.

Phenomenology and artificial hearts

Pat McConville (Monash University)

New and emerging biomedical devices radicalise the relationship between worldly, material objects and the feeling, experiencing human subjectivities which make use of them. Rather than scaffolding native ways of understanding and capacities present in human subjectivity, some biomedical devices appear geared to insert themselves into and alter subjectivity itself.

In this talk, I consider the phenomenological approach offered by Maurice Merleau-Ponty as a way of understanding this relationship and the structures of subjectivity.

I briefly review artificial hearts and other cardiac devices in terms of the straightforwardly bioethical issues they pose in terms of Merleau-Ponty's body-subject.

I also introduce some of the more intimately phenomenological complications they may entail, such as explicit biotechnological representation of bodily states which are usually felt, the loss of cardioceptive and metaphorical resources to understand and explain one's emotional state, and the link between the heartbeat and subjective temporality which may be threatened by non-pulsatile heart devices.

Michel Foucault's normativity

John McIntyre (University of Sydney)

Critics have argued that by lacking an explicit normative basis, Foucault makes normative claims to which he is not entitled. I will critique one response which argues that Foucault's works are not only "non-normative", but that we should also be "non-normative" and eschew "normative political theory". This argument relies on stipulating normativity as explicit and consciously intended prescriptions, rules or standards and rejecting any understanding of normativity beyond this as trivial. I argue that this argument is contrary to the thrust of Foucault's project. Whilst Foucault's work generally adopts a descriptive stance, description is never "pure" but is unavoidably underlain by normative commitments. Foucault's historical accounts were directed at making hidden norms explicit, so opening them to problematisation. Foucault's own normative commitments cannot be partitioned off from this problematisation. By being made explicit, they

can open further space for thought, an aim Foucault would support. I reframe the unclear notion of "normativity" in terms of the stances of observer and participant and consider the unavoidable imbrication of these two stances. I suggest that Foucault's reflexivity radicalises scientific modernity's compulsion to continually uncover what lies below its surface. This account undermines criticisms of Foucault whilst acknowledging his normative commitments.

'The Bloody Mystification of a New Planetary Order': *Homo Sacer* and the global democratic spectacle

Daniel McLoughlin (UNSW Sydney)

The introduction to *Homo Sacer* states that the book "was originally conceived as a response to the bloody mystification of a new planetary order." Agamben develops a withering and relatively detailed critique of this planetary order in works written immediately prior to *Homo Sacer*, namely, *The Coming Community* and the essays collected in *Means without End*. This analysis of contemporary politics draws heavily on Guy Debord to argue that the end of the Cold War had seen the development of a new state form characterised by the victory of the market, a rise in authoritarianism and nationalism, and a crisis of the left. This paper shows the way that Agamben's diagnosis of this "global democratic spectacle" shapes the concerns and stakes of the *Homo Sacer* project, including its interest in the state of exception, the critique of totalitarianism, and its analysis of oikonomia. By reading the *Homo Sacer* project in this way, I problematise a number of the major critiques of Agamben's work, including the claim that he ignores capitalism, that he conflates democracy and totalitarianism, and that there is a major break between his early work on sovereignty and his later analysis of government.

Elucidating the Relation between Digital and Eco-Systemic Sustainability

Roman Meinhold (Mahidol University, MUIC)

The digital infrastructure is the lifeblood and platform of daily economic activities. In the last months, the Fridays for Future movement taught political and business leaders, but also the wider public, the lesson of not having taken intergenerational responsibility seriously enough. The purpose of this paper is to elucidate the relationship between two crucial forms of sustainability: digital sustainability and eco-systemic sustainability. The transdisciplinary synthetic approach in this paper views this relationship from different disciplinary vantage points, taking into consideration the ICT infrastructure's stakeholders – in a wider sense – who are affected by tradeoffs and conflicts between digital and eco-systemic sustainability, but who may also have an impact on the ICT infrastructure. In this context three arguments are crucial: 1) Our current and prospected economic system is not only heavily depending on ICT, but unthinkable without digital ICT infrastructure , 2) digital sustainability in the long run is impossible without eco-systemic sustainability, 3) according to climatologists' findings humanity is heading toward a point of no return in terms of climate change that may finally lead to anthropocentric human extinction. Therefore digital sustainability needs to be not only compatible with eco-systemic sustainability, but needs to operate within its framework.

Intelligibility of the eternal, or against teleology: ground for Spinoza's ethics

Josipa Mickova (University of Melbourne)

I present a historically-motivated reconsideration of Spinoza's philosophical project, namely as an ethics that relies on two key components: the existence of an eternal order of things, and the intelligibility of this order. My interpretation foregrounds Spinoza's requirement for that which is eternal as the chief progenitor and regulator of the doctrines in Spinoza's philosophical system, and suggests that neglect of the eternal can produce misleading understanding of Spinoza's doctrines and his project more generally. I focus on Spinoza's notion of adequate ideas---instrumental for the articulation of his ethics---as a particular domain where this neglect has played out in contemporary Spinoza scholarship. I argue that, by neglecting the eternal, contemporary interpretations defuse the ethical potency of Spinoza's adequate ideas, and suggest under-appreciated interpretations of these ideas as a remedy.

Adorno Contra Transcendental Idealism: A Critique of Husserl's Notion of Objectivity

Raphaella Elaine Miranda (University of The East, University of Santo Tomas)

The work examines Theodor Adorno's critique of Edmund Husserl's transcendental idealism. The intended goal of Husserl's phenomenology was to continue the Cartesian project of certitude, and in the process, dismantle the alleged arbitrary division between subject and object. Despite sharing the latter's goal of effecting a radical turn against traditional epistemology, Adorno criticizes Husserl's idealist position. Husserl asserts that objectivity is not inherent in the object, but is reliant to internal structures of consciousness and its relation with the object. By virtue of the transcendent nature of Husserl's eidos, Adorno asserts that this idealism posits an abstract "philosophical First" that reveals nothing concrete about the object. Consequently, instead of being a revolutionary approach, as Husserl would argue, it instead becomes an affirmation of the totalitarian nature of the classical notion of subjectivity. Herein I will demonstrate how the abstract and dominating nature of Husserl's philosophy fashions objectivity as its necessary instrument. Objectivity for Husserl only occurs once the transcendental subject exhausts the object's "horizons of meaning," implying the necessity of the subject's participation. Following this, I will demonstrate Adorno's critique of objectivity in the backdrop of his confrontation of the crisis of philosophy, vis-à-vis his own proposed materialist dialectic method.

Spinoza's freedom

Bahar Mirteymouri (Western Sydney University)

For Spinoza, fear presents as the most destructive emotion that has a huge impact on preventing one from genuinely experiencing freedom and instead establishes personal authority characteristic of despotism. However, through overcoming the inevitable feeling of fear, we understand freedom as something political that articulates itself in the form of public interaction. To explain Spinoza's concept of freedom as something distinct from the causality of nature, we need reconcile the ontological aspect of freedom as intellectual capacity of one's mind and the practical aspect as one's usage of knowledge to achieve tranquillity and safety. In doing so, it is necessary to pose the distinction between two different approach towards nature, namely,

causality and instrumentality. Spinoza's instrumental perspective indicates that one's peace and safety depends on the mutual cooperation of individuals, which eradicates fear.

The perhaps of spirit and being: Dialectical Ontology of rhythm

Latheesh Mohan (Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi)

This is an attempt to understand the concept rhythm in a manner that befits the nature of this concept. Rhythm has been defined mainly as flow and form. It could be argued that these two major definitions of rhythm in a way determine two major ways of philosophical understanding: Dialectic and Ontology. In the Dialectical systems, rhythm is understood as the point-of-balance that enables movement. For example, Gilles Deleuze defines rhythm as the point between two intermilieus that constantly slips away (*A Thousand Plateaus*, p. 346). (non) Doctrines based on fundamental Ontology tend to understand rhythm as form. As an example, Martin Heidegger defines rhythm as 'what is at rest' (*On the Way to Language*, p. 149). This paper attempts to navigate both these traditions (definitions) to show the coupled or hyphanated nature of rhythm.

Rig Veda and Atharva Veda are examined in order to dig out the meaning of the ancient Indian concept Ritam. It is interesting to note that Ritam as a concept has always been represented by coupled god-heads (Mitra-Varuna, Georges Dumezil).

Dialectical Ontology is used here as a transit ph(r)ase that would eventually solve the tension between the singular and the (third) concept.

Organizing Space: Subjectivity and the Surveillant Assemblage

Joeri Mol, Graham Sewell, Laurent Taskin (University of Melbourne, Université Catholique de Louvain)

In this paper, we theorize surveillance as an 'assemblage' of techniques and practices that produces subjectivity. Subjectivity is considered as the effect produced by the surveillant assemblage in terms of the interaction of an 'objective gaze' and a 'subjective gaze', each of which can emanate from within or without the boundaries of an organization. We identify four types of surveillant assemblage—theocratic panopticism, bureaucratic panopticism, autocratic panopticism, and agoracratic panopticism—as particular configurations of these objective/subjective and inside/outside features that produce characteristic social spaces of organizational surveillance. We investigate how changes in the configuration of these features constitutes a deterritorialization of one social space of surveillance and a reterritorialization of another. Ultimately, we examine how agoracratic panopticism has the capacity to challenge our received understanding of the bureaucratic organization as an iron cage (cf. Weber's "stahlhartes Gehäuse"). By supplanting inside gazes with those cast from the outside, the agoracratic panopticism not only undermines the solidarity of peer relationships, but also replaces the rational-legal superior/subordinate relationships with market governance. Last, we consider the implications of all 4 surveillant assemblages on contemporary organizations vis-à-vis the rise of the 'gig' or 'sharing' economy.

Unleashing the untimely one: on the transfiguration of Dionysus following the eternal recurrence

Thomas Moran (Monash University)

The figure of Dionysus is one of the most misunderstood and yet crucial elements within Nietzschean philosophy. The following paper will argue for a transfiguration of Dionysus following Nietzsche's vision of the eternal recurrence in 1881. Drawing on the work of Lou Salomé and Pierre Klossowski I will argue that Nietzsche's vision of the eternal recurrence fundamentally alters his philosophical project by introducing a radically non-teleological understanding of temporality and historicity. This transformation will be explored through a comparative analysis of the Dionysian in Nietzsche's early work, particularly The Birth of Tragedy, with that of its return in his late period particularly Beyond Good and Evil. For the young Nietzsche Dionysus represents a cultural and philosophical ideal from which society has fallen. But, following Nietzschean art historian Aby Warburg, for the late Nietzsche Dionysus is a figure capable of recurring at any point in history and particularly in times of significant historical transformation. Rather than tracking a linear development I seek, following the anti-teleological thought of the recurrence, to chart the uneasy return of Dionysus within Nietzsche's corpus and in doing so to show the potential still latent within the Dionysian impulse today.

Philosophy, Politics, and Cosmopolitanism: Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève

Max Morris (KU Leuven)

A more radical political proposal than has hitherto been ascribed to Leo Strauss can be drawn from his exchange with Alexandre Kojève. As an alternative to Kojève's idea of a world state, Strauss proposes a cosmopolitan society of philosophers. Kojève challenges Strauss with the claim that non-historicist philosophy is incapable of providing a philosophic answer to the question of justice. Unless philosophy abandons the idea that there exists something like eternal justice, there will always be an unpassable chasm separating the finite human philosopher from justice. Many scholars have understood Strauss' response to consist in his zetetic understanding of philosophy, critique of the inhumanity of Kojève's world state and politics of prudence and moderation. These interpretations render Strauss lacking in terms of an adequate response to Kojève's challenge. Conversely, this paper argues that Strauss endorses and provides the resources for the cultivation of the conditions requisite for a truly cosmopolitan society.

A contradiction in Heidegger's art-essay

Michael Mosely (UNSW Sydney)

Critics have generally understood Heidegger's discussion of art in "The Origin of the Work of Art" (from 1936) to designate works of art as sites that create or reflect cultural worlds. Heidegger appears to make this point explicitly when, at the end of the art-essay, he writes that it was through works of art that entities were revealed as ens creatum in the Middle Ages and as manipulable by calculation in the modern period. Throughout the art-essay, however, Heidegger describes works of art as revealing beings in their truth and at the beginning of the art-essay it is

precisely the interpretation of entities as *ens creatum* that is said to be an assault on the thing-being of the thing. There is, therefore, apparently a contradiction within Heidegger's understanding of art. In the 1935 version of this lecture, however, Heidegger indicates that the world that is 'set up' in a work of art can become subject to confusion and devolve into an unworld, defined as a world in which Being does not presence. Thus works of art when they are working do not, for Heidegger, create cultural worlds but provide an encounter with Being itself.

Derrida's Atheism

David Newheiser (Australian Catholic University)

The character of Derrida's atheism is contested. John Caputo argues that, although Derrida did not identify with any religious tradition, he affirmed a "religion without religion" that lacks determinate content. In response, Martin Hägglund claims that Derrida defends a radical atheism antithetical to religion as such. In this paper, I argue that Hägglund's critique of Caputo is correct, but his broader conclusion is wrong. In my view, although Derrida is an atheist of a certain sort, his work undermines the antagonism toward religion that interpreters such as Hägglund attribute to him.

In my reading, Derrida's early work suggests that it is impossible to exclude religion altogether. Just as the play of différance disrupts every attempt at purity, Derrida repeatedly demonstrates (in relation to Hobbes, Camus, and others) that the supposed critics of religion continue to rely on a religious heritage. Drawing on a text I have translated for publication in 2020 – "Christianity and Secularization" (which is also unpublished in French) – I conclude that the label "atheist" fails to capture Derrida's ambivalent relation to religion. In contrast, Derrida's analysis of secularization captures both his critical reservations in relation to religion and his positive appropriation of religious thought and practice.

In catastrophic times: Jean Baudrillard's impossible exchange with science

Brett Nicholls (University of Otago)

Baudrillard is often hastily linked to a postmodern anti-science position. But what is Baudrillard's actual relationship to science? What role does science play in the complexities of his thought? And what might his work contribute, if anything, to our understanding of scientific pronouncements about global warming? This paper sets out to answer these questions and shows that Baudrillard engages with science in three distinct ways. First, he directly challenges scientific realism (as expressed in French structuralist Marxism). Second, scientific concepts function as metaphors for fatal thinking about the world. And third, and most significantly, he takes developments within science as evidence that the world is illusory and uncertain and the catastrophic processes that mark our time are beyond objective control. My claim is that Baudrillard is an anti-realist of sorts, as many have rightly pointed out, but his anti-realism does not lead to a vulgar anti-science position. Instead, his position is best described as a duel with science and scientific knowledge. I will unpack the contours of this duel. Then, in the final analysis, I will explore how this duel might position a Baudrillardian, if such a figure exists, in relation to the science of global warming.

Africa Dwells-with-Others: A Dialogue Between Heidegger's Mitsein and the Sub-Saharan African Concept of Ubuntu

Augustine Obi (University of Melbourne)

Many African scholars have recognised Ubuntu as a robust homogeneous theory of African humanism. Derived from Bantu vernacular and loosely translated as "a person is a person through other people", Ubuntu supplies a platform for an African humanistic argument that justifies the primacy of the community over the individual. Such an understanding of the relationship between the individual and the community spawns an ontological dichotomy and implicitly provides an argument that legitimises totalitarianism. This paper attempts to reconstruct and relaunch Ubuntu with the help of Heidegger's account of Mitsein so that it can gift the discourses of African humanism with a new perspective on which to make sense of the conception of the human person. It explicitly takes up Heidegger's claim that "Dasein in itself is essentially Mitsein; this means that because Dasein's Being is Being-with, its understanding of Being already implies the understanding of Others" SZ: 156-7/120; 124/161. As such, the paper looks to make a compelling case for an understanding of Ubuntu in the context of Mitdasein, one that sees the individual and the community not as an ontological dichotomy or contradictory phenomena sitting side by side, but as equiprimordial existential, with each qualifying the other.

Fin Fatale: We Are To Undo Badiou's Knot

Reto Oechslin (Stànza©)

From an advanced progressive viewpoint, logic's power is limited in Alain Badiou's plan. His meditation on logic exhausts itself on the third level of category theory, were logic resists mathematics to the extremities of categorical algebras. Similarly, ontology may never be pure mathematics, but at the most, mathematical. Mathematics' subordination to logic becomes particularly evident in its pursuit of logic. What we may see as a remarkable weakness of mathematical logic, constantly forces algebraic antitheses to ride the onto-logical undertow to little more than their fatal end. Such intersectional short-comings might well be caused by logic's proper delimitations, in which the progression of mathematical lineages replaces and continues to repel pure mathematics. The zone, where the mathematical adjective meets its nominative counterpart, teases out wild beasts of ontological overkill. Equally, this has considerable implications for Badiou's mathematical-ontological equation, which like a knot, holds too tightly to the forefront of speculative debates. It is here, precisely, where the Badiouian mathematical-ontological remedy is deceived and subsequently becomes defeated. How are we to undo the Badiouian knot? By observing firstly, that Badiou's equation is linked to a bizarre idealisation of logic's amplitude and potency, and secondly, that Badiou's remedial mimicry of logic hints at what truly causes mathematics' subordination to logic. Potentially, this will lead to and reveal the infamous double role that logic plays, which, as a disturbing tribulation, renders logic compatible exclusively with itself and repels every imaginable intersectional blur, including its relations.

The reveal of the Real in hashtag politics

Rosemary Overell (University of Otago)

Recent media studies work pivots off considerations of how 'reality' is (re)presented and circulates in popular culture. Such discussions hinge on a vaunting of the 'signifier' and leverage a politics of the 'reveal' of the 'actual' significance of media texts, as opposed to their ideological meaning, as crucial to critical analysis. In this paper, however, I consider the limitations of media studies through an insistence on a Lacanian approach to mediated representation. I propose that the 'reveal-of-the-real' favoured by contemporary media studies does little to account for the effects and, perhaps more importantly, affects generated by the Lacanian Real. I nuance understanding representations of the 'real' in popular media as more than machinations of 'false consciousness' demanding an illumination of 'things as they really are'. Rather, I propose we must grapple with the Lacanian Real to consider how ideology works. To demonstrate this, I focus on the politicised hashtag ('#'). I suggest that we can read the function of #politics as indicative of the Real; the hashtags index, but are also generative of affects. The 'reveal' here is of the Real – that of anguish and the impossible subject. This paper offers a provocation to contemporary media studies.

A Heideggerian Perspective to Technology

Sushobhona Pal (Shri Shikshayatan College)

This paper will attempt to put forward Heidegger's views on technology. Heidegger wants to save humanity from being absolutely vulnerable to being exploitable material as well as warning us that we are in danger of thinking no alternative relation to the world except as technological. This I think is very relevant now since we are heading towards a futuristic possibility where the power unleashed by technology will be more than what we can ever have over ourselves. The future should not become a struggle for survival for humanity, competing with future Alexas. The Singularity Point is a potential situation with unlimited non-biological power where machines will surpass the human brain. I think a solution to this could be found in the writings of Heidegger. He mentions an enigmatic saving power in his seminal work 'The Question Concerning Technology'. He also talks of 'God'. I think for Heidegger it this God who can save us from this inevitable situation. By the term 'God' Heidegger is emphasizing the marginal practices of love, friendship which will deliver us from becoming dominated by technology. The marginal practices must be made center stage because they have the touch of humanness which machines can never have. It is here where humanity will always score above machines no matter how far machines go beyond their original programming. These marginal practices of love, friendship are the new God that will become a meaningful option and technology would no longer be the key word.

Derrida's Last Supper(s)

Christian Parker (University of Auckland)

In "Passions: An Oblique Offering" Jacques Derrida explores the aporia within one's duty in responding to an invitation out of friendship and politeness. Undergirding this invitation is the allusion to the Last Supper with Derrida standing in as the lamb ready to be sacrificed by his twelve "disciples" presenting at the conference on his work. However, in deconstructive fashion,

this is not the last supper and Derrida is by no means the messiah sent to make things right. His idea of the messianic as an undeconstructible carries this sense of something infinitely unexhausted, never closing in on itself and hence always to come, ungrounded and ungrounding. And yet within Derrida's vision of the messianic lies its own aporetic logic. Once the undeconstructible is cast, it cannot not, to use Derrida's phrase, undo itself. The medium will always betray the message such that there is an inherent messianism that I will explore within Derrida's vision of messianicity. Rather than being an outright rebuke of Derrida's approach, I will argue this speaks to the very theme of contamination running throughout his work; a contamination that can both speak of destinerrance whilst decrying a misreading by one's interlocutors.

Suffering and Transfiguration in Nietzsche: Some Observations

Jamie Parr (Australian Catholic University)

The twin problems of human suffering and the task of its transfiguration lie at the core of Nietzsche's philosophical project. These concerns span the range of Nietzsche's writings, from the artistic activity of the ancient Greek tragedians (*The Birth of Tragedy*), to the experience of the 'goddess' in 'artistic' experiences (*The Joyous Science*) and, perhaps most importantly for him, the contemporary problem of nihilism that supervenes upon the failure of the Christian means for the transfiguration of life's pain (*On the Genealogy of Morals*).

I shall begin with the claim that acts of transfiguration do not abolish the negative in life, rather they 'gild' the negative in some manner, by incorporating it within a 'positive' or 'affirmative' artifact or experience. To demonstrate this activity, I shall present an analysis of Arnold Schoenberg's Verklärte Nacht ('Transfigured Night'; 1899), focusing on the development, and eventual transfiguration, of key motifs within that work. With this analysis in place, I shall then connect these observations, and the definition of transfiguration they support, to selected descriptions of transfiguration in Nietzsche's works, thereby shedding light on that activity as he understands it.

Virtues and values in Australian political culture

Monte Pemberton

Values are familiar as tokens of social and political commitment in government, organisations, and personal relationships. Also familiar is the failure to act in accordance with professed values. Sartre and Henri Lefebvre have both explained, in their respective fashions, why values lack compelling force. Nevertheless, values remain a key feature of modern political life. This was not always the case. Historian Judith Brett has noted that while the Liberal Party of Australia was founded as a party of virtue, within fifty years it had abandoned virtues for values. This departure has been mirrored in public life, to the extent that virtue is commonly derided as 'signaling'. Nevertheless, efforts, such as those of Adrian Pabst, at restoring virtue to the benefit of democracy are emerging. Could democracy be restored with virtue? This paper offers some thought on this matter by way of an explanation for the ascendancy of values, not only with reference to the above writers but also Baudrillard and anthropologist Ghassan Hage. If virtue is to perform a restorative

role for government, government must at least face its inability to govern and overcome its reluctance to be seen to govern.

The Epistemic Invisibility of Rape

Kate Phelan (RMIT University)

Women routinely experience sexual violation. The law as routinely denies this, judging that the act in question belongs to the realm of permissible sexual relations, not the realm of rape. Feminists attribute the law's failure to recognise women's rape to the prevalence of myths about female sexuality. On this account, women's rape may be difficult to know, obscured as it is by myths, but it is ultimately knowable. Rendering it visible, then, is a matter of shattering the myths by which it is obscured. In this paper, I argue that if we take seriously the place and power of social meanings in our lives, then we arrive at the conclusion that women's rape is not merely difficult to know, it is unknowable. I then explain what this means for how we go about making the injustice of women's sexual violation visible.

Resisting Subhabituality: an ethics of time after Deleuze and Foucault

Antonia Pont (Deakin University)

This paper introduces the poetic device of the 'subhabitual', riffing off the Deleuze of Difference and Repetition, to consider the temporal effects of repetitious and economically-approbated digital and other behaviours in light of time's ontological importance for our ability to form intentions for political and communal action. The paper proposes that—despite the 'living present' (the time of habit) being the most basic of Deleuze's three syntheses of time—certain shared and acquired behaviours prevalent in a digitalised and neoliberalising moment may, due to their non-rhythms and interrupting of contracting/contemplation operations, undermine it. A subhabitual time, then, would be a less-than-time and not sufficient for the constituting of any kind of robust subject. For the latter, habit's mode is recognised as crucial; without it the conditions for a self-organising subject, able to form intentionalities, are weakened. Subhabituality, then, as a poetics for an emergent non-time arguably surreptitiously fosters the apolitical.

Taking up Foucault's interest in practices of care-of-the-self, the paper then contrasts these with contemporary digital/economic practices that undermine stabilities offered by habit's time, asking how Foucault's thinking in ethics can provide conditions under which we have the capacity to refuse complying with logics that, after Simon Springer, we might dub neoliberal.

On the Relation of Truth, Democracy and Critique: 'Parrhesia' in Times of Post-Truth and Populism

Martine Prange (Tilburg University)

We live in a 'post-truth' society, in which truth has become irrelevant and the underbelly more

important than the intellect, it is said. In the current paper, I suggest otherwise. The 'crisis of truth' is not happening, because the truth has become irrelevant, but because everyone claims to speak the truth. I therefore advocate new philosophical research into the precise relationship of truth, democracy, and critique. With the latter I make a start in this paper by investigating the question, 'how can we discern "truth-speakers" from those who only claim to speak the truth, or: how can we discern parrhesiastes from populists?'

To answer this question, I make a philosophical analysis based on a close reading of Michel Foucault's last lectures concerning the classical-Greek concept for speaking the truth frankly, 'parrhesia' as a political notion. I argue, first, that populist politicians tend to come in the disguise of courageous truth-speakers, making them very similar to parrhesiastic speakers, but they lack four essential qualities of the parrhesiastic critic, beginning with a real commitment to truth. Second, I argue, by referring to both Kant's essay 'What is Enlightenment?' and Foucault, that the kind of critique democracy needs is the parrhesiastic kind.

Toys-r-Us: Infancy and Art. Agamben's account of infancy, play, temporality and possibilities for art.

Elizabeth Presa (The Victorian College of the Arts, Melbourne University)

"A look at the world of toys shows that children, humanity's little scrap dealers, will play with whatever junk comes their way."

One of the lessons Giorgio Agamben teaches us is that if we are to take seriously claims of the emancipatory nature of philosophy in politics we must take seriously the importance of infancy and the potentiality of experience derived through play. It is perhaps not surprising therefore that there is a "Winnicottian dimension" to Agamben's thought especially given the influence this modest British child psychoanalyst has had on thinkers as diverse as Blanchot, Lacan, Irigaray, Deleuze, Steigler and others writing on childhood.

This paper explores something of Agamben's fascination with infancy, toys and playing which he characterises as a concern with the "crumbness" of crumbs and scraps. Importantly for Agamben, play sets up an oscillation between potentiality and actuality - "that no longer distinguishes between possibility and reality, but turns the possible into life itself." Through play the burden of bureaucratic structures are released into poetic rhythms and forms.

A Precognitive Account of Harmony Grounded in a Phenomenological Reading of Kant's Theory of Perception

John Preston (University of South Florida)

In the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, Kant argues that judgments of taste are reflective judgments about the beauty found in the form of objects. Unlike traditional cognition, Kant characterizes the encounter with beautiful objects as lacking concepts and being accompanied by a feeling of pleasure. The pleasure itself is characterized (see above quote) as a harmonious play of the cognitive faculties. In his paper "The Harmony of the Faculties Revisited" Paul Guyer gives a

comprehensive overview of the various positions found throughout the secondary literature surrounding the nature of this harmony. He splits them into three general groups: precognitive, multicognitive, and metacognitive. In this paper, I will defend a precognitive interpretation by giving a phenomenological account of perception in Kant. In particular, I will show how the application of the categories found in the schematism can be read as an account of how sensations are synthesized into appearances. Once we understand the step by step process of how sensations are transformed into experience, we can give an account for where in that process the pleasure found in the perception of the form of beautiful objects takes place.

Heidegger, fundamental ontology and metontology: possibilities for phenomenomethodology across philosophy and the human sciences.

John Quay (University of Melbourne)

An ever-growing number of published books and papers attests to more than one understanding of phenomenology spread across philosophy and the human sciences. Recent debates concerning the application of phenomenology in the human sciences highlight the need to position these various approaches methodologically. In this paper Heidegger's discussions of fundamental ontology and metontology are employed to suggest a way in which phenomenological philosophy may work in support of phenomenological human science, offering a broader notion of phenomenomethodology. The central methodological concept is "phenomenon." Heidegger argued that "it is extremely important for a further understanding of the concept of phenomenon to see how what is named in both meanings of *phainomenon* ('phenomenon' as self-showing and 'phenomenon' as semblance) are structurally connected" (BT, 1996, p. 25). This methodological connection between both meanings of phenomenon signposts the need for phenomenological philosophy in the conduct of phenomenological human science. The phenomenological reduction is required in order to access the phenomenon as self-showing and achieve a fundamental ontology. Fundamental ontology can in turn, as metontology, contribute to phenomenological human science through rebuilding or "restruction" of the phenomenon as semblance.

Rudolf Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom in the light of his later work

Thomas Redwood (University of Melbourne)

The question of Rudolf Steiner's place in the academy remains deeply unresolved. Despite the influence Steiner continues to have in the realms of education, health and agriculture, the esoteric nature of his later teachings prompts predictable levels of unease and contempt among many. There is still, it would seem, far too much about Steiner which sets him apart from academic scholarship.

This paper will contend that the esoteric nature of Rudolf Steiner's work (which he elaborated as Anthroposophy) can in part be understood as a necessary strategy taken by the philosopher to fully elaborate his philosophical principles. Steiner was indeed a historically significant philosopher of the Idealist tradition. He developed Idealism into a phenomenology. But such was the difference of his core epistemological principle that he felt required to work outside of the academy.

This paper will attempt to draw back those esoteric aspects of Steiner's later work by contextualising them in reference to his seminal text "The Philosophy of Freedom". Often considered the only of Steiner's core texts to warrant serious academic attention, "The Philosophy of Freedom" describes the spiritual theory of knowledge that the author would address more directly in his later life.

Framing the Predictive Mind: Why We Should Think Again About Dreyfus

Jack Reynolds, Cathy Legg (Deakin University)

This paper poses an old problem to contemporary proponents of predictive coding/processing: the frame problem. We argue that some of the challenges that the frame problem presented for AI remain relevant for predictive coding theorists. For our purposes, we Hubert Dreyfus's treatment of the frame problem in his influential critique of AI and computationalism. In short, for Dreyfus the embodied nature of cognition, skill acquisition, and habits, is important to guarding against informational overload, or a regress of rules and heuristics, and we argue there are important lessons in this for predictive coding, which is a contemporary version of computationalism about the mind.

Spinoza, Locke and the Influence Industry

Janice Richardson (Monash University)

As the collective Tactical Tech have illustrated, there are globally over 300 companies which, like Cambridge Analytica, aim to sell their services to political parties. I examine what views about our self/other relations needed to be in place to result in our diminished view of democracy.

The cornerstone of the neo-liberal view of oneself as an enterprise, is predicated upon an initial move by Locke, in which he views ideas as something that we work upon to appropriate as an internal, private possession. To illustrate what is at stake in Locke's view of selfhood, I compare his position with that of Spinoza. In particular, I consider their possible responses to the question: what happens when we interact with other bodies and other minds (ideas)? I draw on Balibar's reading of Locke on selfhood and show how – from different perspectives – the way that Balibar draws together the self of the Essay and the Two Treatises dovetails with that of Janet Coleman, a philosopher of the history of political thought. Working within different frameworks and from dissimilar starting positions, both link the image of ourselves from the Essay with the self that appropriates property through work in the Two Treatises.

Proposing an account of the 'dominant (English-speaking) online social imaginary'

Louise Richardson-Self (University of Tasmania)

The purpose of this paper is to explore whether it is coherent to propose that a dominant (English-speaking) online social imaginary governs our social interactions on the internet today. Looking through such a lens we may ask, what are its features? Who are online social spaces for?

Where do our standards of permissible and forbidden behaviour come from? And how can/does this change over time?

Neoliberalism and Nihilism: Theses on Wendy Brown's Analysis

Scott Robinson (Monash University)

In this paper I propose some theses concerning the nihilism of neoliberalism. Channelling two thinkers of modern nihilism – Friedrich Nietzsche and Walter Benjamin – through the contemporary political thought of Wendy Brown, this paper lays out the psychology, politics and historical barbs of nihilism. Key to modernity's nihilistic psyche is resentment, and through resentment moralism, which I interpret following Brown as a form of anti-politics. I list key features of neoliberalism for Brown, including the exercise of instrumental rationality in support of traditional morality emptied of its content or principles. I then turn to Benjamin's nihilism and offer an imagistic argument for the power of destructive nihilism in releasing revolutionary energy and emancipating experience from the trap of resentment. This paper aims to first outline then suggest additions and amendments to Wendy Brown's recent and past work on neoliberalism, Nietzsche and nihilism. I move through different contexts (climate change, Australian non-politics) to supplement Brown's account.

From the sublime to the beautiful soul: the conservatism of Deleuze's late neo-Kantianism

Jon Roffe (Deakin University)

The significance of Kant's transcendental idealism for Deleuze's philosophy is by now well-known. Not as widely appreciated is the fact that this significance runs throughout the whole of his work, well beyond the 'traditional' writings of the 1960s.

This paper traces the ongoing role of two assessments of a central part of Kant's system on Deleuze's view - the doctrine of the faculties - first advanced in the 1956 'The Idea of Genesis in Kant's Aesthetics'. There and elsewhere, Deleuze shows the weakness of the version of the doctrine presented in the first Critique. He contrasts to this the way that the faculties interact in aesthetic judgments of the sublime, and takes this as paradigmatic in his own construction of a theory of faculties in Difference and Repetition.

What is surprising, however, is Deleuze's gradual return to the former account in his later works, notably *Foucault* (1986) and *What is Philosophy?* (1991). My goal in this paper will thus be to demonstrate this reversion, and to indicate why - on the basis of Deleuze's own earlier critical account of Kant - it introduces a profound weakness and conservatism into the later works.

Nietzsche's quietest heresy: On the origin of causality in prayer

Lachlan Ross (Deakin University, University of Melbourne)

This paper studies Nietzsche's idea, presented in Human, all too Human, that nature is without causality, and that causality is introduced into nature via human intervention, and in particular, the act of prayer. The paper will also look at Nietzsche's discussion of causality in Beyond Good and Evil, where he makes a similar statement, that we introduce causality into nature mythologically.

How to be a self: A Nietzschean guide

David Emmanuel Rowe (Deakin University)

Sitting on the psychologist's couch, one wishes to a) find out who they are and b) find out who they ought to be. It can be confusing determining who one is independent of outside forces; it can also be confusing working out who one should be in a world with so many options. Nietzsche as psychologist provides answers to both. On the one hand, he determines what the self is—call this the descriptive self—on the other hand he determines what the self should be—call this the normative self. Distinguishing these two modes is helpful in untangling much of what Nietzsche says about the self. I will argue that there are some benefits in broadening our initial Western, Cartesian, substance conception of the self to include other conceptions, such as those of Hinduism and Buddhism. Such a broadening of one's perspective allows a deeper understanding of the Nietzschean self, where the descriptive self is a collection of various drives and the normative self is one with a liberated will, is free from bad conscience and has a 'great health'. As every good psychologist ought to do, I will provide some Nietzschean insights on how to be a (normative) self.

Spinoza and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition

Jon Rubin (Melbourne School of Continental Philosophy)

The Maker's Knowledge tradition stretches from the Ancient Greeks via Bacon, Vico and Kant, to the Bourbaki collective and Foucault's analysis of power/knowledge. But we can start with Hobbes' claim that we know the truths of geometry and political science because we construct them (physically in the drawing of a Euclidean proof and materially in the making of the social contract, or a diagram of power), whereas the physical sciences remain merely 'probable'. We can begin to thematically extend this tradition via Anscombe's reading of Aquinas on the difference between practical and speculative knowledge. Finally we see it in contemporary philosophies of experimental science which focus on the making of specific effects as objects of knowledge.

This paper has two aims: 1) to expand on this thumbnail sketch of the tradition 2) to examine whether Spinoza should be seen as part of it and if so, how this can inform out understanding of what Spinoza thought knowledge and truth were. It will take as a starting point Guéroult's comment that Hobbes' maker's knowledge understanding of geometry is a key source for Spinoza's own theory of conceptual, formal, and genetic truth in the Emmendation of the Intellect.

Cruel Optimism and Neuro-Liberalism in the Work of Catherine Malabou

Francis Russell (Curtin University)

One of the under-theorised strengths of Catherine Malabou's *What Should We Do With Our Brain?* is the critical stance it takes regarding the overlapping discourses of managerialism, neuroscience, and mental illness. For many contemporary sufferers of mental illness, the neuroscientific framing of mental illness as a brain disease produces both the greatest optimism regarding future health, and the greatest threat of further alienation and subjugation under neoliberal governance.

Nevertheless, this talk asks: does Malabou's critique of neoliberal flexibility run the risk of embracing a neuro-liberalism, in which an optimism regarding plasticity, individual liberty, and compromise between the humanities and life-sciences obscures the political limitations of neuroscience as a site for political-philosophy? Furthermore, can we really locate in the brain a progressive politics, especially in the context of debates around mental illness, when so many groups and individuals are resistant to understanding themselves as their brains? What are the risks of encouraging people to understand themselves as brains, even if the notion of brain deployed has been liberated from neoliberal notions of flexibility and self-management? To pursue these questions, this talk looks to the potential critical power and cruel optimism performed by Malabou's writing on mental illness and the brain.

The Poverty of Logicism

Desmond Sander (University of Tasmania)

(I think that) The Logicism of Russell, Ryle and Lewis, promoted for decades by a number of Professional Philosophers in Australia (and elsewhere), supports the ongoing divide between (what we call) Continental Philosophy and (what I call) Anglo-Australian-American Philosophy.

Today I will present the (maybe) new way of thinking which (I think) is needed to erase that fruitless divide and which (I'm confident) will do so. This is only the thinking of a minor Mathematician about WHAT IS and about WHAT HAPPENS, inspired in different ways by Husserl, Wittgenstein and Gödel.

The imaginaries of success and failure of tech entrepreneurs in Colombia: a critical approach

Sebastian Santisteban (Ceipa Business School)

This article proposes a theoretical discussion between social imaginaries theory and lacanian theory as a hermeneutical framework to critically study the discourse of tech entrepreneurs in Colombia. The lacanian four discourses are discussed in relation to the concept of hypermodernity developed by Lipovetsky and the concept of fantasy in social imaginaries theory. Based on the notions of success and failure, the testimonies of several tech entrepreneurs are

interpreted from the proposed theoretical framework. It's concluded that entrepreneurs understand the capitalist discourse not as an ideological construct but as part of an empirical reality that can´t be contested. In this sense, further investigation becomes highly valuable and necessary regarding the real chances and intentions that tech entrepreneurs have of transforming contemporary societies and building a "so called" better world.

Rhetoric and Justice in the Sophist Gorgias

Jacinta Sassine (Western Sydney University)

The Sophists, as early teachers of the law, are uniquely positioned to offer insight into the continuous – and highly relevant – relation between rhetoric and justice. Turning to Gorgias in particular, his unique approach to oratory exemplifies a high point in the cultural movement of the Sophists. This paper will offer a reading of Gorgias' works as presenting an insightful theory of justice, as based on his understanding of rhetoric. Supplemented by his caricature within Plato's Gorgias dialogue and the work of his fellow Sophist, Protagoras, Gorgias' texts strongly suggest that it is rhetoric – and not reason – that gives the possibility of justice. When framed within the democratic polis of Athens, this paper will further illuminate the connection Gorgias' rhetorical model of justice has with the tension between the practical operation and idealistic trajectory of the law.

Discourses on love: Terrence Malick's 'Weightless' trilogy

Robert Sinnerbrink (Macquarie University)

Terrence Malick's recent films expand the idea of 'film as philosophy' so as to encompass religious experience and theological themes. Malick's 'weightless' trilogy -- To the Wonder (2012), Knight of Cups (2015), and Song to Song (2017) -- explores the possibilities, limits, and confusions attending different conceptions of love (drawing on Plato and Kierkegaard), from the romantic and ethical to the spiritual and religious. In their 'weightless', aesthetic (sensuous) pursuits, Malick's attenuated characters (or 'figures') fail to achieve what Kierkegaard called the task of becoming a self: integrating finite and infinite dimensions of one's subjectivity, via recognition of one's dependence on an infinite being, failing which one remains in a state of existential despair. This experiment in Kierkegaardian edification, however, raises intriguing questions. Can the religious be expressed through cinema? Are the late Malick films updated Platonic myths, Kierkegaardian edifying or upbuilding discourses, aimed at a sceptical world captivated by the aesthetic possibilities of cinema but less receptive to its ethical, let alone religious, possibilities? These questions drive Malick's 'religious turn' towards an experimental, Christian-existentialist poetics of revelatory cinematic expression. They also remain open questions in evaluating the aesthetic success of Malick's work as instances of cinematic ethics.

Walter Charleton and the Cartesian Passions

Maks Sipowicz (Monash University)

In his Natural History of the Passions (1674) Walter Charleton develops a theory of the passions with the idea to "research after the most powerfull Remedies against their Excesses" (NHP epistle p.6). In writing this, Charleton reveals himself to have a similar aim in his study to that of Descartes in his Passions of the Soul (1649). The similarities between the two texts do not end here. In this paper I argue that Charleton appropriated many aspects of the Cartesian theory of the passions to his own understanding of metaphysics. In so doing, Charleton presents a unique interpretation of the Passions and provides an opportunity to show the extent to which the Cartesian text was influential in early modern England.

Albert Camus: Solidarity and Literature

Brock Smith (Murdoch University)

In this paper, I explore the connection between ideas of community and the role of the writer in the works and thought of Albert Camus (1913-1960). I argue that community, and the relationship between an individual and their society, is a central theme that runs throughout his narrative fiction. The relation between an individual character and the community of which they are a part is questioned and problematized, in different ways, in all of Camus' major novels. This idea of 'community' is re-created and re-imagined in every encounter a reader has with his stories, the characters in his stories, and the questions and responses such encounters provoke. In this sense, literature, for Camus, is a form of social practice that may highlight our human connectedness, as well as its inherent tensions and problems. Camus does not view writing as solely an expression of his individual experiences, miseries, or hopes; rather, writing for him is a commitment to express the shared experiences of his community. Hence, the notion of community (or the individual–social dynamic of how one relates to those around them) is, I argue, a central theme running through his oeuvre.

Bergson and Heidegger on Time, World and Enaction

Marilyn Stendera (Deakin University)

Comparisons of Bergson and Heidegger often focus on the way that each sets up an opposition between ordinary and originary time, between a 'flattened', quantitative conceptualisation of temporal succession and a richer, more primordial temporality. This paper will seek to build upon and also move beyond this initial point of intersection, suggesting that there are further, as yet underexplored resonances between the two accounts of time, ones that come to light in drawing out what each tells us about the temporal structures of practice, habit and skill. It will be argued, moreover, that these resonances are of particular relevance to contemporary discourses about dialogues between phenomenology, the philosophy of life and enactivism.

Truth and Method of Heidegger's Analytic of Dasein

Blake Stove

The stated aim of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time is to interrogate the question of being or the meaning of being in general. However, this work is incomplete, and the published work is for the most part devoted to the Analytic of Dasein. The purpose of the Analytic is to determine the categories of factical life or the essential structures constitutive of human experience and understanding. According to Heidegger's phenomenological method the categories or essential structures delineated in the Analytic are ahistorical and universally valid. However, these methodological commitments appear to be in tension with the substantive claims in the Analytic concerning the situatedness of Dasein (the philosophising subject) and the role of language in structuring human understanding. These substantive claims would seem to imply the impossibility of Dasein transcending its own situatedness to identify universal structures and the permanent possibility of reinterpretation or 'destruction' of the categories, thereby undermining their status as universally valid and ahistorical. In this talk I will give a brief overview of the apparent tension in Being and Time and then outline the argumentative strategies deployed by Cristina Lafont, Richard Rorty, and Jacques Derrida in challenging the viability of Heidegger's Analytic. Finally, I will defend Heidegger's transcendental ambitions in Being and Time by arguing that the attempts by these critics to collapse the ontological difference with reference to historical or linguistic difference do not touch upon the horizon on which the Analytic is operative. It follows from this that the fact of historical or linguistic difference is insufficient to undermine Heidegger's methodological commitments and that these critics are inattentive to the ways in which the horizon of the Analytic that they seek to undermine is nevertheless presupposed in their own critique.

Republican autonomy

Ezechiel Thibaud (Lingnan University)

Neo-republicans have provided a strong definition of freedom as the absence of domination, and this definition contrasts with the liberal emphasis on liberty as non-interference. But neo-republicans seem to lack a clear and distinct definition of autonomy. This paper is an attempt to determine what constitutes autonomy from a classic and a neo-republican perspective.

My first goal is to understand the structure and characteristics of what constitutes a republican form of autonomy, and what distinguishes it from other perspectives (liberal, hierarchical, relational, etc.). In order to do so, I go over the classic republican tradition, from Aristotle to Rousseau, and analyze the main components of this kind of autonomy and its link with citizenship and civic virtue. My second goal is to question Philipp Pettit's affirmation that freedom as non-domination has been the core idea of republicanism since Cicero. I argue that a closer look at the republican tradition provides a different understanding of freedom: Classic republican liberty seems to be closer to a form of civic autonomy than to the absence of domination. From this observation, I raise the question of what the implications of this claim would mean for republicanism today.

A prolegomena to ethical theory in the philosophical anthropology of Edith Stein

William Tullius (The Carnegie Academy and Campbellsville University)

One is not ordinarily inclined to think of Edith Stein as a moral philosopher, as Stein never writes a work explicitly on ethics. Nonetheless, this paper insists that Stein was consistently attentive to the ethical dimension, which she explicitly studies in certain important passages of her works. Moreover, I argue that Stein's moments of attention paid to ethical insight are not merely passing concerns either, nor are they mere digressions her main interests. Rather, Stein was consistently concerned with the (ethical) question: what is the nature of human being and how does one live humanly? To that extent, then, Stein is in a thematic way concerned with morality and provides it with a philosophical analysis throughout her work. My contention, then, is that Edith Stein is genuinely a moral philosopher, although her philosophy of the moral life has largely gone hidden from view. This paper will develop some basic elements of Stein's moral philosophy visible in her engagement with philosophical anthropology, some reasons why the ethical dimension of her work has gone with little systematic notice in the literature, and concludes with some remarks on the potential of a Steinian ethical theory for the problems of moral philosophy today.

"Sex slash death is in my head": on virginal, suicidal, redemptive, repetitive, sadistic and fantasmatic responses to the problematic of the drive

Kirk Turner (Deakin University)

One of the key tenets of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory is the human inability to integrate and symbolize death and sexuality. Complicating any 'natural' relation to the world, language is implicated in giving them meaning but at the same time a hole is created in our representations. Each are related to the drive which is seen to impact our lives in many ways. How is the drive inflected when we encounter the pain of existence, Weltschmerz, however? Philipp Mainländer, the German poet and philosopher, paradoxically combined in his systemic pessimism the advocacy of both free love and asexual purity; a Christ-like redemption removed from overarching religious frameworks; and suicide as the apotheosis of the end of suffering and embracement of nothingness, i.e. the philosophical enshrinement of non-being. His entire outlook could be seen as responding to the above concerns in an idiosyncratic way which culminated in his own hanging at the age of 34. We will turn to his main work, on philosophy as salvation, to see how sex and death factor into his metaphysics and epistemology. Ultimately, his case will be examined as presenting one (negative) solution to Lacan's thesis that there is 'no Other of the Other.'

Can we be friends? Ecological grief and decentering relationships of the Anthropocene.

Fiona Utley (University of New England)

Any ethical approach to our ecological crisis has now acquired an additional dimension – the anticipatory grief of humans as we encounter the escalating evidence of environmental loss. That we have a moral relationship with this, our lifeworld, is reflected in our anticipatory grief, yet, understanding how this is so, and responding appropriately confronts us. Complicating our grief,

and creating difficulties in mobilising an effective response, is the confrontation that our loss is at our own hand; through our appropriation of the essential otherness of nature to the ends of our own subject position. Ralph Acampora has argued for a phenomenological approach to animal ethics that is grounded in shared bodied experiences or symphysis. In this paper, I extend his ontological approach to corporeal compassion in two ways. Firstly, I extend this relationality as symphysis to the lifeworld more generally, that is, to all living ecologies and geographies, recognising this essential and characteristic interrelatedness of ecologies as the context of our moral relationality. In this, I emphasise how we are both loved (incorporated into) and rejected (alienated) by this lifeworld. Secondly, I explore the significance of Derrida's configuration of friendship and anti-friendship to understanding this as a moral relationality.

Aristoteles latinus and the discourse of early modern philosophy

Chris van Rompaey

While Descartes and Spinoza in particular sought to distance themselves from the views of the schoolmen they could not so easily dispense with the rhetorical structures and technical vocabulary of scholasticism which held sway right up until the time of Kant. It would, however, be a mistake to regard the schoolmen as the inventors of this language. Its seeming indestructibility derives, as I hope to show in this paper, not even from the twelfth- and thirteenth-century translators of the Aristotelian corpus but from a tradition of rendering Greek philosophical texts into Latin that extends back to Classical times. The result was a form of expression so securely established that it could only be overcome by abandoning Latin itself as the language of philosophical discourse. The paper will trace the historical developments that led to the evolution of scholastic Latin, focusing particularly on the translations of Aristotle and Porphyry by Boethius, and of the Pseudo-Dionysius by Scotus Eriugena, as well as on later translations by Michael of Venice, Robert Grosseteste and William of Moerbeke, among others. It will also look briefly at Early Modern attempts to ovecome limitations of scholastic Latin by redefining its terminology and disrupting its rhetorical conventions through such devices as the '*mos geometricus*'. While close attention will be given to specific terms and translation strategies, no knowledge of Latin will be assumed.

Is a Climate Disaster Inevitable? Process Philosophy as a Call to Action

Glen Veitch (University of Newcastle)

Far more prescient than the distinction between continental and analytic schools of philosophy for the concerns of the 21st century is the distinction between substance and process metaphysics. Substance metaphysics, alongside classical science, understands the observer to be separate from the system being observed, which unfolds somewhat deterministically. For the substantialists, the world has often been considered a closed system. Concerning Earth's ongoing climate emergency, the philosophical lens of substance has allowed the idea of inevitability to enter the discourse. As a result of this, the combination of substance metaphysics and classical science has dissuaded much needed environmental action.

Process metaphysics and contemporary science, on the contrary, deny this possibility by locating

the human observer within the system, as an integral, interdependent constituent of the whole. Fundamental to process ontologies is the possibility of authentic novelty — as change, not substance, is primary.

Process metaphysics denies any notion of inevitability and thus all change, including climate change, is fundamentally alterable. This paper proposes that adopting a novel philosophical lens concerning the climate emergency — the lens of process metaphysics — would better place humanity as central within the system undergoing radical change and thus imply not only responsibility but hope.

Academic and Master: Prestige against Style

Valery Vinogradovs (Crossing Avenues)

According to a dominant cultural norm, philosophers are identified with academics. When this belief is embraced, an academic is looked up at as an ultimate model for doing philosophy, a special persona bearing philosophical knowledge. This opinion, causing a great deal of confusion now, can and should be challenged.

Firstly, this paper looks at the seminal work of Ian Hunter (2001, 2006, 2008), who is interested in the motives and aspirations of one's philosophical activity. In a Niezschean vein, he attacks the likes of Kant and Badiou, "theorists", who exploit academic influence to advance their worldview, their truth; and to induce students into it. In contrast, Hunter seeks to restore civil philosophy, gravitating toward the understanding of institutional practice as a means to social order. While the idea of pursuing civil philosophy is certainly merited, one issue with Hunter's position is that he can't resist carving a professional out of a philosopher.

To confront an instinct to institutionalise philosophical life, we must concede that, anthropologically, Philosopher is a creative idea capable of being actualised in an army of forms. With this in mind, the paper moves on to consider a group of wandering teachers -- Confucius, Aristotle, Diderot -- so as to elucidate the notion of a master. It will be argued that freedom of activity and diversity of experience fostered by a commitment to indeterminate philosophical existence are conducive to the cultivation of a philosophical lifestyle, an elusive and strong alternative to the prestigious profession available to a few.

To have done with emancipation? Latour and ecology

Christopher Watkin (Monash University)

The West finds its identity in what Lyotard and others have called the “emancipation narrative” of modernity: the idea that we understand our present-day selves and societies as having been, and as in the process of being, liberated from manifold oppressions. Some today hold this emancipation narrative to be dangerous illusion that must be rejected; prominent among those who argue in this way is Bruno Latour. Over recent years Latour has repeatedly taken aim at what he sees to be the dangerous ideology of emancipation as non-attachment, which he holds to be in large measure to blame for our failure to respond adequately to the current ecological crisis.

This paper will examine Latour's ecologically-motivated critique of the modern emancipation narrative, situating his own solution to the crisis of emancipation as part of a Western tradition he fails to acknowledge. It will argue that, despite the impression one might be left with after reading Latour, the salient question is not "is emancipation compatible with ecological concern?", but rather "what sort of emancipation is called forth by the current ecological crisis?" The paper concludes by reflecting on how our answer to this question can revolutionise the way we think about freedom.

On Caterino's and Hansen's *Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism*

Bryce Weber (Monash University)

This paper provides a reconstruction and critical evaluation of Brian Caterino's and Phillip Hansen's recently published *Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism* (Toronto: U of Toronto Press, 2019). Caterino and Hansen argue that critical theory in its current form has largely turned into a social liberal reformist project that has learned to accommodate itself to the existing neoliberal status quo; and that this accommodation has left it with little capacity to provide either an adequate diagnosis of – or conception of an alternative to – neoliberalism and its associated pathological manifestations. In response Caterino and Hansen develop an innovative critical theory of democracy that brings together Macpherson's theory of developmental democracy, Habermas's account of rights and popular sovereignty, and an account of communicative action that provides the basis for a conceptualisation of democracy as a form of life based on the intuitions of mutual accountability nascent in everyday lifeworld communicative action.

This paper explains the rationale for constructing their theory of democracy in the way they do but argues that their treatments of both Macpherson's critique of neoliberalism and of communicative action are less dialectically dynamic – and hence have less critical purchase – than they might be.

Beyond Narrative and Sameness: Reinterpreting Selfhood

James Wells (Monash University)

Generally, when philosophers talk about selves, some mention is made of John Locke's chapter on personal identity in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. In the analytic tradition, the argument for 'selfhood as sameness' has formed the basis for a great number of theories that describe the identity of persons in purely numerical terms. However, over the last few decades a growing number of theorists, most notably Alasdair MacIntyre, have argued that numerical individuation is not enough to describe the richness of human life. These sentiments have also been echoed in the continental tradition, with the work of Paul Ricoeur in particular offering a similar basis for rich or substantive accounts of selves: the teleological structure of a narrative. But is narrative theory any better than numerical individuation? Inspired by recent criticisms of both made by Elisabeth Camp, I argue that selfhood is best understood in terms of character. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate how insights from analytic and continental philosophy contribute to

grounding and defending this position, and that, at least when it comes to personal identity, Locke's thought is actually far closer to 20th European philosophy.

Aspiration, Habit, and Embodied Agency in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception

Justin White (Brigham Young University)

In *Aspiration*, Agnes Callard examines the phenomenon of aspiration, the process by which one acquires values and becomes a certain kind of person. Aspiring to become a certain type of person involves more than wanting to act in certain ways. We want to come to see the world in a certain way and to develop the dispositions, attributes, and skills that allow us to seamlessly and effectively respond to situations. The skilled athlete or musician, for example, has developed the muscle memory and the perceptual equivalent to naturally see what a situation requires and to respond well, whether playing a Rachmaninoff concerto or returning a tennis volley.

I use Merleau-Ponty's *Phenomenology of Perception* to flesh out the process of becoming, through which aspired-to values, skills, and characteristics become part of one's embodied being-in-the-world. Although some rightly focus on Merleau-Ponty's efforts to avoid over-intellectualizing skillful action, without appreciating his distinction between habitual actions and human (or personal) acts, we overlook an important aspect of robust human agency—the way "a human act becomes dormant and is continued absent-mindedly as a reflex" (90). Merleau-Ponty's account of habit and its relation to personal acts offers a rich and phenomenologically sensitive picture of aspiration.

Corplication: Deleuze's Expressionism

Dominic Williams (Federation University)

Expressionism, or the metaphysics of expression, in Deleuze's writing unfolds by means of his encounter with Leibniz and Spinoza. In *Expressionism in Philosophy: Spinoza* (1990) he credits both thinkers for reinventing the concept of expression in philosophy and illustrates that implication, explication, complication, and inherence constitute the aspects of expression. Deleuze consistently uses notions or concepts of expression throughout his oeuvre, carefully constructing the concepts and attributing them to their inventors or their own logics. In this paper I address the quiddative contributors to a specifically Deleuzian expressionism. A single word phrase, plication, in *A Thousand Plateaus* (1987) with Guattari, begins to crystalize Deleuzian expressionism within his concepts of immanence and becoming. While Deleuze suggests expressionism consists in the entire argumentative force of Spinoza and Leibniz, it does not find the same absolute consistency in Deleuze's own work. Rather, Deleuze is, I propose, a subsistent expressionist insofar as expressionism constitutes an eventality that subtends all of his work without the aetiological certainty that it will perform consistently in each event. In this paper I explore Deleuze's identification, creation, and use of plication in the development his own expressionism. I conclude by individuating Deleuze's expressionism as corplication.

Feeling Language: Merleau-Ponty and Creative Expressions

George Wood (University of Melbourne)

Certain creative usages of language—poetic descriptions, for instance—strike us as 'apt'; they give us the sense that something has been articulated beautifully by a particular form of words. This can occur when we describe an independently existing 'thing' (e.g. a chair) in a beautiful way, but we also experience this aesthetic response in the case of 'constitutive' expressions (e.g. poetic descriptions of feelings). Constitutive expressions are ones where the 'thing' we express would not be accessible without the new expression; the expression and the 'thing' described come into being together, so to speak. I suggest that Maurice Merleau-Ponty's view of language as an embodied activity offers a useful account for these circular-seeming linguistic achievements. With particular reference to his descriptions of language usage as a form of behaviour that involves our being oriented in a landscape, I suggest how the view of creative expression that emerges can help to explicate the relationship between feeling and meaning that we find in 'apt' descriptions.

Kant, Meillassoux and the Neglected Alternative: Why Speculative Realist Critiques of Kant Fail.

Michael Yuen (Australian National University)

Speculative Realists widely accept Meillassoux's (2008) critique of Kant. Does the Kantian picture have resources to respond?

Meillassoux develops an account on which we know that things in themselves might become completely different from appearances: that they might become 'chaotic'. He argues that we can agree with Kant that the mind's principles govern appearances and hence aren't chaotic; but Kant is unwarranted in denying that things in themselves could become chaotic because he denies knowledge of things in themselves. After all, claiming that things in themselves couldn't become chaotic is claiming something about them.

I argue that Meillassoux's critique resembles a long-standing objection: the neglected alternative. Initially referring to space and time, we can state it generally: Kant argues that certain principles (like space and time) reflect the mind's properties and not properties of things in themselves; but he can't rule out a third alternative: that they are properties of both. Similarly, Meillassoux critique turns on claiming that the mind's properties and things in themselves might be completely different. If my analysis is convincing, then the Kantian picture has resources to refute or at least dramatically blunt Meillassoux's critique through standard replies to neglected alternative objections.

The I-Alien relation and Vertical givenness in Husserl's Generative Phenomenology

Hora Zabarjadi Sar (The University of Queensland)

Husserl believes that the alien in its original inaccessibility does not belong to my field of possibilities as original givenness. Thus, the alien shows itself in its non-originality. Or as Levinas puts it, the Other is absent in present, that is the phenomenality of alien experience is

characterized as non-phenomenality. It seems that when Levinas speaks about Non-phenomenality he considered those modes of givenness that are not presentational and perceptual.

Steinbock suggests that for Husserl the only mode of givenness which is also dominated by the phenomenological ways of experiencing is the mode of presentation. Therefore the alien is experienced as accessible in a manner of inaccessibility in the mode of presentation. Moving beyond the limits of presentational givenness, Steinbock (2017) asserts that we need to reflect within the very experiencing itself, that is being open to all kinds of given in the distinctive manners that they give themselves. drawing upon 'Generative Phenomenology' this paper tries to propose, unlike givenness as presentation, the givenness of the other person as 'revelation' belongs to the vertical realm, which has its own structure of evidence, its own modality and modalization and does not yield perceptual sense and judicative meaning by objectifying acts.

Beauvoirian Housewife and the Ambiguities of Time

Sameema Zahra (University of Queensland)

Time plays an important role in Beauvoir's understanding of freedom. Human actions are future-directed; however that does not cancel out the present. Herein lies Beauvoir's distinction between the mythical future and the living-finite future. The authentic subject has access to a future that is open, but at the same time living and finite, a future to which the oppressed person or an inauthentic subject does not have access. I argue that according to Beauvoir woman's oppression lies in her absence from the living time. I will discuss with the help of Beauvoir's example of the housewife and how her world tends trap her in purely repetitive time, cyclical activity without any relation to an open future. I want to point out three things: first how patriarchy tries to cut the housewife's world from living time. Second, patriarchy fails at this attempt because woman is an ambiguous being and if she is denied direct access to the future and transcendence she will turn her immanence into a project. Finally, Beauvoir demonstrates that these so-called feminine actions also show the ambiguity of our existence, the dyad of transcendence and immanence of our activity, the dependence on nature that masculinity wants to deny.

Conference Schedule

ASCP 2019 Program – Tuesday 3 December

Postgraduate/Early Career Researcher Day: 356 North Wing, Arts West

12.30-1.00	**Registration**
1.00-2.00	**Grant adventures: The ups and downs of the grant process** Knox Peden Christopher Mayes Louise Richardson-Self
2.00-3.00	**Afternoon Tea**
3.00-4.00	**Philosophy pathways: What you can do and how you can get there** Jack Reynolds Ross Barham Rachel Joy
4.00-4.30	**Break**
4.30-5.30	**Publishing without perishing: Publication tips** Marguerite La Caze Andrew Inkpin Daniel Lopez

Public Lecture B117 Glyn Davies Building/Melbourne School of Design (free, no registrations required)

7.30-8.30	**Martin Hägglund** This Life: Why Mortality Makes Us Free

ASCP 2019 Program – Wednesday 4 December

8.15-8.45	**Registration**									
8.45-10.30	**Welcome to Country:** Aunty Di **Conference Opening:** Prof. Margaret Cameron (Head of School, SHAPS, University of Melbourne) **Keynote - Rebecca Comay, 'Deadlines (literally)'** **(Public Lecture Theatre, Old Arts)**									
10.30-11.00	**Morning Tea (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									
Room	156	161	253	256	261	353	354	356	454	461
11.00-12.30	**Thematic Panel: Religion and the Limits of Reason in the Early and Late Heidegger** **Ingo Farin** *Transcending Reason* **Martin Leckey** *The Gods in the Fourfold: The Divine in Later Heidegger*	**Joeri Mol** *Organizing Space: Subjectivity and the Surveillant Assemblage* **Vincent Le** *The Deepfakes to Come: A Turing Cop's Nightmare*	**John Cleary** *What is an Idea? Plato's theory of participation and mathematics* **Sean Bowden** *Expressive action and destratification in A Thousand Plateaus*	**Anya Daly** *The Declaration of Interdependence! – Feminism, grounding and enactivism* **Kazi A S M Nurul Huda** *A Recognition Theoretic Account of Hermeneutical Injustice*	**Janice Richardson** *Spinoza, Locke, and the Influence Industry* **Jon Rubin** *Spinoza and the Maker's Knowledge Tradition*	**Dimitris Apostolopoulos** *Merleau-Ponty's Hegelian Transformation of Intentionality* **Andrew Inkpin** *Complex Community: Towards a Phenomenology of Language Sharing*	**Leonard D'Cruz** *The Methodological Significance of Foucault's Normative Commitments* **Mark Kelly** *Foucault and Psychoanalysis: A Missed Encounter?*	**Book Panel: Marguerite La Caze, *Ethical Restoration after Communal Violence: The Grieving and the Unrepentant*** **Marguerite La Caze** **Simone Drichel** **Peter Banki**	**George Duke** *Political Romanticism* **Mike Grimshaw** *The legacy of Weimar?: Trump as Schmittean sovereign and Taubesean katechon*	
12.30-2.00	**Lunch (own arrangements)**									
2.00-3.30	**Thematic Panel: Nietzsche's Politics** **Nicola Chadwick** *On Conway's Account of Nihilism and Decadence in Nietzsche* **Paul Patton** *Democracy and Cultural Elites in Nietzsche* **Vanessa Lemm** *Nietzsche's Great Politics of the Event*	**Bertille De Vlieger** *Emotional knowledge and its value in society* **Ezechiel Thibaud** *Republican autonomy* **Joel Katzav** *Grace and Theodore de Laguna's Dogmatism and Evolution (or, A tale of modern philosophy, Willard V. Quine and the marginalisation of speculative philosophy)*	**Christian Parker** *Derrida's Last Supper(s)* **James Kent** *Hans Blumenberg on the Rigorism of Truth and the Strangeness of the Past* **Joel Glazebrook** *Towards a creative ethnology of human sacrifice: the syncretistic methodology of Bataille's and Wittgenstein's approach to philosophical anthropology*	**Brett Nicholls** *In catastrophic times: Jean Baudrillard's impossible exchange with science* **Glen Veitch** *Is a Climate Disaster Inevitable? Process Philosophy as a Call to Action* **Larelle Bossi** *Gelassenheit in the waterscape: thinking about our experience of coastal and aquatic environments.*	**Ben Hjorth** *Function and field of "cause(rie)" in/as the language of psychoanalysis* **Kirk Turner** *"Sex slash death is in my head": on virginal, suicidal, redemptive, repetitive, sadistic and fantasmatic responses to the problematic of the drive* **Rosemary Overell** *The reveal of the Real in hashtag politics*	**Christopher Lloyd Buckle** *Aristotle and Heidegger on Pathos and Being* **Maks Sipowicz** *Walter Charleton and the Cartesian Passions* **Emily Hughes** *Towards a phenomenological theory of affect*	**Brendan Duncan** *Non-conceptual thinking in Badiou and Mādhyamaka: negativity and the communicability of non-conceptual truth* **Caitlyn Lesiuk** *Revisiting Badiou's Beckett: literature as an evental site in* L'immanence des vérités **Reto Oechslin** *Fin Fatale: We Are To Undo Badiou's Knot*	**Book Panel: Jon Roffe, ed., *The Works of Gilles Deleuze*** **Joe Hughes** **Vincent Le** **Sanja Mladenovic**	**Geoffrey Hondroudakis** *Logos, Analogos, Techne: Planetary Computation and the Technopolitics of Abstraction* **Roman Meinhold** *Elucidating the Relation between Digital and Eco-Systemic Sustainability* **Vanessa Arapko** *Post-capitalist realism*	
3.30-4.00	**Afternoon tea (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									
4.00-5.30	**Thematic Panel: Techne, Polis, and Differenz in Heidegger** **Richard Colledge** *Kant's 'Ontological Difference': Heidegger on Kant on Being as Position* **Miguel Vatter** *Martin Buber and Martin Heidegger on Dasein, Polis, and Anarchy* **Dimitris Vardoulakis** *Heidegger's Ruse of Techne and Materialism*	**Jacinta Sassine** *Rhetoric and Justice in the Sophist Gorgias* **Tristan Bradshaw and Ben Brown** *Critical antiquities and theorizing modern crises*	**Brianni Lee** *A Comparative Critique of Foucault and Adorno: Defining a Domain of Authentic Action between Preserving Negativity and Talking Back* **Wendyl Luna** *Kantian Enlightenment as Parrêsia: Foucault on Kant's reprisal of the Greek problem* **William Hebblewhite** *Time, Space and Distribution*	**Christopher Boerdam** *What's Left for Žižek?* **Jayson Jimenez** *Anthropocene and the 'Post-Kantian Decider'* **Tom Ford** *Philological Materialism*	**Dipen Barua** *Becoming, Being, and Existence in Indian Thoughts: A Conceptual Analysis from the Perspective of Buddhist Term Bhava* **Thomas Redwood** *Rudolf Steiner's Philosophy of Freedom in the light of his later work*	**Jamie Parr** *Suffering and Transfiguration in Nietzsche: Some Observations* **Venessa Ercole** *Nietzsche's Dionysian Care of Self and the Musical Secret* **David Rowe** *How to be a self: A Nietzschean guide*	**Caterina Diotto** *Walter Benjamin: the romantic form of the novel and the sense of life* **Edward Bradford** *Terminology in the "Epistemo-Critical Foreword" to Walter Benjamin's* Origin of the German Trauerspiel **Scott Robinson** *Neoliberalism and Nihilism: Theses on Wendy Brown's Analysis*	**Book Panel: Martin Hägglund, *This Life: Secular Faith and Spiritual Freedom*** **Conall Cash** **Mathew Abbott**	**Ella Bryning** *To Admit the Pleasure-giving Muse: Poetry and Thought in the work of Iris Murdoch and Judith Balso* **Robyn Adler** *The Other Side of Transparency-art and the opaque subject of psychoanalysis*	
5:30-7.30	**ASCP Reception (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									

Unless otherwise stated, all rooms are in Arts West, North Wing (Building 148a)

ASCP 2019 Program – Thursday 5 December

8:30-9:00	**Registration**									
9.00-10.30	**Keynote - Samantha Matherne, 'Recapturing Edith Landmann-Kalischer's Theory of Aesthetic Value' (Public Lecture Theatre, Old Arts)**									
10.30-11.00	**Morning Tea (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									
Room	156	161	253	256	261	353	354	356	454	461
11.00-12.30	**Thematic Panel: Nature, Culture, Social Critique** **Loughlin Gleeson** *'Critical Naturalism' in Hegel and Marx* **Simon Lumsden** *Hegel's Theory of Culture* **Cat Moir** *The Nature of Hegel's Social and Political Thought* **Heikki Ikäheimo** *The Self-creating Life-form of persons and its limits*	**Artem Bourov** *Making sense of self-awareness: phenomenology beyond qualitative feel* **James Wells** *Beyond Narrative and Sameness: Reinterpreting Selfhood* **Mackenzie Groff** *Nostalgia, Exile and other Reconstructive Tools in a Phenomenological Understanding of the Fractured Self*	**Bahar Mirteymouri** *Spinoza's Freedom* **Josipa Mickova** *Intelligibility of the eternal, or against teleology: ground for Spinoza's ethics* **Moira Gatens** *Singularity, Similarity, and Exemplarity in Spinoza*	**Alex Cain** *Arendt's contradictions: Eichmann in Jerusalem in the perspective of Arendt's practice of Socratic dialogue* **Daniel Brennan** *Wonder and the private sphere in Iris Marion Young and Hannah Arendt* **Michelle Boulous-Walker** *The Work of Laughter is the Work of Philosophy: Diotima and Arendt*	**Brock Smith** *Albert Camus: Solidarity and Literature* **Jennifer Ang** *Living existentially* **Ross Barham** *The Meaning of Life – what the science says*	**Conall Cash** *Truth and Intersubjectivity in Merleau-Ponty's Political Thought* **George Wood** *Feeling Language: Merleau-Ponty and Creative Expressions* **Pat McConville** *Phenomenology and Artificial Hearts*	**Amy Hickman** *Dispelling Misconceptions: Inheritance and Difference in Esposito and Derrida* **Stephen Abblitt** *"School-sick": Autobiography, autoimmunity and the education of Jacques Derrida* **David Newheiser** *Derrida's Atheism*	**Book Panel: Jessica Whyte, *The Morals of the Market: Human Rights and the Rise of Neoliberalism*** **Jessica Whyte** **Justin Clemens** **Janice Richardson** **Miguel Vatter** **Charles Barbour**	**Kong Ting** *Marx's Concept of Community* **Daniel Badenhorst** *They cannot descend: Frantz Fanon and Jean-Paul Sartre on 'the zone of non-being'* **Rachel Joy** *The topopoiesis of mourning: a creative melancholia towards decolonization in Australia.*	
12.30-2.00	**Lunch (own arrangements)**									
	1.00-2.00 Equity & Diversity Plenary – Karen Jones, Augustine Obi, Rachel Joy (room 353)									
2.00-3.30	**Thematic Panel: French Husserl Revisited** **Knox Peden** *On Jean Cavaillès* **Bryan Cooke** *On Michel Henry*	**Steven Churchill** *"It is stupid to confuse the moral and the aesthetic": Sartre's moralising in his amoral imaginary* **William Tullius** *A prolegomena to ethical theory in the philosophical anthropology of Edith Stein*	**Nathan Bell** *Refugees: Towards a new Concept of the Political* **Robert Boncardo** *The Last Days of the Dialectic: Alain Badiou's Political Engagements, 1969-1981*	**Kate Phelan** *The Epistemic Invisibility of Rape* **Luara Karlson-Carp** *Parsing the impasse of sexual difference: Irigaray with and against Heidegger and Lacan*	**Grace Campbell** *Intentionally sought self-destruction and the work of Sabina Spielrein* **Jane Connell** *Nietzsche, Freud and the Baroness von Moser: A reading of the 'compulsion(s) to repeat*	**Karen Green** *Women's reception of Kant, 1790-1810* **Mathew Abbott** *The Vulnerability of Self-Conscious Animals: On Hegel's Amphibians and Géricault's Horses*	**Antonia Pont** *Resisting Subhabituality: an ethics of time after Deleuze and Foucault* **John McIntyre** *Michel Foucault's normativity*	**Book Panel: Raymond Ruyer, *The Genesis of Living Forms*** **Jon Roffe** **Maurizio Melloni** **Nicholas Barthel de Weydenthal**	**Martine Prange** *On the Relation of Truth, Democracy, and Critique: 'Parrhesia' in Times of Post-Truth and Populism* **Monte Pemberton** *Virtues and values in Australian political culture*	**Latheesh Mohan** *The perhaps of spirit and being: Dialectical Ontology of rhythm* **Michael Fagenblat and Antonio Vargas** *Who Cares: Heidegger on "the truth of a people"*
3.30-4.00	**Afternoon tea (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									
4.00-5.30	**Thematic Panel: Reconsidering Lukács** **Daniel Lopez** *The Finite and the Infinite in Lukács and Hegel* **Cat Moir** *The Nature of Social Ontology in Lukács and Bloch* **Julien Potter** *The Road from Syracuse: Lukács and Heidegger on the Titanic Individual*	**Chris van Rompaey** *Aristoteles latinus and the discourse of early modern philosophy* **Tim Flanagan** *Plotinus' Orientalism and the Language Within Language*	**Elizabeth Presa** *Toys-r-Us: Infancy and Art. Agamben's account of infancy, play, temporality and possibilities for art.* **Michael Hearn** *Thus Spoke The Student from Bologna: In Defence of The Blush and Embarrassment* **Daniel Mcloughlin** *'The Bloody Mystification of a New Planetary Order': Homo Sacer and the global democratic spectacle*	**Francis Russell** *Cruel Optimism and Neuro-Liberalism in the Work of Catherine Malabou* **Louise Richardson-Self** *Proposing an account of the 'dominant (English-speaking) online social imaginary'* **Sebastian Santisteban** *The imaginaries of success and failure of tech entrepreneurs in Colombia: a critical approach*	**Adrian Marshall** *Heidegger vs. Kant's Concept of Comportment and the notion of Divinity in Virtual Reality* **Blake Stove** *Truth and Method of Heidegger's Analytic of Dasein* **Sushobhona Pal** *A Heideggerian Perspective to Technology*	**Sameema Zahra** *Beauvoirian Housewife and the Ambiguities of Time* **Paul Atkinson** *The Simultaneity of Flows: Bergson, Wildon Carr and the Relativity of Life* **Marilyn Stendera** *Bergson and Heidegger on Time, World and Enaction*	**Ben Kearvell** *Disability and its Deleuzions: Approaching Disability Studies from a Deleuzean Perspective* **Corey Cribb** *The Inertia of Cinema's 'Real Movement': Resonances of Blanchot's 'Animating Paradox' in Deleuze's Cinema 2* **Dominic Williams** *Corplication: Deleuze's Expressionism*	**Book Panel: Alison Ross, *Revolution and History in Walter Benjamin*** **Alison Ross** **Justin Clemens** **Knox Peden** **Jessica Whyte**	**Michael Lazarus** *Gillian Rose, Georg Lukács and the Lament over Reification: Sociological or Speculative Critique?* **Raphaella Elaine Miranda** *Adorno Contra Transcendental Idealism: A Critique of Husserl's Notion of Objectivity* **William Bennett** *Does Sovereignty Transgress History?*	
7:00	**Conference Dinner – Naughtons Hotel**									

Unless otherwise stated, all rooms are in Arts West, North Wing (Building 148a)

ASCP 2019 Program – Friday 6 December

8:30-9:00	**Registration**									
9.00-10.30	**Keynote - Martin Hägglund, 'Secular Faith and Political Emancipation' (Public Lecture Theatre, Old Arts)**									
10.30-11.00	**Morning Tea (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									
Room	156	161	253	256	261	353	354	356	454	461
11.00-12.30	**Thematic Panel: Hegel and French Philosophy** **Mario Wenning and Jingwen Zheng** Amour proper *and* Annerkenung: *Rousseau's Challenge to Hegel Reconsidered* **Gregory S. Moss** *Towards an Ecstatic Phenomenology of the* Ἓν καὶ Πᾶν	**Desmond Sander** *The Poverty of Logicism* **Valery Vinogradovs** *Academic and Master: Prestige against Style*	**Jon Roffe** *From the sublime to the beautiful soul: the conservatism of Deleuze's late neo-Kantianism* **Michael Yuen** *Kant, Meillassoux and the Neglected Alternative: Why Speculative Realist critiques of Kant fail*	**Robert Sinnerbrink** *Discourses on love: Terrence Malick's 'Weightless' trilogy* **Michael Mosely** *A contradiction in Heidegger's art-essay*	**Christopher Watkin** *To have done with emancipation? Latour and ecology* **Fiona Utley** *Can we be friends? Ecological grief and decentering relationships of the Anthropocene*	**Jack Reynolds and Cathy Legg** *Framing the Predictive Mind: Why We Should Think Again About Dreyfus* **Justin White** *Aspiration, Habit, and Embodied Agency in Merleau-Ponty's Phenomenology of Perception*	**Augustine Obi** *Africa Dwells-With-Others: A Dialogue between Heidegger's* Mitsein *and the Sub-Saharan African Concept of* Ubuntu **John Quay** *Heidegger, fundamental ontology and metontology: possibilities for phenomenomethodology across philosophy and the human sciences.*	**Book Panel: Oliver Feltham, *Destroy and Liberate: Political Action on the Basis of Hume*** **Oliver Feltham** **Justin Clemens** **Dimitris Vardoulakis** **Charles Barbour** **Jessica Whyte** **Paul Patton**	**Bryce Weber** *On Caterino's and Hansen's 'Critical Theory, Democracy, and the Challenge of Neoliberalism'* **Peter Banki** *Neo-Liberalism and the Haunting Right to Bildung*	**Benjamin Grieve-Johnson** *Against Technology: Toward a Non-Ethics, not of Technology* **Paul Healy** *Living with Technology: Human Enhancement or Human Development?*
12.30-2.00	**Lunch (own arrangements)**									
	1.00-2.00 ASCP Annual General Meeting (room 353)									
2.00-3.30	**Thematic Panel: Institution of Intellectual Community: Blanchot, Kojève and Badiou at *Critique*** **Joe Hughes** Critique*: Foundations, The Review Form, and the early essays of Maurice Blanchot* **Elliot Patsoura** *Kojève, Bataille, and the Crossroads of* Critique **Jessica Marian** *The Badiou Crisis at* Critique	**John Preston** *A Precognitive Account of Harmony Grounded in a Phenomenological Reading of Kant's Theory of Perception* **Konstantin Azarov** *A Kantian approach to local color* **Sherah Bloor** *Anatomy of the Invisible: Kant's diagnosis of religious disorders and the poetic cure*	**Gregory Marks** *Thinking Flesh: Nietzsche, Hysteria, and the Gothic Body* **Lachlan Ross** *Nietzsche's quietest heresy: On the origin of causality in prayer* **Thomas Moran** *Unleashing the untimely one: on the transfiguration of Dionysus following the eternal recurrence*	**Mahmood Fazal** **Matt Marasco** *Towards a Hegelian Critique of Photography* **Philip Martin** *Making History: Art as a Practice of Creative Solidarity in the Kyōto School* **Sam McAuliffe** *Improvising Aesthetic Experience*	**Thematic Panel: Crossing Avenues: Free Spirit in the Prison World** **Valery Vinogradovs**	**Danfei Liu** *Rethinking the 'Problematic' in Economic and Philosophical Manuscript of 1844* **David Blencowe** *Totality is modern and it is material: historical materialism beyond the social* **Yanhui Bai** *Historical Materialism in the Perspective of Marx's Political Philosophy materialism beyond the social*	**Christopher Edwards** *The Transcendental Origin of Nature: Husserl and Richard Avenarius* **Hora Zabarjadi Sar** *The I-Alien relation and Vertical givenness in Husserl's Generative Phenomenology* **Kyle Gleadell** *Science, Scientism, and Formalisation: Husserl and Klein's contributions to the phenomenology of modern science*	**Book Panel: Marguerite La Caze and Magdalena Zolkos, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives on Vladimir Jankélévitch: On What Cannot Be Touched*** **Marguerite La Caze** **Magdalena Zolkos** **Paul Atkinson** **Peter Banki** **Tim Flanagan**	**Max Morris** *Philosophy, Politics, and Cosmopolit-anism: Leo Strauss and Alexandre Kojève* **Norma Lam-saw** *At the limits of the political: Bartleby's passivity and the impolitical* **Valentin Cartillier** *Whose dead god: the Althusserian spectres of Hegel*	
3.30-4.00	**Afternoon tea (Arts Hall, Old Arts)**									
4.00-5.30	**Plenary: The Work of Justin Clemens (Public Lecture Theatre, Old Arts)**									

Unless otherwise stated, all rooms are in Arts West, North Wing (Building 148a)